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Summary
Introduction: Avalanche incidents commonly take place in adverse 
environmental conditions, and the expected survival time of avalanche 
victims is short. These situations require an immediate rescue response, 
which may pose a serious challenge to the safety of both rescuers and 
avalanche victims. Historically, the Norwegian rescue service has 
experienced few serious accidents, but undesirable incidents where 
rescuers are dangerously exposed in avalanche runout zones seem more 
frequent. Risk management in the avalanche rescue service is 
multifaceted, influenced by its multi-organizational structure. 
Individuals acting in this socio-technical rescue system are easily caught 
between two imperatives: saving lives and staying alive. The aim of risk 
management is to maintain equilibrium in rescue commitment. This 
project analysed whether the Norwegian avalanche rescue system is 
correctly balanced to withstand the extra load of common risk 
influencing factors in rescue operations.
Aim: The fundamental aim of this thesis was to contribute to new 
knowledge on factors that are important for risk management and 
performance in the Norwegian avalanche rescue service.
Methods: Mixed methods research was applied to answer the specific 
research questions. This implied multiple research activities in a 
combination of quantitative and qualitative methodologies. Study 
number 1 was a retrospective study to characterize Norwegian avalanche 
incidents and rescue response (Paper I). A comprehensive study 
comprising avalanche rescue statistics, cross-case analysis, factor 
analysis and risk modelling was conducted to gain insight into avalanche 
rescue performance (Paper II). In a phenomenological study to explore 
the concept of overcommitment, nine air ambulance crews from five 
bases took part in focus group interviews (Papers III and IV). Lastly, a 
systemic safety analysis was conducted in two separate seminars, 
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supported by the insight of six experts in Norwegian avalanche rescue 
operations (Paper V). The thesis itself is a cross-paper synthesis of 
results. 
Results: The studies returned results which contribute to justified beliefs 
about patient and rescuer safety in Norwegian avalanche rescue 
operations. 
Paper I: Norwegian avalanche rescue statistics from the periods 1996-
2017 and 2010-2017 showed that 75% of avalanche victims were already 
located and recovered by the time organized rescue units arrived at the 
accident site. Of the remaining 25% not recovered by companion 
rescuers, organized rescuers located 62% due to visible parts and 
transceivers. Of the avalanche victims, 55% were characterized as 
patients, and many of these suffered serious injuries. These statistics 
indicate that avalanche incidents are first and foremost medical 
emergencies, leading to the conclusion that medical personnel should be 
dispatched directly to the accident site without waiting or detouring for 
specialized resources for search operations.  
Paper II: Descriptive statistics confirmed that the number of road related 
avalanche rescue incidents increased markedly in the study period. In the 
period 1996-2014, avalanches reaching public roads caused six fatal 
accidents, four personal injury accidents and fifteen close calls. Eleven 
out of 34 avalanche victims died (32.4%). Out of 135 incidents, 110 had 
no victims involved in the avalanches. From 1996 to 2014, no vehicles 
were completely covered by avalanche debris, and all onshore victims 
were located due to visible parts. In 62% of 45 analysed cases, in the 
period 2010-2014, the regional avalanche danger was at level 3: 
considerable.  
In 78% of these rescue operations, rescuers were, to a varying degree, 
exposed in avalanche runout zones. The rescuers´ degrees of exposure 
correlated positively with deviations from a prescription for avalanche 
risk assessment and management. An exploratory factor analysis based 
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on the analysis of deviations pointed to three latent factors: “Degree of 
avalanche risk awareness”, “Degree of commitment” and “Degree of 
application of risk reduction measures and mitigation”. 
Qualitative and quantitative modelling with a Bayesian Belief Network 
showed a 63% probability of safe and efficient avalanche rescue 
performance. Overall, the analyses showed that rescue management in 
the alert phase, professional assessment of avalanche conditions, and 
continuous risk assessment are the most important risk influencing 
factors to control when aiming for an effective and safe rescue operation. 
In addition, actions to control undue haste and overcommitment and to 
enhance risk awareness will contribute to increased safety in this line of 
rescue work. 
Papers III and IV:  The reflections of 30 crew members from the 
Norwegian Helicopter Emergency Medical Service on the concept of 
overcommitment yielded a definition of overcommitment in the context 
of rescue activities; “Situations in which rescuers make themselves or 
others vulnerable by committing more than is feasible, desirable, 
expected, recommended, or compellingly necessary in the given scenario 
and thereby run the risk of personal injury or death”.  
Air ambulance personnel recognize overcommitment in a variety of 
situations. They broaden the concept to include both regular, everyday 
actions and hazardous rescue attempts in extraordinary incidents. The 
causal factors and the definition of overcommitment could provide a 
basis for evaluation, learning and systems-based counteracting measures. 
Air ambulance personnel pointed to sociological, cognitive, and 
organizational elements that may influence their degree of commitment 
in hazardous rescue situations. Their team-based approach to 
commitment moderation and operational uncertainty management could 
be adoptable by cooperating rescue organizations in the avalanche rescue 
service. 
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Paper V: The systemic safety analysis revealed that some groups of 
dispatchers and emergency personnel lack the recommended training 
and that they are not systematically equipped with basic avalanche safety 
equipment. The role of the police as a continuous controller at multiple 
managerial levels in the rescue service is also questionable. This points 
to assumptions that are failing, as regards compliance with safety 
requirements, the proficiency of important actors in the rescue service, 
the operationalization of the safety control structure and what is common 
avalanche rescue practice in Norway.  
The most common explanations of recurrent unsafe control actions were 
inadequate control algorithms. Especially in road related avalanche 
incidents, this frequently leads to situations where first responding 
rescue units are exposed to considerable avalanche danger.  
The safety control structure of the rescue service points to coordination 
risks. This is related to multiple controllers, overlapping and boundary 
areas of responsibility and complicated communication lines. There are 
challenges linked to: differing control algorithms between dispatch 
centres; rescue units which can be dispatched from several different 
dispatch centres; and an autonomous and uncoordinated response. This 
leads to a “first come, first served” situation, which is contradictory to 
the “safety first” attitude of the rescue service. The existing rescue 
system places few constraints on the first responding, and sometimes 
untrained, rescue units. The overall result indicates a lack of control of 
important processes in avalanche rescue operations. 
The systemic safety analysis proved relevant and productive, as it 
directed the analyst’s attention towards challenges related to the 
organization and management of rescue operations, rather than operator 
failures at the sharp end. 
Conclusion: A synthesis of results from the various studies indicates that 
the Norwegian rescue service is vulnerable to common risk sources in 
rescue operations, affecting the safety of both rescuers and patients. The 
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avalanche rescue system could benefit from a focus on the integrity of 
already established safety barriers. This implies an interorganizational 
effort to identify and reach common goals and system requirements.  
This thesis may serve as input to discussions on risk acceptance levels in 
the rescue service, the applicability and validity of control algorithms in 
rescue management and how to adjust the degree of commitment in 
various rescue missions. 
 
Samandrag 
Innleiing: Snøskred skjer vanlegvis under vanskelege miljøforhold og 
forventa overlevingstid for skredofre er kort. Slike situasjonar krev ein 
omgåande respons frå redningsetatane, og det kan utfordre tryggleiken 
til både redningsmannskap og pasientar. Historisk sett, så har 
redningstenesta i Noreg opplevd få alvorlege ulykker, men uønskte 
hendingar der mannskap er farleg utsette i utløpsområder for skred er 
meir vanleg. Risikostyring i skredredningstenesta er mange-fasettert, og 
påverka av ein multi-organisatorisk struktur. Enkeltpersonar i dette 
sosio-tekniske systemet kan lett bli fanga mellom to imperativ; det å 
redde liv og det å halde seg sjølv i live. Målet for risikostyring er å halde 
redningsengasjementet i balanse. Dette prosjektet analyserte i kva grad 
den norske skredredningstenesta er godt nok balansert til å motstå ekstra 
påverknad frå vanlege risikofaktorar i redningsoperasjonar.  
Mål: Hovudmålet med avhandlinga har vore å bidra til ny kunnskap om 
forhold som er viktige for risikostyring og yting i den norske 
skredredningstenesta.  
Metodar: Det vart nytta ei fleirmetodisk tilnærming for å svare på 
forskingsspørsmåla. Det førte med seg fleire ulike forskingsaktivitetar i 
ein kombinasjon av både kvantitative og kvalitative metodar.  Det fyrste 
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studiet var ei retrospektiv beskriving av norske snøskredhendingar og 
redningsaksjonar (Artikkel nr I). Ein omfattande studie  som inneheldt 
statistikk over skredredningsaksjonar, fleirkasuistiske detaljanalysar, 
utforskande faktoranalyse og risikomodellering vart gjort for å få innsikt 
i redningstenesta si evne til å gjennomføra redningsaksjonar på ein trygg 
og effektiv måte (yting) (Artikkel nr II). 9 luftambulansemannskap på 5 
basar deltok i fokusgruppeintervju i ein fenomenologisk studie for å 
utforske omgrepet over-engasjement i redningstenesta (Artikkel nr III 
and IV). Til sist deltok 6 ekspertar frå redningstenesta i ein system-
teoretisk analyse av tryggleik i norske skredredningsaksjonar (Artikkel 
nr V). 
Resultat: Studiane gav grunnlag for grunngjevne oppfatningar om 
tryggleik for både pasientar og redningsmannskap i norske 
skredredningsaksjonar. 
Artikkel nr I: Norsk skredredningsstatistikk i perioden 2010-2017 synte 
at 75% av alle skredofre vart funne og gravne fram innan redningstenesta 
kom fram til skadestaden. Av dei resterande 25% som ikkje var funne av 
kameratar, så fann redningstenesta 62% av skredofra synlege på 
overflata, eller ved hjelp av sender-mottakar utstyr.  55% av skredofra 
vart karakterisert som pasientar, og mange var alvorleg skadde. Denne 
statistikken syner at skredulykker er fyrst og fremst medisinske 
naudsituasjonar. Det førte til ein konklusjon om at medisinsk personell 
bør sendast direkte til ulykkesstaden utan fyrst å måtte vente eller fly 
omvegar for å rykke ut saman med spesialiserte søkemannskap. 
Artikkel nr II: Deskriptiv statistikk bekrefta at talet på skred-over-veg-
aksjonar auka betydeleg i studieperioda. Frå 1996 til og med 2014 
forårsaka snøskred som kryssa vegar 6 dødsulykker, 4 
personskadeulykker og 15 nestenulykker. 11 av 34 skredofre omkom 
(32.4 %). 110 av 135 registrerte skredhendingar var utan skredofre. Frå 
1996 til 2014 var det ingen køyretøy som var totalt overdekka av snø, og 
alle skredofre som ikkje vart ført ut i vatn vart funne synlege. 62% av 
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skredhendingane i perioden 2010-2014 (n=45) gjekk føre seg under 
skredfaregrad 3, betydeleg. Dei andre hendingane skjedde under 
skredfaregrad 4 og 5. 
I 78 % av desse redningsaksjonane var redningsmannskap, i varierande 
grad, eksponert i utløpsområder for snøskred. Grad av eksponering 
korrelerte positivt med registrerte avvik frå ein norm for 
skredrisikovurdering og -handtering. Den utforskande faktoranalysen, 
som var basert på den nemnde analysen av avvik, peika på 3 latente, 
samlande faktorar: “Grad av å vere medviten om skredrisiko”, “Grad av 
engasjement”  og “Grad av nytta risiko- og skadeavgrensande tiltak”. 
Kvalitativ og kvantitativ modellering med Bayesiansk nettverk synte at 
sannsynet for trygge og effektive redningsaksjonar ved skred-over-veg-
hendingar var 63 %. Totalt sett synte analysane at leiinga av 
redningsaksjonane i varslingsfasa, profesjonell vurdering av 
skredtilhøve og kontinuerleg skredrisikovurdering er dei viktigaste 
risikopåverkande faktorane å kontrollere for å oppnå ein trygg og 
effektiv skredredningsaksjon. I tillegg, handlingar som skal førebyggje 
unødvendig hastverk og over-engasjement, og å gjera redningsmannskap 
meir medvitne om skredrisiko, vil bidra til auka tryggleik i denne form 
for redningsarbeid. 
Artiklar nr III og IV: Refleksjonane til 30 mannskap frå 
ambulansehelikoptertenesta førte til ein definisjon av over-engasjement 
ved redningsaktivitetar; "Situasjonar der redningsmannskap gjer seg 
sjølv eller andre sårbar ved å engasjere seg meir enn det som er mogleg, 
ynskjeleg, forventa, anbefalt eller tvingande naudsynt i eit gjeve 
scenario, og som dermed risikerer personskade eller død".  
Luftambulansemannskap kjenner att over-engasjement i fleire ulike 
situasjonar. Deira erfaringar har utvida konseptet til å femne om både 
kvardagslege oppdrag og hasardiøse redningsforsøk i ekstra-ordinære 
situasjonar. Årsaksfaktorane og definisjonen av over-engasjement kan 
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fungere som eit utgangspunkt for evaluering, læring og system-baserte 
førebyggjande tiltak.  
Informantane peika på sosiologiske, kognitive og organisatoriske 
element som kan verke inn på grad av engasjement i farlege 
redningssituasjonar. Deira lag-baserte tilnærming til justering av 
engasjement og operativ handtering av usikkerheit kan kanskje 
adopterast av samarbeidande organisasjonar i skredredningstenesta. 
Artikkel V: Den system-teoretiske analysen av tryggleik i 
skredredningstenesta avslørte at nokre naudetatar manglar den 
opplæringa som dei er rådde til å ha ved redningsinnsats etter 
snøskredulykker. Dei er heller ikkje systematisk utstyrte med naudsynt 
utstyr for tryggleik ved skredulykker. Ein kan også setja spørsmålsteikn 
ved politiet sin rolle som kontrollør på fleire nivå i redningstenesta. Dette 
peikar på sviktande føresetnader om etterleving av reglar og anbefalingar 
som gjeld tryggleik, profesjonalitet hos viktige aktørarar i 
redningstenesta, operasjonaliseringa av den strukturen som er lagt til 
grunn for å kontrollere tryggleik og det som er vanleg praksis i 
skredredningstenesta i Noreg. 
Dei vanlegast forklaringane til gjentekne usikre kontrollaktivitetar var 
utilstrekkelege kontrollalgoritmar. Særleg ved skred-over-veg-aksjonar 
førte dette til at dei redningsmannskapa som kom fyrst fram til 
ulykkesstaden ofte vart eksponert for betydeleg skredrisiko. 
Strukturen for kontroll av tryggleik peikar også på risiko ved 
koordinering av redningsressursar. Dette er relatert til fleire kontrollørar 
ved ulike naudmeldingssentralar, overlappande og tilgrensande 
ansvarsområde og kompliserte kommunikasjonsliner. Det er utfordringar 
knyta til ulike kontollalgoritmar mellom naudmeldesentralar, 
redningsressursar som kan bli sendt ut frå fleire forskjellige 
naudmeldesentralar og ein redningsrespons som er autonom og ikkje 
koordinert med tanke på kven som skal komme fyrst fram til eit farleg 
område. Dette fører til ein “fyrst til mølla får fyrst male” situasjon, som 
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er i motstrid til den “Tryggleik fyrst” haldninga som skal gjelde for 
redningstenesta. Det eksisterande redningssystemet legg få avgrensingar 
på dei, nokre gonger utrente, redningsressursane som kjem fyrst fram til 
skadestaden. Totalt sett, syner resultata ein manglande kontroll over 
viktige prosessar ved skredredningsaksjonar. 
Den system-teoretiske framgangsmåten synte seg både relevant og 
produktiv. Den retta stadig merksemda mot utfordringar ved 
organisering og leiing av redningsaksjonar, heller enn mot feil hos 
redningsmannskap i den skarpe enden. Ei utfordring kan vere eit 
omfattande behov for dokumentasjon. 
Konklusjon: Ein syntese av resultata frå dei ulike studiane indikerer at 
den norske skredredningstenesta er sårbar overfor vanlege risikokjelder 
ved redningsaksjonar. Det kan gå ut over tryggleiken for både pasientar 
og redningsmannskap. Skredredningssystemet kan med fordel fokusere 
meir på integriteten til allereie etablerte barrierar for tryggleik. Dette 
inneber tverr-organisatoriske aktivitetar for å identifisere og nå felles mål 
og funksjonskrav. 
Denne avhandlinga kan tene som innspel til diskusjonar om kva for 
risikonivå ein kan akseptere i skredredningstenesta, om kor brukbare og 
gyldige algoritmane som blir brukte for å kontrollere tryggleik i 
redningstenesta er, og korleis ein kan tilpasse engasjementet i ulike 
redningsoppdrag. 
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Introduction 
1 
1 Introduction 
The topic of this thesis is risk management in Norwegian avalanche 
rescue operations.  Within this choice of term lies a recognition of the 
sometimes conflicting imperatives of rescue work: the patient`s right to 
an optimal rescue response (Helse og Omsorgsdepartementet, 2008; 
Saunes et al., 2010) versus the rescuers` own safety. Throughout this 
study, risk management is considered a balancing act (Aven, 2014, p. 
161); is the avalanche rescue system correctly balanced to sustain the 
extra load of common risk influencing factors in rescue operations, like 
uncertainty, rescuer variability and changing environmental conditions?  
This section will introduce the Norwegian avalanche rescue service and 
some important challenges related to its management of snow avalanche 
risk during rescue operations. 
1.1 The Norwegian avalanche rescue service 
 Structure 
The Norwegian rescue service is constituted by a joint effort of 
professional, volunteer and private organizations. Two Joint Rescue 
Coordination Centres (JRCC), in north- and south Norway, monitor, 
assist and instruct the Local Rescue Coordination Centres (LRCC), 
which are run by regional police headquarters. Calls of avalanche 
emergency can be made to either the LRCC (112), the Emergency 
Medical Coordination Centres (EMCC) (113), the Fire and Rescue 
Coordination Centres (FRCC) (110), or directly to the JRCC.  
All four emergency coordination centres can initiate rescue operations 
and dispatch rescuers to incidents requiring an immediate rescue effort. 
The emergency call centres are obliged to notify their LRCC 
immediately in cases where the situation requires a coordinated effort 
Introduction 
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defined as a rescue mission. Likewise, “The local Rescue Coordination 
Centre shall notify the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre without delay 
if the situation is perceived as a possible rescue mission” (Regjeringen, 
2015). In Norway, a rescue mission is defined as: "Publicly organized 
immediate efforts by several partners to save people from death or injury 
due to an acute accident or hazards and which are not taken care of by 
specifically created bodies or by special measures” (Regjeringen, 2015). 
The LRCCs are responsible for managing and coordinating onshore 
rescue operations within their own jurisdictional area. However, in 
emergency preparedness issues, the police have no instructional 
authority on other actors in the rescue service. As such, the rescue service 
is not directed by a single authority but relies on the competent 
management of every single rescue unit. Volunteer rescue resources are 
called out on demand, to assist in technical rescue management, 
avalanche risk assessment, searches of the avalanche debris, excavation, 
first aid treatment and evacuation of victims. 
The Ministry of Justice and Public Security is the superior administrative 
office governing the rescue service, issuing decrees, regulations and 
instructions to influence emergency preparedness and operational 
abilities. 
 Systems and organizations 
Nancy Leveson (2011, p. 63) states that systems theory was developed 
for systems exhibiting organized complexity – systems that are not easily 
available for analytic reduction and statistical methodology. Is the 
Norwegian avalanche rescue service a system and an organization with 
the characteristics of organized complexity? 
The actors constituting the rescue service prepare for various types of 
emergencies and respond accordingly, following calls of distress. In all 
phases, though independent as organizations, they show interdependency 
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in their activities, trying to achieve the common valued goal of rescue: 
saving lives (Regjeringen, 2015). In this sense, the rescue service is an 
operating entity “comprising discrete components which transform input 
to output for a purpose” (Hughes et al., 2015, p. 272).  
Hughes et al. (2015) refer to six systems theory based criteria in their 
assessment of road safety strategies and their relation to systems theory, 
which in the context of avalanche rescue can be transformed to: 
Key components: The rescue units constitute the unity of parts necessary 
to achieve the common goals of saving lives and operating safely. 
Although single components / rescue units sometimes act autonomously, 
fulfilling the task of a lifesaving action, they are always interacting with 
higher coordinating levels of command (Joint and Local Rescue 
Coordination Centres, EMCCs, FRCCs and Incident Commanders) and 
both pre-hospital and hospital-based medical resources. Without a 
successful chain of activities, the overall performance is reduced. 
Relationships: All rescue units interact by command, common rescue 
techniques, and in communication and information. 
Objective: The purpose of the rescue service is to “save people from 
death or bodily harm, resulting from acute accidents or hazardous 
situations”, as formulated in the royal decree describing the organization 
of the rescue service (Justisdepartementet, 2015). In this context, the 
objective of safe operations must be added, as stated in The National 
Guidelines for Avalanche Rescue (NRR, 2012). 
Interdependencies: The contribution and interaction of each rescue unit 
is described by law, regulations, guidelines and emergency preparedness 
plans. Interdependency underlines the importance of the united effort of 
all components to achieve the common goals.  
Principles: The Norwegian rescue service is based on four principles 
(Justisdepartementet, 2015).  
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Firstly, the principle of Samvirke, which is a Norwegian word meaning 
a product of collaboration, cooperation, confidence, trust, common 
understanding and volunteerism (Aasland & Braut, 2018; Regjeringen, 
2015, Chapters 1-4). Samvirke implies that all public agencies are 
obliged to contribute, with appropriate means, to a search and rescue 
operation. It also encourages a seamless integration of volunteer rescue 
resources. Samvirke was a major success factor in the rescue efforts 
following the terror attacks in Norway on 22nd July 2011, and this 
principle of cooperative organization was later formally approved as a 
principle of the Norwegian rescue service (Regjeringen, 2015). Lacking 
an adequate English expression, Samvirke is not being translated in this 
thesis.  
It follows that all actors are responsible for effective cooperation, both 
in preparing for emergencies and during rescue operations. The principle 
of integrated coordination structure means that all operations, sea, land 
or air, are handled by the same organization. The principle of 
responsibility requires that the same agency that is responsible for 
handling daily tasks within a specific sector is also responsible for these 
activities during a rescue operation, irrespective of the extent and cause 
of the emergency. Lastly, the principle of coordination allocates this 
function to the JRCCs and the LRCCs.  
As the rescue service is not one single organization, it is difficult to 
recognize principles in support of a specific avalanche rescue strategy, 
although The National Guidelines for Avalanche Rescue (NRR, 2012) 
fill the gap in outlining a common plan of action.  
Theoretical basis: Norwegian avalanche rescue is based on best practice 
(Van Tilburg et al., 2017), interacting with both national and 
international research through the International Commission for Alpine 
Rescue (CISA-ICAR, 2019).  
Based on these criteria, the Norwegian avalanche rescue service can be 
defined as a system. Considering the next question, whether the 
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avalanche rescue service is an organization in the correct sense of the 
word, Hilde Brandshaug (2011) studied the performance of the 
Norwegian rescue service on the basis of organization theory and 
concluded that the Norwegian rescue service can be viewed as an 
integrated project organization – a hybrid of cooperation and project. 
This relates to the fact that the rescue service is constituted by several 
organizations, and that integrated units with inter-dependent tasks offer 
an optimal opportunity to solve complex challenges. Although a project 
normally has a defined beginning and end, the rescue service is running 
a series of projects – the projects emerge as a response to calls of distress. 
The repeated actions, and joint preparations and exercises, build 
longstanding relationships, enabling organizational learning. To achieve 
and uphold a high-performance level, in line with the ambitious objective 
of saving lives, and act cautiously, a holistic approach (systems view) is 
paramount. This requires intra- and inter-sectorial communication, 
information and trust.  
 Complexity of avalanche rescue operations 
By royal decree, handbooks and guidelines (NRR, 2012; Regjeringen, 
2015, 2018), the Norwegian rescue system is strictly hierarchically 
organized, with clearly defined roles and lines of command. The system 
assumes a centralized command over rescuers, who can act 
autonomously.  
In practical terms, the rescue system represents public, voluntary and 
private organizations, different managerial levels, actors, functions and 
tasks. We also see that various elements of crisis management, 
emergency preparedness and preventive measures may be handled by 
different groups, agencies and individuals. 
A rescue operation is managed by people with varying levels of 
knowledge, skills and experience, from a variety of organizations with 
differing safety culture and safety regulations. Rescue units cannot solely 
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be differentiated by their professional status, since the systematic level 
of training varies within and between rescue resources. The level of 
training and experience amongst the responding rescuers in any given 
rescue operation is not known, thus introducing an element of 
uncertainty in rescue performance (Paper II). The workplace, “the plant” 
of operation, is unknown to the actors up until the time when they arrive 
at the accident site. The individual collaborators may be totally new to 
each other and ignorant of each other’s competence. It is much like 
playing a soccer match, every time with a new team, and every time at 
the “away” ground. Added to this is the urgency of the matter, always 
requiring a short response time and efficient rescue activities by whoever 
happens to be the first organized rescue responder.  
Based on this multi-agency structure, the task-oriented goals, improvised 
and cooperative nature of activities, and complex interactions with 
multiple components in, sometimes unexpected, sequences (Perrow, 
1984), the Norwegian avalanche rescue service is here considered an 
(integrated project-)organization, exhibiting organized complexity. 
Along with the previous conclusion that the rescue service is also a 
system, it follows that it is eligible for the application of systems theory 
and thinking.  
 Safety as an emergent property in avalanche 
rescue 
Considering the structure and hierarchy of the avalanche rescue service, 
system safety – as a factor of pertinent avalanche risk assessment and 
management – is achieved only when all components interact actively 
through all phases of a rescue operation – it is an emergent property 
arising from system component interaction (Leveson, 2011, p. 67) 
(Papers II and V).  
From a chronological and hierarchical perspective, rescuers` exposure to 
avalanche risk may result from a lack of coordination and control 
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activities at higher levels, as “Safety then can be viewed as a control 
problem” (Leveson, 2011, p. 67). In this thesis, it is questioned whether 
valid safety constraints are in place and known to the managerial levels 
in the various organizations involved in avalanche rescue operations. If 
not, can this be linked to deficiencies in the common process of 
identifying basic goals, hazards and system requirements (Leveson, 
2011, p. 203) (Paper V)?  
Safety objectives, prioritized by leaders at all levels, are amongst 
important pillars supporting high reliability organizations (Aven et al., 
2004; Weick et al., 2008). Leveson, however, claims that it is not 
prioritizing the safety goals that is a major problem, “but making difficult 
tradeoffs and decisions about how much risk is acceptable and even how 
to measure the risk” (Leveson et al., 2009, p. 240). This points back to 
the dilemmas involved in risk management, as rescuers regularly 
experience a goal conflict between rescue efficiency and rescuer safety, 
in which “Declining a rescue attempt must be a socially acceptable and 
respectable option where the risks are considered genuinely intolerable” 
(Ash & Smallman, 2010, p. 47) (Papers III and IV).  
The hierarchical structure of the rescue service seems to invite a systems 
thinking approach to safety. In this context, a closer examination of the 
safety control structure of the avalanche rescue service (Paper V) might 
act as a preparation for further evaluation of specific rescue operations. 
It might also serve as a basis for defining suitable risk indicators for land-
based winter rescue in Norway (Section 4.6.1). A systems view on 
avalanche rescue performance is necessary when looking for “ways to 
enhance the ability of systems to succeed under varying conditions” 
(Hollnagel, 2011, p. 1). 
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 Risk and avalanche rescue in Norway 
In Norway, avalanche rescue operations have increased in number over 
the last 20 years (Papers I and II) and represent major challenges for the 
emergency response organizations. The challenges are mainly linked to 
performance, i.e. how to conduct efficient and safe rescue operations in 
challenging environmental conditions. The main areas of operation are 
in uncontrolled, free mountain terrain or along public roads which run 
through narrow valleys, exposing the rescuers to considerable danger of 
being hit by neighbouring, secondary avalanches (Glassett & Techel, 
2014; Lunde & Kristensen, 2013).  
Luckily, no Norwegian avalanche rescuers have come to harm since six 
local rescuers were killed in 1971, in Hjørundfjord. Historically, no 
fatalities amongst avalanche rescuers in more than 45 years looks a 
flattering result for the Norwegian rescue service. Statistically, however, 
it may look less flattering. Based on data from the Norwegian Avalanche 
Rescue Database (NARDB) (Papers I and II), in the period 1996-2017, 
the average duration of Norwegian avalanche rescue operations was 2.7 
hrs; the average number of rescuers per operation was 15.6; and the 
average number of rescue operations per year was 34. Extrapolating this 
over a period of 50 years, this adds up to 72,000 rescuer hours and, as 
previously stated, 6 fatalities. The number of fatalities per million person 
rescue work hours is then (Rausand & Utne, 2009, p. 56): 6 / 0.072 = 
83.3. By comparison, the Helicopter Safety Study 2 (Hokstad et al., 
1999), estimating risk for North Sea helicopter transport 1990-1998, 
found a fatality rate of 2.3 per million person flight hours. So, despite no 
fatal accidents in the last 50 years, we see that the fatality rate per work 
hour is unreasonably high, compared to other seemingly risky and 
necessary activities in society.  
This is all a question of perspective and scale. Firstly, we could see these 
numbers in the perspective of major accident risk, i.e. highly infrequent 
accidents with multiple casualties. Low annual accident rates can be 
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quite deceptive, leading organizations towards complacency and 
habitual high risk practice (Leveson, 2011; Rasmussen, 1997), since the 
individual rescue units “never” experience accidents. Infrequent 
accidents are difficult to approach with statistical studies, especially as 
regards uncertainty in the various parameters that could indicate a shift 
of risk towards unacceptable limits. Monitoring major accident risk 
requires vigilance and “sensitivity to operations” (Weick et al., 2008, p. 
45). It is therefore necessary to also develop and monitor other risk 
indicators than fatality rates (Section 4.6.1).  
Secondly, since these rescue operations are handled by many different 
teams and individuals, not by one identifiable, large company, and many 
years may pass in between accidents, the fatality rate is not very useful 
as an operational indicator of safe practice (Hopkins, 2009). In the oil 
and gas industry, loss of containment (e.g. gas leakages) is used as an 
indicator of major accident risk. In this line of work, we may consider 
incidents where rescuers are exposed in runout zones during high 
avalanche risk as “loss of containment”. These incidents are more 
frequent (Paper II) and countable on a small scale, thus enabling a 
monitoring of accident risk at all levels. “If serious failures are rare, one 
means to get more data points for learning is to broaden the number and 
variety of failures that are given close attention” (Weick et al., 2008, p. 
39). 
The accident in Drümännler, Switzerland, in 2010 (Etter, 2010) is one of 
the latest documented major accidents in avalanche rescue. Seven 
people, including the patient, companion rescuers and an air ambulance 
doctor, died in a secondary avalanche during the initial stage of the 
operation. Overall, in Italy, in the period 1985-2009, 6% of avalanche 
accidents involving “mountain professionals” happened during rescue 
operations (Valt et al., 2009). These accidents point to the challenges 
linked to avalanche risk assessments and how to avoid dangerous acts in 
spatially variable and dangerous conditions. 
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Leading up to this study, I was not at ease with the historically low 
fatality rate of Norwegian avalanche rescuers, since observational 
studies (Lunde & Kristensen, 2013) and anecdotal evidence indicated a 
high frequency of undesirable incidents. On one occasion, near the town 
of Sunndalsøra, Norway, on 15th March 2010, 14-15 rescuers at work 
had to run to escape from a naturally released secondary avalanche 
(Fange, 2010). Avoiding accidents is an expression of adequate 
performance in rescue operations, and efficient and safe rescue 
operations are a significant societal safety factor. Therefore, an 
avalanche accident involving rescuers may take the dimensions of a 
national disaster and will attract great public interest; cf. the Vassdalen 
accident in 1986, in which 16 Norwegian soldiers died (Lied, 1988; 
NOU, 1986, p. 20) 
 Norwegian avalanche rescue statistics 
In the 22-year period from 1996-2017, the Norwegian Joint Rescue 
Coordination Centres registered 720 avalanche incidents, with an annual 
mean of 33 ± 7. In 360 of these incidents, rescuers were called out and 
searched in avalanches without any involved victims. Only 35% of the 
incidents were avalanche accidents requiring a rescue response. In the 
remaining 15% of the incidents, rescuers were dispatched but not 
activated on site. A total of 568 avalanche victims were recorded in 279 
accidents, and 313 of these victims were counted as patients, of whom 
120 died. 
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 Thesis limitations 
The risk management perspective in this thesis is limited to snow 
avalanche risk, i.e. the hazards related to travel and rescue activities in 
avalanche terrain, how this is assessed and managed by the involved 
parties, at all managerial levels, and what consequences this might have 
for the safety of rescuers and patients. This means that all other types of 
hazards, e.g. road traffic and snowmobile accidents, are not a part of the 
considerations and analyses in this project. However, transportation 
hazards as a consequence of operative decision-making are included in 
Papers III and IV. 
As regards patient safety, the selected risk management perspective also 
includes dispatch and prioritization of rescue resources in all types of 
avalanche rescue operations and the consequences these rescue activities 
might have for the patients` prognosis and well-being. 
 Thesis aims 
The main objective of this PhD project was to contribute to new 
knowledge on factors that are important for risk management and 
performance in the Norwegian avalanche rescue service. Knowledge in 
this respect is defined as propositional knowledge, expressed as 
“justified beliefs” and generated in reliable scientific processes (Aven, 
2014, pp. 64-65). Important issues in this context are the concept of 
overcommitment and long-term monitoring of accident risk. 
Detailed aims were: 
Paper I: to present a basis for evaluation and necessary adjustments in 
the dispatch, prioritization and management of Norwegian avalanche 
rescue operations. 
Paper II: to present characteristics of Norwegian road related avalanche 
incidents and rescue operations; the rescuers’ degree of exposure to 
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avalanche risk and their risk assessment and management activities 
during these rescue operations; and, finally, a Bayesian network model 
of the overall performance of the Norwegian avalanche rescue service in 
road related avalanche rescue operations. 
Paper III: to present how overcommitment is described and understood 
by Norwegian Helicopter Emergency Medical Service personnel, as a 
uniform concept in rescue operations.  
Paper IV:  to present how overcommitment is identified and managed by 
the frequent first rescue responders in the Norwegian Helicopter 
Emergency Medical Service. 
Paper V: to present a systems theoretic process analysis (STPA) of the 
Norwegian avalanche rescue service and a subsequent evaluation of its 
applicability in the context of socio-technical, multi-organizational 
activities like avalanche rescue operations. 
 Thesis structure 
The thesis comprises two chapters. The first chapter, containing six 
sections, is a cross-paper elaboration of the rationale behind the various 
studies, the theories on which the research perspective is based and a 
presentation and discussion of methods, results and main findings. The 
conclusion offers a short summary of important results, suggestions for 
follow-up studies and important improvements in avalanche rescue 
practice. The last chapter contains copies of Papers I-V. 
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2 Theory 
Snow avalanche rescue is a complex process, incorporating knowledge 
from a wide range of research disciplines. The following is a presentation 
of selected theory related to the focus points of this thesis: risk and 
management of risk in snow avalanche rescue operations, human factors 
in rescue work and long-term monitoring of accident risk. In addition, 
each of the Papers I-V contains theoretical contributions which are 
specifically related to the research questions of the various studies. 
 Risk, uncertainty and probability 
Recognizing risk and constructing risk images on which to base 
decisions about safety are continuous and critical activities for rescuers. 
The activities may be structured risk analyses or, more commonly, 
simple observations and discussions during stressful moments of rescue 
response. In these situations, rescuers are acting as both risk analysts and 
decision makers (Braut et al., 2012), and the decisions may affect single 
rescuers, rescue units and the avalanche victims. The activities of rescue 
work seldom cause externalities, although there is a chance that rescuers 
trigger avalanches that could hit other people in the area. Of course, air 
rescue activities always carry the possibility of causing harm to third 
parties, but this issue is not included in the scope of this thesis. 
The combination of the consequences (C) of the rescuers` decisions to 
respond to (or not respond to) an avalanche accident (A) and the 
associated uncertainties (U) (Aven, 2014, pp. 33 and 40) constitutes the 
framework for understanding and describing risk in this thesis. The 
uncertainties are linked to the rescue activities in the response phase, 
environmental conditions like avalanche activity, the avalanche incident, 
the patient`s condition or the consequences thereof. The future events or 
consequences are unknown. Even the most extensive work to reduce 
uncertainty about avalanche release will not bring us to a state of 
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omniscience – an ability to foresee everything (Njå et al., 2017). It is 
simply not possible, even during high avalanche risk conditions, to 
predict with certainty that an avalanche in a known path is going to 
descend or not (Schweizer, 2008), despite extensive historical data from 
the area. Only in hindsight may it be possible to see the outcome, e.g. 
avalanche activity in the area of operations.  
A fundamental lack of knowledge as a basis for accurate predictions 
points to “scientific uncertainty”, i.e. “We are unable to reconstruct the 
causal connections with a high degree of confidence and reliability” 
(Aven & Renn, 2010, p. 73). It can be debated whether this scientific 
uncertainty is “Small” or “Moderate” (Aven, 2014, p. 162). A terrain-
based assessment will tell us exactly where the avalanche may descend, 
and snow avalanche research has made important contributions to our 
knowledge of snow avalanche fracture mechanics. However, our present 
understanding of the interplay between variable snowpack 
characteristics and the influence of terrain and weather factors does not 
allow a high degree of accuracy in predicting sensitivity to triggering, 
the time of avalanche release and avalanche size (volume, exact runout 
length and destructive force) (Kronholm et al., 2002; McClung & 
Schaerer, 2006; Schweizer, 2008). If having to work beneath a huge 
avalanche release zone, uncertainty also relates to our confidence in the 
models we apply to predict avalanche release (Aven & Renn, 2010, p. 
73). Most likely, the level of confidence in risk analysis models will vary 
between individual rescuers, giving rise to disharmony in dynamic, real-
time risk assessments and risk acceptance levels (Ash & Smallman, 
2008; Penney, 2019, pp. 6-8). 
Steven G. Vick (2002, pp. 254-256) points to the importance of 
acknowledging uncertainty as a first step in admitting to the reality that 
total knowledge is elusive. If reality calls for caution, a cautionary 
strategy to risk management is recommended (Aven, 2014). The ill-
defined remaining uncertainty forces the rescue service “to place  more 
emphasis on vulnerability and resilience assessment (are we able to cope 
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with the surprises?), inclusion of less uncertain alternatives in the 
assessment, and using more refined and comprehensive methods for 
characterizing unknowns and uncertainties (for example by selecting 
experiential knowledge from people who have experience with the risk)” 
(Aven & Renn, 2010, p. 74).  
Obviously, the background knowledge (K) and transparency regarding 
its strength and relevance is crucial for the quality and trustworthiness of 
the judgements of mission risk. In emergency preparedness planning, it 
is reasonable to expect a certain level of documentation, e.g. as suggested 
by Aven (2008, 2014) and Berner & Flage (2017). In dynamic 
emergency response situations, the strength of knowledge supporting the   
risk assessments must be ensured by the alert and dispatch routines, i.e. 
only competent personnel, at all managerial levels, should be engaged in 
rescue operations (NRR, 2012).  
When referring to the vulnerability of avalanche rescuers, patients, 
companion rescuers and bystanders, the sources of risk (RS) considered 
in this project are limited to avalanches reaching the areas of operation, 
flawed rescue management or inadequate avalanche risk assessment. In 
the case of an avalanche hitting rescuers on the ground, inside or outside 
vehicles (C,U,K | RS), we can make a judgement about the 
consequences, based on statistics; the overall mortality rate in Norwegian 
avalanche accidents is 0.22-0.32  (Papers I and II) and internationally 
around 0.40-0.50 for those totally buried in the avalanche debris (Haegeli 
et al., 2011; Hohlrieder et al., 2007; Lunde & Kristensen, 2011; Techel 
& Zweifel, 2013; Tschirky et al., 2000).  
It is clear from the mentioned studies that consequences can be reduced 
by using avalanche safety equipment, but survival cannot be guaranteed. 
As regards patients, rescuers who arrive late or who abstain from a rescue 
attempt (RS) will worsen their prognosis (C, U, K | RS). Safety 
equipment, risk awareness and mindful dispatch of rescue resources are 
examples of safeguards used to reduce the effect of various hazards on 
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our activities, objects or objectives. The logic is that the overall risk can 
be reduced by applying relevant safeguards (Kaplan & Garrick, 1981, p. 
12). 
Braut et al. (2012) recommend the concept of risk images to reflect the 
decision makers’ belief in possible outcomes of different alternative 
decisions. The risk image needs to reflect all dimensions of risk 
(A,C,U,K) (Aven, 2008), as well as our predictions of events and 
consequences, e.g. avalanche activity and the consequences for rescuers 
and patients.  
 Measures of uncertainty – Probability 
In any situation dominated by uncertainty, the answer to most questions 
will include the words “probably” or “as far as I know”. In the context 
of risk, not knowing is dangerous and, as a substitute for certainty, we 
can grade and describe uncertainty, e.g. by using the concept of 
probability. By ascribing values between zero and one, we can 
communicate our thoughts as to whether a specific event will happen or 
not – we offer “a measure of uncertainty” (Aven, 2012, p. 39). We can 
simulate an event by introducing probability models, but they presume 
stability, which in the real world is difficult to attain. There will be 
variations in both the populations and situations studied, with respect to 
relevant factors and the assigned parameters. The way you choose to 
analyse and present a phenomenon will, of course, have an impact on 
both the results and the degree to which the results are meaningful to the 
decision makers. In that respect, transparency is important in all phases 
of the risk analysis. 
Against this background, we see different views on probability, starting 
with the classical approach, dating back to de Laplace in 1812, requiring 
a finite number of equally likely outcomes – a situation which is hardly 
attainable in real situations of avalanche risk. The frequentist 
interpretation, which is usually denoted “the law of large numbers”, 
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requires that the events are repeated an infinite number of times, and is 
often represented by a normal distribution. It can be argued that the 
inherent variability of snow avalanche release and runout lengths forces 
the risk analyst to consider this natural hazard a unique event, and in that 
case the frequentist approach would not make sense. It is clearly not 
possible to repeat the avalanche an infinite number of times, and the 
“experiment” is not repeatable under the exact same conditions 
(Schweizer, 2008; Watson, 1994). Contrasting with this approach is the 
Bayesian, subjective approach, in which probability values are assigned 
“with reference to an uncertainty standard” (Aven, 2012, p. 194; 2014, 
p. 221), i.e. the uncertainty about an event is compared to the likelihood 
of drawing a specific ball from an urn containing ten balls. The 
assignment itself is based on available knowledge, historical data and 
experience. In this approach, the basis for selecting specific probability 
values can be questioned, whereas the values themselves are the risk 
analyst`s expressions of uncertainty about the variables in question. For 
further discussions on this approach, please see Paper II. 
 Predictability of avalanches   
 Avalanche release – Stability evaluation 
An avalanche release zone is the part of the terrain with a slope 
inclination > 25o (Lied & Kristensen, 2003; McClung & Schaerer, 2006), 
and the runout zone is the part of the avalanche path where the debris 
comes to rest (ɑ maximum). The avalanche track is the area between the 
release and the runout zones and follows natural terrain features. 
One of the main puzzles for snow scientists to solve has been that of 
avalanche release mechanisms, which cannot be fully explained solely 
by analysing forces acting on objects resting on inclined planes, although 
“Simple failure criteria of the Coulomb type were adequate for treating 
planar slip” (Mellor, 1976, p. 252). Obviously, it is reasonable to 
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conclude that snowpack structures are subjected to greater shear forces 
on steeper inclines, but numerous observations confirm that avalanches 
can also be triggered from flat ground, contraindicative of shear strength 
as the limiting factor for avalanche release (Johnson et al., 2004). 
Although the release of a snow slab results in a progressive shear fracture 
along the weak layer, isolated calculations of stress and strain in the 
snowpack show that it is, in fact, not possible to arrive at the high stresses 
necessary for a homogenous, isotropic snowpack to fracture (Lied & 
Kristensen, 2003). The answer to this contradiction was originally based 
on the work of Alan Arnold Griffith (1893-1963), (Griffith, 1920), who, 
in 1920, concluded that an inherent weakness in a brittle material is 
sufficient for fracture. Much later, from 2000 onwards, the most recent 
add-ons to Griffith`s theory now show that an initial downwards collapse 
of a weak layer is followed by a propagating fracture. Several important 
measurements and tests by Johnson et al. (2004) and van Herwijnen and 
Jamieson (2007) led up to a breakthrough, until, finally, two studies by 
Heierli et al. (2011; 2008)  demonstrated that “A small number of factors 
increases the risk of triggering fracture: the intensity and the direction of 
the skier load, the depth of the weak layer, the stiffness and penetrability 
of the slab, the fracture energy of the weak layer, and the size of flaws”. 
None of these factors is easily observed and controlled by humans. They 
also concluded that slabs are as equally easy to trigger on gentle as on 
steep slopes. Earlier, several studies by Kronholm et al (2002), 
Schweizer et al 2003) and Schweizer & Kronholm 2007 showed  
considerable spatial variation in both snowpack structure and stability, 
which explains why important factors for snow avalanche release are not 
easily observed and controlled.   
The activity of naturally released avalanches is indicative of the density 
and distribution of triggering spots (Schweizer et al., 2018) and supports 
judgements of snowpack stability.  
Emma Kate Howley (2007) developed classification trees in her study of 
wind drift and precipitation levels as predictors of natural release of snow 
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avalanches in Grasdalen, Norway.  Offering no exact critical values for 
avalanche release, she summarized that her thesis “highlights the 
complicated relationship between preceding weather conditions and 
avalanche occurrence indicating the vast array of factors to be considered 
for avalanche prediction”. Howley referenced a study by Kronholm et al. 
(2006), in which they showed a misclassification of all avalanche days 
to be 15%. In their introduction, they state that a spatio-temporal 
prediction of avalanche release is impossible, concluding, however, on 
page 10: “Based on a set of simple meteorological parameters it can 
reasonably well be predicted whether a day will have avalanches or not”. 
The implications of these findings are that neither regional avalanche 
forecasts nor isolated local stability evaluations can offer an adequate 
degree of certainty to decisions about safe crossing of avalanche release 
zones. For rescuers, this means that avalanche release zones with dry, 
layered snow must be considered as “no go” areas. This is reflected in 
the risk analysis model presented in the National Guidelines for 
Avalanche Rescue (Lied & Kristensen, 2003, p. 119; NRR, 2012). 
 Avalanche size – Runout length 
The runout length of avalanches is another critical variable in avalanche 
emergencies. The runout is dependent on both terrain features and snow 
characteristics (McClung & Schaerer, 2006). The Norwegian 
Geotechnical Institute (NGI) (Lied & Kristensen, 2003, p. 82) has 
observed maximum runout lengths equal to an angle of sight of 18o from 
the end of the debris to the top of the release zone. The maximum runout 
length (ɑ maximum) can be calculated using various models, and the 
statistical-topographical alpha-beta model developed by NGI is 
prevalent in avalanche risk assessments in Norway (Lied & Kristensen, 
2003, p. 81).  
Many Norwegian road sections cross known avalanche paths, also as 
high upslope as in the release zones (Kristensen et al., 2008). This 
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implies that even small avalanches may reach the roads, and the annual 
frequency of avalanche blocked roads is relatively high (Bjordal & 
Larsen, 2009; Busterud, 2016). The most frequent avalanche danger 
level during which public roads are blocked by avalanches is level 3 – 
considerable (Orset et al., 2017). This also corresponds to the most 
frequently observed danger level during Norwegian road related 
avalanche rescue operations in the period 2010-2014 (Paper II). 
Naturally, rescuers responding to road related avalanches travel along 
these roads, often in periods of widespread avalanching (Paper II). The 
European avalanche danger scale (EAWS, 2016) describes an increasing 
frequency of naturally released avalanches with the higher danger levels 
3-5. This is supported by several studies (Schweizer et al., 2003; Techel 
& Schweizer, 2017), even though the use of this five-step model allows 
considerable inter-rater and inter-regional variability (Schweizer et al., 
2018). The size of avalanches did not correlate clearly with danger level, 
which led the authors to suggest a revision of definitions used in the 
model. The determination of avalanche size is based on runout length, 
damage potential and volume (EAWS, 2016). These input parameters to 
avalanche forecasting are usually estimated from a distance, not 
measured, so inter-rater variability is not uncommon (Moner et al., 
2013).  
The challenge for rescuers is to predict the possible size (runout length) 
of an avalanche in a given path, based on an estimation of snow depth in 
the release zone and available snow for entrainment along the avalanche 
track. For engineering purposes, McClung and Schaerer (2006, p. 136) 
advocate a combination of historical data and observations of avalanche 
debris and damage to vegetation and infrastructure to determine runout 
lengths. They further state that the use of avalanche dynamics models 
implies risky assumptions. The statistical-topographic approach is also 
criticized by the authors for weaknesses linked to precision and 
applicability across different mountain ranges. These methodological 
challenges underline the uncertainty involved in predictions of avalanche 
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runout distances: uncertainties that may pose very practical and 
dangerous consequences for rescuers in time-critical situations.  
Aggregated quantitative data is, no doubt, useful input to risk analyses 
but offers little guidance in future unique, fateful moments of rescue 
operations (Aven, 2012, pp. 7-11; Braut et al., 2012). In cases where 
rescuers travel on the ground in avalanche terrain, they need to assess 
whether avalanches can release and reach their position. Commonly used 
roads and routes can be predefined and mapped in detail, also with regard 
to return periods for specific avalanche paths, i.e. the frequency with 
which avalanches reach a specific position. Naturally, short and small 
avalanches have higher frequencies than long and large avalanches (Lied 
& Kristensen, 2003; McClung & Schaerer, 2006). This encounter 
probability can be given in qualitative or quantitative terms, which is a 
matter of debate in avalanche forecasting programmes (Kristensen, 
2016).  
The European Danger Scale (EAWS, 2016) offers a five-degree 
qualitative description of avalanche danger, and regional forecasts with 
the predicted danger levels are usually assigned to areas of 100 km2 or 
more. These forecasts are not intended for local-scale decisions about 
avalanche risk. To inform decision makers in questions regarding 
closures of road and railway sections, evacuation of production sites and 
protection of infrastructure, object-specific forecasting programmes are 
established. These forecasts are issued for shorter periods of time, 
normally 24 hours, and the encounter probability is often rank ordered 
as “Low”, “Medium” and “High”. Vick (2002, p. 258) argues that 
qualitative approaches introduce more ambiguity and that they 
conveniently sidestep the efforts of quantification. On the other hand, a 
numerical assignment of probability, as a value between 0 and 1, was 
considered undesirable by experienced forecasters at the Norwegian 
Geotechnical Institute, since “This gives an impression of an unrealistic 
high precision” (Kristensen, 2016, p. 3). 
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In rescue operations, informal and ad hoc “local forecasting” is 
conducted by the responding rescuers, as they try to assess avalanche 
safety along their selected routes. The rescuers may find decision support 
in applying various models for avalanche risk analysis; then they must 
base their input data on assumptions and uncertain information about 
local snowpack and avalanche path characteristics. “A major 
fundamental physical uncertainty in avalanche forecasting resides in the 
usually unknown temporal and spatial variations of instability in the 
snow cover, including their links to terrain” (McClung & Schaerer, 2006, 
p. 148). The output from the various models invariably contains an 
undefinable portion of uncertainty, sometimes termed “residual risk”. In 
practical terms, “residual risk” means “life threatening danger”.  
Pre-rescue calculations of individual risk to road users travelling specific 
avalanche-prone road sections may inform decision makers about the 
overall risk level in the area.  Such calculations are demonstrated by 
Kristensen et al. (2003), showing example probability values of 0.0001 
and 0.15 for moving and stationary cars to be hit by secondary 
avalanches along specific road sections. Expected values, however, do 
not account for outliers and will generally not apply to the situation at 
hand. Aven (2014, p. 25) states that “The use of expected values in risk 
management can seriously misguide decision-makers in practice”. In this 
context of local forecasting, the calculations involved are also 
questionable, as spatially relevant real-time input data is generally scarce 
(Aven, 2008; Kristensen, 2016).  
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 Risk management in integrated project 
organizations 
A characteristic feature of avalanche rescue operations is that the victims 
are in a danger zone with spatio-temporal variability in avalanche risk. 
With reference to the previous sections, we may conclude that accurate 
predictions of avalanche activity are hardly attainable, so avalanche risk 
to rescuers needs to be regulated by their degree of presence in the danger 
zones. To some extent, risk can be reduced by removing the snow in the 
release zones, e.g. by blasting. This is, of course, not a preferred strategy 
in the initial stages of rescue operations, as it may endanger avalanche 
victims. Management of risk in these circumstances needs to be 
continuous and mindful, as tasks change along with changes in the 
environmental conditions and the situation (Tissington & Flin, 2005). To 
stay safe while in avalanche terrain is therefore, to a large extent, based 
on individual knowledge, skills and attitudes.  
Risk management per se is a managerially structured approach to ensure 
that rescuers avoid harm’s way in their efforts to save lives. It includes 
all activities to achieve, maintain and improve on a predefined level of 
safety (Aven et al., 2004). Safety “is an internal construct” open to 
individual interpretation (Vick, 2002, p. 257), so exact safety levels are 
difficult to specify, measure and communicate in objective terms. Safety 
is also a multifaceted concept relating to our physical environment, as 
well as human and social factors, encouraging us to believe that 
individual and organizational initiatives may influence our feeling of 
safety and our susceptibility to accidents (Aven et al., 2004).  This 
perspective is reflected in the framework for accident data collection and 
analysis – “Occupational Accident Research Unit” (OARU) (Kjellén, 
2000; Kjellén & Hovden, 1993). An accident is considered an element in 
a process, preceded by deviations from norms and requirements (Figure 
1). Deviations demonstrate a lack of control, eventually leading to a total 
loss of control – and accidents (Leveson, 2011; Rasmussen, 1997). 
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Figure 1. OARU. The “Occupational Accident Research Unit” model for accident data collection 
and analysis (Kjellén, 2000; Kjellén & Hovden, 1993).  
We have previously concluded that the avalanche rescue service is an 
integrated project organization (Brandshaug, 2011), and we observe that 
rescue activities, including risk management and accident prevention 
activities, are carried out as a temporary collaboration of cooperating 
organizations. Since the rescue service is not one single organization, 
there is no senior management to establish and maintain common health, 
safety and environmental systems. In the rescue service, the "safety 
organization" arises spontaneously when rescuers meet at the accident 
site, with the challenges this entails for mission assessment and 
completion. Most important in this context are differences in safety 
culture, variable competence and differences in risk acceptance levels in 
the various organizations – and between individual rescuers. In each 
rescue operation, there will be a challenge related to "the collective 
understanding of what is dangerous and how to contribute to reducing 
the dangers" (Aven et al., 2004, p. 34).  
An overall risk acceptance level has not been set for the Norwegian 
rescue service, and words like “safety”, “risk” or “risk management” are 
not mentioned at all in an authoritative document like the “Plan of 
organization for the Norwegian rescue service”  (Regjeringen, 2015). It 
does, however, outline the structure, hierarchy and responsibilities of the 
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rescue service, including the JCRCCs` auditing of LRCCs. Safety and 
risk management is described only in general terms in the “Handbook 
for the rescue service” (Regjeringen, 2018). The focus is on the 
individual rescuer`s own responsibility to “act as safely as possible. 
Beyond that, the management of each agency / organization must take a 
special responsibility” (Regjeringen, 2018, p. 71).  One may assume that 
this approximates the principle that the risk should be kept as low as 
reasonably practicable (ALARP) (HSE, 2018), without specifying upper 
and lower limits for a tolerable range. None of these documents specifies 
overarching roles in risk management, apart from the tactical 
responsibility of the Incident Commander (from the Police) during 
rescue operations. As regards professional emergency response 
organizations, it is reasonable to expect that the safety regulations laid 
down in the Norwegian “Working Environment Act” (Fougner & Holo, 
2006; Regjeringen, 2005) are also applicable and mandatory in 
avalanche rescue operations.  
“The National Guidelines for Avalanche Rescue” (NRR, 2012) offer 
general recommendations on safety measures, stating that “Search and 
rescue activities are to be conducted with as low risk as possible” and 
that risk assessments are to be conducted “on all levels, prior to and 
during rescue operations…in accordance with the methodology of the 
individual organizations”.  
These documents confirm the socio-technical structure of the rescue 
service, also acknowledging, however, that the participating 
organizations are acting on their own premises. Both vertically and 
horizontally, the individual organizations and management levels will 
influence the overall ability of the rescue service to conduct safe and 
efficient rescue operations (Rasmussen, 1997).  
Safe operations require the avoidance of critical errors, and an 
accumulation of errors over time may proceed gradually and unnoticed 
until total failure (Dekker & Pruchnicki, 2014; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997). 
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However, measuring the safety of an organization by counting errors and 
deviations from norms is controversial (Leveson, 2011; Rasmussen, 
1997; Reason, 1997). Given the complexity of avalanche rescue 
operations, the rescuers’ ability to improvise and deviate from guidelines 
will be important to reflect the changing demands and environmental 
conditions. In this perspective, deviations may then be considered 
necessary operational optimization – not human error (Reason et al., 
1998), and operations succeed because operators adapt to the demands 
of current situations (Hollnagel et al., 2015). “It all depends on the local 
conditions and the adequacy of the procedures” (Reason, 1997, p. 73).  
Siri Wiig studied risk and error management processes across 
organizational interfaces in the Norwegian health services (2008) and 
concluded that “Different system levels are dependent on each other in 
the process of error prevention” (Wiig & Aase, 2007, p. 10). In a systems 
view, errors are indications of underlying organizational problems, and 
a collective, interorganizational capacity to avoid errors is required to 
avoid accidents.  
Leveson and Stephanopoulos call for a “system-theoretic control-
inspired” perspective in risk management. In this perspective, safe 
operation “is a constraint on how the mission…can be achieved, where 
by constraint we imply limitations on the behavioural degree of freedom 
of the system components” (2014, pp. 1 and 6). This approach dates back 
to Jens Rasmussen and his hierarchical safety control model of risk 
management (1997). In his view, risk management is a control task, and 
control can be enforced in many ways on different levels in the 
management structure. Rule-compliance is in line with Nancy Leveson`s 
view that safety is a control problem (2011), and the objective of exerting 
control is to avoid habitual operation on the margin of safe practice. 
Leveson presents the assumption that “Operator behavior is a product of 
the environment in which it occurs” (2011, p. 47), thus focussing on the 
mechanisms that shape human behaviour rather than on operator errors. 
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Andrew Hopkins (2011, p. 5) debates rule-compliance and risk 
management as two complementary approaches. He states that “Decision 
makers need rules, not numerical risk acceptance criteria, to guide their 
decisions”. For the sharp-end decision makers, rules may act as guidance 
to draw a line between acceptable and non-acceptable risk taking, termed 
“the line in the sand” by Jan Hayes (2012). From this perspective, rules 
are considered safety barriers, and the integrity of such barriers is 
considered paramount to safe operations. In her study on hazardous 
industries, managers of operations observed the status of barriers and 
applied professional judgement to establish self-imposed limits for final 
decisions on how to proceed in non-normal situations. In operational 
decision-making, less attention was paid to (uncertain) results from risk 
assessments and more to “How best to proceed”, comparing it to a job 
safety analysis.  
Rule- and constraint-based risk management is rooted in the 
cautious/precautious risk management strategy (Aven, 2014), 
accounting for uncertainties in our understanding of important 
phenomena and surprises in operations. In a robust approach, the focus 
will be on barriers to resist surprises, in recognition of the inherent 
uncertainties in risk assessments. In view of the challenges linked to 
climate change and natural hazards (Bjordal & Larsen, 2009), 
“Robustness in this context…should also cover the ability to cater for 
unknown requirements that may arise at a later stage of the field life 
cycle” (Vinnem, 2014, p. 369). 
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 Human factors in avalanche rescue 
A fundamental knowledge about snow avalanche physics is necessary 
but not enough to stay safe in avalanche terrain. So, there is more to 
sound decision-making than being knowledgeable and skilled, as 
demonstrated by the incidence rates of professionals in avalanche 
accidents (Horgen, 2017; Johnson et al., 2016). In Switzerland, in a five-
year period preceding 2006, 18% of victims were under the supervision 
of mountain guides (Walter & Brügger, 2012). A common denominator 
in avalanche accidents is that the victims have overlooked or ignored 
danger signs, or they have not taken adequate precautions in obviously 
dangerous conditions (Atkins, 2000; Vanpoulle et al., 2017).  In spite of 
detailed information on snow, weather and terrain factors in avalanche 
bulletins, most avalanche accidents take place during danger level 2 and 
3 conditions (EAWS, 2016; Greene et al., 2006; Techel & Zweifel, 
2013). On recognition of this context, the role of human factors in 
avalanche accidents has gradually become an important part of 
avalanche training and accident analysis (Adams, 2004; Atkins, 2000; 
McCammon, 2002, 2004, 2009).  
Many sad accidents in aviation are also linked to human factors 
(Braithwaite, 1999), with “Controlled Flight Into or Toward Terrain” 
being a most disturbing and quite common category (Boeing, 2018; 
Winn et al., 2012). Accidents when flying in darkness and adverse 
weather conditions are typical, and “Pilot decision making” and 
“External environment awareness” are frequent “Standard Problem 
Statements” (Blumen, 2012; Winn et al., 2012, p. 80). In aviation as in 
avalanche accidents, lack of experience does not totally reflect the 
important array of possible explanations.  
To reduce human errors as a cause of aviation accidents and to improve 
pilot performance, Crew Resource Management (CRM)  (Cooper, 1980; 
Helmreich et al., 1999) was introduced, and the CRM training 
programmes has achieved international recognition and dissemination. 
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In the original workshop report by Cooper et al. (1980, p. 7), a list of 
frequently observed problems was presented: 
x Preoccupation with minor mechanical problems 
x Inadequate leadership 
x Failure to delegate tasks and assign responsibilities 
x Failure to set priorities 
x Inadequate monitoring 
x Failure to utilize available data 
x Failure to communicate intent and plans 
Later developments of this approach now include topics related to 
cognitive errors, social psychology, teamwork, behavioural and 
communication skills, safety culture and safety climate (Flin et al., 2008; 
Salas et al., 2000). Although its efficiency and popularity have been 
debated, CRM training is now widely recommended by civil aviation 
authorities and adopted by other industries devoted to high reliability 
organizing (Flin et al., 2008; Weick et al., 2008). In the latest versions of 
CRM, human error is recognized as inevitable, and strategies aim at 
avoiding, trapping and mitigating consequences of error (Helmreich et 
al., 1999). Flin et al. (2008, p. 247) claim that this approach is a 
prerequisite for applying CRM as protection against human limitations. 
Different categories of travellers in avalanche terrain will have different 
motives and imperatives for being there, of which recreationists have the 
highest degree of freedom in their choice of time and place for their 
activities. Most avalanche professionals, like guides and avalanche 
forecasters, may also freely choose terrain complexity, despite 
experiencing pressure and expectations from schedules, clients and 
employers (Johnson et al., 2016). Rescuers experience the least degree 
of freedom, as they cannot choose another place, another time. They are 
truly on the horns of a dilemma, having to balance their own safety 
against the survival of other human beings (Paper III).  
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Albert R. Jonsen (1986, p. 174), ethicist by profession, introduced “The 
Rule of Rescue” in his discussion on priorities in healthcare in the light 
of utilitarianism. He concluded that medical measures that may prevent 
death or prolong life constitute a formidable barrier to “felicific 
calculus”, a scientific measure of what matters in decision-making.   
“I call this barrier the rule of rescue.  Our moral response to the 
imminence of death demands that we rescue the doomed. We throw 
a rope to the drowning, rush into burning buildings to snatch the 
entrapped, dispatch teams to search for the snowbound...The 
imperative to rescue is, undoubtedly, of great moral significance; 
but the imperative seems to grow into a compulsion, more 
instinctive than rational”.  
This phenomenon affects most aspects of medical intervention (McKie 
& Richardson, 2003), also how we conduct mountain rescue operations. 
Somewhere along the axis from imperative to compulsion, we need to 
define and explain the concept of overcommitment. 
John S. Ash and Clive Smallman (2008) studied the effect of 
overcommitment on decision makers` choice of rescue mode: defensive 
or offensive. They suggested that a statutory obligation to act, fear of 
scrutiny of rescuers, high expectations from the society and victim 
allegiance may force rescuers into overcommitment. In their study, 
overcommitment was defined as “rescue attempts in circumstances that 
were judged too risky to personnel by the expert cohort” (2008, p. 43).  
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 Monitoring of accident risk in the avalanche 
rescue service 
In risk management, Safety Information Systems (SIS) are established to 
enable comparison of the current safety level with safety goals (Aven et 
al., 2004). SIS data normally shows the "HSE cost" in the production, in 
the form of historical data on undesirable incidents, injuries and 
accidents. These are commonly called “lagging” risk indicators. By 
analysing SIS data, organizations may (Aven et al., 2004): 
• Monitor the current safety level 
• Identify risk factors 
• Identify causes to adverse events 
• Evaluate the effect of safety measures and activities 
• Provide a basis for prioritizing between measures 
In the Norwegian avalanche rescue service, there is no systematic 
documentation of HSE-related parameters. Since historical data may be 
scarce and because conditions may change over time, there is a need to 
identify predictive indicators of risk: “Given such a perspective, finding 
indicators that allow an organization to act before something happens, 
i.e. to be leading, rather than reactive and lagging, is a main challenge” 
(Herrera, 2012, p. 1).  
In a proactive approach, it is necessary to describe and understand how 
the avalanche rescue system performs during normal operations, to 
identify factors of success, as well as the true origins of undesirable 
incidents (Hollnagel, 2013; Hollnagel et al., 2015). The challenge is to 
adopt reliable and valid indicators that allow us to anticipate how future 
accidents may occur. The term "anticipate" also includes the uncertainty 
associated with the selection and assessment of relevant variables. 
Andrew Hale (2009, p. 479) points out that “It is also necessary that the 
leading indicators can be shown to correlate with the lagging ones”, as a 
proof of validity. This “necessity” could pose a practical-epistemological 
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problem, as correlation does not imply causation (Skog, 2004, p. 37). 
The effect of risk influencing factors on rescuer safety is seldom direct, 
close in time or always observable (Hume, 2003). Thus, the causal 
relationship is explained by logical induction. In this respect, to explain 
why an accident happened will always be easier than to predict that an 
accident will happen. Hale recommends adopting a standard scientific 
approach in the selection and evaluation of risk indicators (2009, p. 480). 
Thorsen and Njå (2014) studied how major accident risk in offshore oil 
and gas activities was monitored, and they developed a set of leading 
technical, operational and organizational risk indicators. They linked 
their 16 leading risk indicators to six risk influencing factors (RIF), of 
which “Monitoring technical barriers”, “Planning of activities”, 
“Competence and training” and “Information about risk” could be 
relevant in this project. In their conclusion, they found it important to 
build understanding and ownership of a limited set of indicators, and to 
communicate the proactive and predictive value of leading indicators to 
key personnel.  
In a major accident risk perspective, lagging risk indicators may not 
detect important systems-based causal factors (Leveson, 2011, 2015; 
Thorsen & Njå, 2014). Nancy Leveson introduced system-specific 
assumption-based leading risk indicators (2011, 2015), stating that major 
accidents result not from single component failure but from loss of 
control in the socio-technical system. The approach is based on the 
accident model, “System-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes” 
(STAMP) and rooted in Assumption Based Planning (APB) (Dewar, 
2002; Dewar et al., 1993). Dewar et al. (1993, p. 5) define an assumption 
as: “…an assertion about some characteristic of the future that underlies 
the current operations or plans of an organization”. In Leveson`s 
perspective, then (2015, p. 8), “A leading indicator is a warning signal 
that the validity or vulnerability of an assumption is changing”. 
STAMP's starting point is that accidents happen when safety constraints 
are violated, and the associated “Systems Theoretic Processes and 
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Analysis” (STPA) technique is designed to aid the identification of 
scenarios that may lead to violation of constraints. The leading indicators 
derive from the assumptions on which system design and operation is 
based and assumptions about the system`s vulnerability to changes. In a 
bow-tie-like approach, “shaping” and “hedging” actions are applied to 
maintain the integrity of the assumptions. The approach requires 
comprehensive documentation of assumptions and indicators, and 
Leveson brings up the question of the feasibility (2015, p. 32) “of 
documenting and checking all the vulnerable assumptions in complex 
systems”. She states that documentation of the assumptions included in 
engineering is anyway recommendable, and that “The process of 
documenting assumptions (design rationale) can be justified for more 
than a leading indicators program”. 
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3 Methodology 
3.1 Scientific approach 
The research presented in this thesis was conducted within a complex 
socio-technical system. Recollecting that the main aim of the project was 
to contribute to new knowledge, the intermediate objectives were to 
describe, explore, interpret and explain various phenomena pertaining to 
both natural and social science. Theories existed before the 
commencement of the various studies, as a basis for study design. 
Theories also developed from the studies, on which conclusions and 
recommendations were based. In this context, theories are defined as 
specified relations between various phenomena, factors and variables 
(Skog, 2004, p. 18).  
The scientific process of induction, in which detailed data about isolated 
events is accumulated and used to formulate general hypotheses, was 
incrementally established as the backbone of science. Results from 
experiments and observations were considered factual evidence, as 
opposed to speculation and clerical authority based on meta-physical 
interpretations.  
Inductive methodology, considered by many to represent the line 
between science and non-science, was first questioned by David Hume 
(1711-1776), a Scottish philosopher, as he claimed that conclusions 
based on observations of certain phenomena in the past will not 
necessarily show regularity and hold good in the future. This is, also 
today, the classical objection against using statistical frequencies to 
predict future events. Hume presented three distinct constraints for a 
causal relation to be fulfilled: the cause must appear prior to the effect, 
close in time and always produce the same effect. Hume, the sceptic, 
eventually compromised and concluded that inductive reasoning is a 
human trait, determining the way we think (Magee, 1973).  Bertrand 
Russell (1872-1970), a supporter of Hume on the problem of induction, 
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concluded that, without the independent logical principle of induction, 
“Science is impossible” (Magee, 1973, p. 21).  
To approach the problem of induction, Karl Popper introduced the 
concept of falsification; the true scientific task is to seek observations 
that would contradict the theory. A theory, then, is only valid to the 
extent that observations do not falsify it (Popper, 1976). Popper denied 
the existence of ultimate sources of knowledge, leaving all sources and 
suggestions open to criticism. His main point, rooted in critical 
rationalism, was that a search for ultimate sources of knowledge should 
be substituted by criticizing the theories presented by others and, above 
all, those presented by ourselves.  
The work presented in this thesis required a holistic approach and 
methodological pluralism (Skog, 2004). Mixed methods research 
(MMR) is positioned between quantitative and qualitative research, with 
a primary philosophy of pragmatism (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). 
It is an approach to knowledge “that attempts to consider multiple 
viewpoints, perspectives, positions and standpoints” (Johnson et al., 
2007, p. 113). Johnson and Ogwuebuzie argued that MMR is “the third 
research paradigm”, while recognizing that “Both quantitative and 
qualitative research are important and useful” (2004, p. 14). By this term, 
they referred to “research culture” as comprising “beliefs, values, and 
assumptions that a community of researchers has in common regarding 
the nature and conduct of research” (2007, pp. 129-130). Guba and 
Lincoln describe research paradigms as “the most informed and 
sophisticated views that its proponents have been able to devise” (1994, 
p. 108). As these research paradigms are human constructions, they can 
only be defended by persuasiveness rather that proof. 
One important aim of MMR is to strengthen content validity, and 
Newman et al. (2013, p. 244) argue that trustworthiness is increased by 
“triangulation of data sources, expert debriefing, and peer review”. From 
the perspective of constructivism, trustworthiness encompasses 
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“credibility (paralleling internal validity), transferability (paralleling 
external validity), dependability (paralleling reliability, and 
conformability (paralleling objectivity)” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 
114).  
Since qualitative and quantitative approaches add different data on the 
same phenomena, mixed methods will broaden the knowledge base and 
strengthen our belief that the applied methods measure what we believe 
that they measure. Triangulation can be applied to sources of data, data 
analysis, investigators, methods and theories (Thurmond, 2001), 
increasing the angle of view and the ways a phenomenon can be 
interpreted. Thurmond also points to some specific disadvantages of 
triangulation (2001), of which the time needed to complete the studies 
and an abundance of data seemed most relevant in this project. 
This thesis is, thus, written from the perspectives of critical realism and 
post-positivism, to gain insight into and experience of the system under 
study (mainly Papers I, II and III), and social constructivism when trying 
to understand and predict future states (mainly Papers II, IV and V) 
(Clark, 1998; Cruickshank, 2012). Figure 2 illustrates how research 
perspectives may change as the angle of view is shifted from 
retrospective to prospective.  
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Figure 2. Research perspectives. The shifting perspectives of research as the angle of view turns 
from retrospective to prospective. Illustration developed in conversation with Professor Ove 
Njå, University of Stavanger. 
 
An important reconciliation in post-positivism is that both numerical and 
non-numerical data are acceptable as blocks in building knowledge, thus 
including methodologies of interpretation. The stance taken in 
perspectives will, naturally, guide and limit the scope of research, the 
choice of methods, samples and analysis techniques (Ponterotto, 2005). 
Guba and Lincoln (1994, p. 116) conclude that “Paradigm issues are 
crucial: no inquirer, we maintain, ought to go about the business of 
inquiry without being clear about just what paradigm informs and guides 
his or her approach”. A diversity in perspectives should counteract 
incompleteness and enhance the overall credibility of the results 
(Thurmond, 2001).  
3.1.1 Study design 
Four separate studies resulted in five papers. The studies presented in 
Papers I-IV informed the safety analysis reported in Paper V. All papers 
informed the analyses and conclusions of the thesis (Figure 3). The 
thesis, thus, results from a multi-study, mixed methods triangulation 
approach. Ideally, results from the various studies should be kept 
separated until the final synthesis, but this is not achievable in practice. 
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There may also be good reasons for informing subsequent studies with 
the factual results from former inquiries, e.g. statistics.  
 
Figure 3. Study design. Papers I-IV informed the safety analysis reported in Paper V, and all 
papers informed the cross-paper findings, as well as the discussion and conclusion included in 
the thesis. 
 
The following is a brief overview of the papers and the associated study 
designs. See also Table 1. 
Paper I reports an empirically based retrospective quantitative study. 
Data from all 720 recorded Norwegian avalanche incidents in the period 
1996-2017 was analysed and interpreted. The tendencies derived by 
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analytical generalization (Polit & Beck, 2010) formed a basis for 
building knowledge and theories regarding patient and rescuer safety. 
Paper II reports a comprehensive study originating from my Master 
thesis, “Norwegian rescue teams' avalanche risk assessment and 
management in road related avalanche rescue operations” (Lunde, 2015). 
A retrospective quantitative study of all Norwegian road related 
avalanche incidents in the period 1996-2014, combined with a case by 
case analysis of 45 road related avalanche rescue operations and an 
exploratory factor analysis (Comrey & Lee, 2013) of risk assessment and 
management activities, served as input to the modelling of performance 
in Norwegian road related avalanche rescue operations. 
Papers III and IV report the findings of a phenomenological study 
comprising nine focus group interviews (P. Plummer-D'Amato, 2008a; 
Prudence Plummer-D'Amato, 2008b) of Helicopter Emergency Medical 
Service (HEMS) crew members in the Norwegian Air Ambulance 
Service. The aim was to explore the concept of overcommitment and to 
derive specific strategies to manage overcommitment in Norwegian 
medical evacuation and rescue operations. 
Paper V reports an expert systemic safety analysis of the Norwegian 
avalanche rescue service. The analysis was based on the STAMP 
approach (Leveson, 2011) and conducted in accordance with the STPA 
method (Leveson, 2013). The seminars and subsequent analyses 
resembled focus group interviews. The aim was to derive a systems 
analysis of the Norwegian avalanche rescue service and to evaluate the 
applicability and feasibility of the STAMP/STPA approach in a multi-
organizational context.   
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Table 1. Research papers with methods, populations and aims. 
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4 Results 
This chapter offers a summary of results from the various studies. In the 
final section, isolated statistics, observations and statements are used to 
synthesize findings across papers.  
4.1 Paper I 
Patient and rescuer safety: recommendations for dispatch and 
prioritization of rescue resources based on a retrospective study of 
Norwegian avalanche incidents 1996–2017. 
Aims: To present a basis for evaluation and necessary adjustments in the 
dispatch, prioritization, and management of Norwegian avalanche rescue 
operations. 
Results: The Norwegian JRCCs have registered 720 snow avalanche 
events, with a total of 568 avalanche victims, of which 120 (21%) died. 
Including those fatally injured, a total of 313 avalanche victims in 209 
accidents were treated as patients (55%), and we saw > 1 patient in 24% 
of these operations. Norwegian avalanche victims were partially or 
completely recovered prior to the arrival of rescuers in 75% (n = 117) of 
all rescue operations. In the remaining 25% of cases, the rescue service 
located 62% (n = 55) of the avalanche victims visually or electronically. 
In 50% of the 720 incidents, rescuers spent time searching in avalanches 
with no victims. 
Conclusions: This survey indicates that we have experienced a shift in 
Norwegian avalanche rescue: from a search for missing persons in the 
avalanche debris to immediate medical care of already-located patients. 
The findings suggest that a stronger focus on both patient and rescuer 
safety is necessary. The patients must be ensured the right treatment at 
the right place at the right time, and the allocation of rescue resources 
must reflect a need to reduce exposure in avalanche terrain, especially in 
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cases with no affirmed victims. The conclusions point to a stronger focus 
on performance measures rather than habitual, structural thinking. 
4.2 Paper II 
Rescue performance in Norwegian road related avalanche incidents. 
Aims: To present a model of Norwegian avalanche rescue performance, 
based on the characteristics of Norwegian road related avalanche 
incidents, the rescuers` degree of exposure to avalanche risk and their 
assessment and management of avalanche risk in these operations.  
Results: The annual average of road related avalanche incidents doubled 
to 11.6 in the five-year period from 2010-2014, compared with the 
preceding period, 1996-2009. Of the 135 recorded 1996-2014 avalanche 
incidents, 110 had no victim involvement (81.5%). In the remaining 25 
recorded accidents, 11 out of 34 avalanche victims died (32.4%). In the 
period 1996-2014, no vehicles or victims were completely covered by 
avalanche debris, and, subsequently, none of the avalanche victims 
required location by traditional means.  
Two-thirds of the 2010-2014 incidents happened during considerable 
avalanche danger (EAWS, 2016) and, in 12 out of 45 operations (26.7%), 
rescuers stayed and worked in avalanche runout zones when danger of 
naturally released avalanches was imminent. Rescuers were not exposed 
in 10 of the 45 rescue operations (22.2%). Members of the rescue service, 
measured through five chronologic phases of rescue operations, deviated 
regularly from the prescription for avalanche risk assessment and risk 
management. The degree of rescuer exposure was highly correlated with 
deviations from the prescribed avalanche risk assessment and 
management activities (0.84).  
A factor analysis (Comrey & Lee, 2013; Starkweather, 2014), based on 
the registration of deviations, supported the isolation of three latent 
factors, denoted: I: Degree of avalanche risk awareness; II: Degree of 
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commitment, and III: Degree of application of risk-reduction measures 
and mitigation.  
Based on the overall results and obtaining expert judgement (Aven, 
2014; Vick, 2002), we constructed a Bayesian network consisting of 34 
variables. The qualitative and quantitative modelling showed that the 
Norwegian rescue service demonstrates acceptable performance in six 
out of ten road related avalanche rescue operations. Acceptable 
performance is achieved when due concern is paid to the safety of both 
rescuer and patient. 
Conclusions: Reported road related avalanche incidents, with no 
observations of involved vehicles, no reports of missing people along the 
road section in question, no visible signs on the surface of the avalanche 
and no other circumstantial indications of an accident, commonly have 
no involved victims. Therefore, in such cases, high-risk search 
operations should be substituted with careful, planned and risk-minded 
investigations to clarify the situation. Excessive exposure of rescuers in 
avalanche runout zones can be linked to deficiencies in the acquisition 
and flow of information in the alert and dispatch phase, inadequate 
deployment of competent personnel and over-commitment. This could 
explain inadequacies in the avalanche risk assessment and management. 
The modelling of avalanche rescue performance with Bayesian Belief 
Networks proved its function as a useful and transparent diagnostic tool, 
aiding the identification and evaluation of risk influencing factors. 
4.3 Paper III 
The concept of overcommitment in rescue operations.  Some theoretical 
aspects based upon empirical data. 
Aims: To describe and define over-commitment as a uniform concept in 
rescue operations, based upon empirical data. 
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Results: Focus group interviews with crew members in the Norwegian 
HEMS revealed “cost benefit” as a term to summarize their 
considerations about degree of commitment during rescue missions. In 
this context, cost is an undefined measure of life-threatening “risk”, 
whereas benefit reflects the patient`s prognosis, given the assistance 
from air ambulance personnel. “Cost benefit” considerations rest on four 
main pillars: patient situation, rescuer situation, triage and rescuer 
robustness. Their comments also aided the identification of eleven causal 
factors which may affect degree of commitment: personal affection and 
risk willingness; tunnel vision and target fixation; mission creeping; lack 
of knowledge; demanding, low frequency events; low-risk high-
frequency events; equipment availability; expectations and external 
pressure; post-quiescence syndrome; unforeseen events; organizational 
overcommitment. 
Conclusions: The reflections of air ambulance personnel broaden the 
concept of overcommitment to also include regular, everyday actions as 
hazardous rescue attempts in extraordinary incidents. Their examples 
draw a fine, blurry line between a necessary change of pace, to reach the 
patient in time, and impetuous actions, putting their lives in danger. 
The study yielded this definition of over-commitment in medical 
evacuation and rescue operations: “Situations where rescuers make 
themselves or others vulnerable by committing more than is feasible, 
desirable, expected, recommended or compellingly necessary in the 
given scenario, and thereby run the risk of personal injury or death”. 
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4.4 Paper IV 
Overcommitment: Management in Helicopter Emergency Medical 
Services in Norway 
Aims: To identify individual approaches and organizational strategies 
that counteract instances in which rescuers commit more than is feasible, 
desirable, expected, recommended, or compellingly necessary. 
Results: Air ambulance personnel pointed to sociological, cognitive, and 
organizational elements that may influence their degree of commitment 
in challenging and hazardous rescue situations. Twelve commitment-
moderating factors were identified: anticipation; contingency planning; 
communication; cue recognition; equipment and sensors; experience; 
risk and vulnerability awareness; quality and flow of information; 
training and preparedness; standard procedures; teamwork behaviour. 
The nontechnical, commitment-moderating activities used by HEMS 
personnel to stay safe in a complex rescue environment, named 
“Operational Uncertainty Management” by the authors, could be linked 
to tactics of coping with uncertainty based on the RAWFS heuristic 
(Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997) and elements of mindfulness (Weick et al., 
2008). RAWFS is an acronym labelling the five coping strategies: 
Reducing uncertainties, Assumption-based reasoning, Weighing pros 
and cons, Forestalling and Suppression of uncertainty. 
Conclusions: HEMS personnel describe a team-based approach to adjust 
their level of commitment in medical evacuation and rescue missions. 
Their organizational structure, on-base duty time, CRM training, and 
frequent debriefing of missions enhance trustful and direct online team 
talk. They rely on a combination of nontechnical skills, standard 
operational procedures, and organizational measures to identify and 
avoid harm's way. 
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4.5 Paper V 
A systems thinking approach to safety in Norwegian avalanche rescue 
operations. 
Aims: To investigate the ability of the STAMP (Leveson, 2011) 
approach to reveal weaknesses in and between services involved in 
Norwegian avalanche rescue missions. By conducting a STPA (Leveson 
& Thomas, 2018), we wanted to: 
1: Identify goals, hazards, requirements and constraints. 
2: Derive a safety control structure for the Norwegian avalanche rescue 
service. 
3: Identify recurrent unsafe control actions in the Norwegian avalanche 
rescue system.  
4: Evaluate STAMP and STPA as methods for analysing risk and safety 
in the Norwegian avalanche rescue service. 
Results: Experts derived goals, hazards, requirements, constraints, a 
safety-control structure and unsafe control actions from a STAMP-based 
analysis of three avalanche rescue operations. The gap analysis revealed 
that both dispatchers and emergency personnel lack recommended 
training. First responders from the ordinary emergency services also lack 
basic avalanche safety equipment. This points to failing assumptions as 
regards compliance with safety requirements, the operationalization of 
the safety control structure and what is common avalanche rescue 
practice in Norway. 
Conclusions: Goals, hazards, requirements, constraints, a safety control 
structure and common explanations for recurrent unsafe control actions 
were identified. Contrary to critics, systemic accident analysis proved 
manageable and productive, as it unceasingly directed the analyst’s 
attention towards organizational challenges at the blunt end. 
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4.6 Main findings across studies 
In this section, common findings across the studies are presented. The 
selection is not complementary, and the findings are supported by a 
varying number of the completed studies. The selection is based on 
related statistical results, observations and statements. By a process of 
“analytic generalization” (Polit & Beck, 2010, p. 1453), the expressed 
findings are, thus, identified by converging evidence derived from the 
various papers. 
x Call-out and dispatch of rescue resources to avalanches with no 
victims involved is common.  
o In 50% of all avalanche incidents and 81% of road related 
avalanche incidents, no victims were involved (Papers I and II).  
o Qualitatively supported in Papers III and V, as the interviewees 
and experts talked about tendencies to deploy an excess of 
rescuers to avalanche incidents with uncertainty as to whether 
anyone was caught. In Paper III, this was named “Organizational 
overcommitment”.  
 
x Overcommitment is common in avalanche rescue operations. 
o The ratio of non-involvement operations to the total number of 
avalanche rescue missions is high (Papers I and II). 
o The frequency of undesirable incidents in avalanche rescue 
operations, as reported in Paper II and in Lunde & Kristensen 
(2013) has been consistently high, around 25%. 
o Observations of overcommitment are reported by important 
actors in this line of rescue work (Papers III, IV and V). 
o Around 40% of road related operations took place during the dark 
hours of the day (Paper II) and frequently in poor visibility. 
o Most of the rescue operations took place during considerable 
avalanche danger (Paper II). 
o A high frequency of deviations related to risk assessment and 
management activities (Paper II). 
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x Variability in rescue response is common. 
o Police incident commanders are not always present. As reported 
in Paper II, incident commanders from the police were present at 
the accident site in 61-72% of cases. 
o Air rescue resources are not always available or able to respond. 
Air rescue helicopters were activated / en route to road related 
avalanche incidents in 47-60% of cases (Paper II). HEMS 
helicopters and Air-Force-operated search-and-rescue 
helicopters responded to 325 and 184 of the 720 registered 
avalanche incidents, respectively, during the years from 1996 to 
2017 (Paper I). 
o The frequency of deviations from a prescription for risk 
assessment and management varied between rescue operations 
(Paper II). 
o Observations reported by HEMS crew members (Papers III and 
IV) and experts (Paper V) indicated great variation in 
competency and preparedness amongst rescuers and rescue units. 
o Modelling of rescue performance showed a 63% probability of a 
safe and efficient avalanche rescue performance (Paper II). 
o Lack of compliance with regulations and recommendations 
(Paper V). 
 
x No avalanche accidents or incidents involving rescue personnel. 
o None of the studies revealed that rescue personnel were directly 
involved in naturally released or self-triggered avalanches. 
Anecdotal evidence indicated that rescuers` vehicles were hit or 
blocked by avalanche debris, and that rescuers had to flee from 
flowing avalanche debris.  
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4.6.1. Risk indicators in the avalanche rescue service 
Based on findings and recommendations in Papers II, III, IV and V, it 
appears important to operationalize indicators that allow the monitoring 
of:  
• The degree of avalanche risk awareness  
• The degree of commitment 
• The degree of risk management and mitigation 
The selection of risk indicators in this project was based on a definition 
derived from Thorsen and Njå (2014, p. 4): “A measurable quantity 
which may provide information about risk factors influencing rescuer 
and patient safety in avalanche rescue operations”.  
According to Herrera (2012, pp. 20-21), risk indicators should be 
meaningful, sensitive, reliable, measurable, verifiable, inter-subjective, 
operational and affordable. The suggested leading risk indicators (Table 
2) are formulated in accordance with these requirements and based on 
cross-paper findings and the system requirements presented in Paper V, 
Appendix A.  
The indicators are also supportive of an assumption that:  
- Avalanche rescue operations are to be handled by trained and 
experienced personnel at all levels, in planned and proficiently 
managed operations that consider both patient and rescuer safety, and 
in which all operative personnel carry the necessary safety 
equipment.  
They are, thus, “developed to identify weakening effectiveness of the 
controls to enforce the safety constraints” (Leveson, 2015, p. 33).  
In the subsequent interpretation of these indicators, small fractions are 
equivalent to the weak danger signs that sometimes precede major 
accidents (Weick et al., 2008) or signs of migration towards a higher risk 
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level (Rasmussen, 1997). Recollecting Leveson’s perspective, they may 
provide “a warning signal that the validity or vulnerability of an 
assumption is changing” (2015, p. 8).  
 
Table 2. Suggested leading indicators of risk in avalanche rescue, based on cross-paper findings 
and the system requirements presented in Paper V, Appendix A. 
Risk influencing 
factor 
Leading indicators 
Technical barriers Fraction of operative personnel with avalanche safety 
equipment, personal GPS tracking device, and personal 
communication device/radio. 
Fraction of rescue operations with a complete set of safety 
equipment to all rescuers. 
Planning / 
preparedness / 
management 
Number of regional avalanche exercises per year. 
Number of interorganizational meetings per year. 
Fraction of formal debriefings following rescue operations. 
Fraction of operations where avalanche rescue specialists are 
called out. 
Fraction of rescue operations where the JRCC was notified 
immediately about avalanche incidents. 
Fraction of rescue operations where medical personnel were 
alerted immediately and deployed directly to the accident site. 
The ratio of completed search operations to the number of real 
rescues involving avalanche victims. 
Competence and 
training 
Fraction of personnel with basic avalanche training. 
Fraction of personnel with system-specific training. 
Fraction of rescuers whose training is overdue. 
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Fraction of rescuers with interorganizational CRM training. 
Information about 
risk 
Fraction of personnel who have attended briefings on 
established safe meeting places along avalanche-prone road 
sections. 
Number of briefings on avalanche rescue response that 
personnel from the emergency services have attended during 
the winter season. 
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5 Discussion 
The main aim of this project has been to contribute new knowledge on 
factors that are important for risk management and performance in 
Norwegian avalanche rescue operations. The initial two studies 
characterized avalanche rescue incidents, risk assessment and 
management activities, and avalanche rescue practice and performance. 
An exploratory study on overcommitment was conducted to increase the 
understanding of human factors in medical evacuation and rescue 
operations, and a safety analysis was conducted to evaluate the avalanche 
rescue system. The studies have offered information on structural, 
operational and individual aspects of avalanche rescue. In this section, 
the presented results are evaluated as to their ability to answer the 
research aims and questions.  
5.1 Risk management – The balancing act 
In this project, undesirable incidents and loss of barrier integrity have 
been considered weak signals of imminent danger. They also signal a 
disturbance of equilibrium, as weight is shifted towards either side: 
patient safety or rescuer safety. Is the avalanche rescue system correctly 
balanced to sustain the extra load of risk influencing factors, like 
uncertainty about the patient`s situation, variability in rescue resources 
and ever-changing environmental conditions? 
The modelling of avalanche rescue performance presented in Paper II 
indicated that 6 out of 10 operations are conducted in a safe and efficient 
manner. Although the focus of this thesis has been to detect weaknesses 
in the overall avalanche rescue system, it is also important to dwell on 
the fact that many high-quality operations are carried out. Indirectly, the 
findings that point to flaws and weaknesses also point to factors of 
success. In the following, a balancing act is sought, illustrated by 
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debating stabilizing and destabilizing factors in risk management in 
Norwegian avalanche rescue operations. 
5.1.1 Stabilizing factors  
Requisite variety 
Previously, in Section 1.1.2, the Norwegian rescue service was referred 
to as an integrated project organization (Brandshaug, 2011). Although 
probably not the result of a specific design to achieve high reliability, the 
multi-organizational and multi-skill profile of the rescue service displays 
“a requisite variety” (Weick et al., 2008) that contributes to keeping 
operations reasonably safe. The rationale for this assertion was 
introduced by Schulman (1993, p. 358), as he pointed to “conceptual 
slack”, i.e. “a divergence in analytical perspectives among members of 
an organization over theories, models, or causal assumptions pertaining 
to its technology or production processes”, as a reliability-enhancing 
property. Conceptual slack encompasses both an excess of resources 
(“resource slack”) and freedom in organizational activity (“control 
slack”), which relaxes the dependence on immaculate procedures and 
foresight.  
Kruke and Olsen (2005) studied reliability-seeking networks and found 
that the collective ability to analyse problems from different perspectives 
contributes to enhanced anticipation, resilience and sound scepticism, 
thus also increasing the ability to cope with extraordinary situations 
(Masys, 2012).   
The strategies recommended by HEMS crew members to recognize and 
manage overcommitment partly relied on requisite variety (Papers III 
and IV). The cross-trained, multi-professional three-man crews 
encourage each other to present different perspectives and opposing 
views, to avoid “tunnel vision” and other similar psychological 
Discussion 
54 
phenomena which may affect their decision-making in challenging 
rescue missions.  
Samvirke1 
Schulman describes two types of conceptual slack: “resource slack” and 
“control slack” (1993, p. 353). It is tempting to see the volunteer rescue 
organizations, in particular, as representatives of “resource slack”, and 
their decentralized structure of emergency preparedness as “control 
slack”, both important assets of the Norwegian emergency preparedness 
principle, “Samvirke” (Regjeringen, 2015). Volunteer rescue 
organizations are not directly limited by economy in their activities; they 
organize their own activities and develop rescue methods and techniques.  
The principle of “Samvirke” can be linked to “the rule of rescue” 
(Jonsen, 1986), in that it entails a voluntary and “deeply rooted 
willingness to help when accidents occur” (Aasland & Braut, 2018, p. 
178). It utilizes, then, the enthusiasm that follows volunteerism (Bowen 
& Siehl, 1997; March & Simon, 1993) in two ways; one is the decision 
to participate and the other is an inherent wish to be utterly prepared for 
the job. In a variety of ways, local rescue resources are “communities of 
practice” (Wenger & Snyder, 2000) defined as “…groups of people who 
share a concern or a passion for something they do and learn how to do 
it better as they interact regularly” (Wenger, 2011, p. 1). The result is 
locally developed knowledge and skills, which contribute to maintaining 
a certain level of expertise in avalanche emergency preparedness.  
In this way, the benefits of requisite variety are institutionalized by the 
principle of “Samvirke”. In a holistic perspective, transfer and overlap of 
 
1 “Samvirke is a Norwegian word for a concept based upon a type of organisation with 
traditions going back hundreds of years, as well as a principle for cooperation and 
collaboration. Still it is something more than and different from collaboration. 
Samvirke carries values as confidence and common understanding. By tradition, 
samvirke is based upon voluntary and open membership and democratic governance” 
(Aasland & Braut, 2018, p. 1). 
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tasks and responsibilities between multi-organizational rescue units may 
also compensate for variability in rescue unit presence, competency and 
degree of preparedness. Since "Samvirke”, in effect, invites local 
rescuers from different professions, with firm knowledge of local 
conditions, to be prepared for a variety of rescue situations, it is here 
considered an important stabilizing factor in risk management.  
Individual capacities 
The framework constituted by local rescue organizations further 
stimulates a development of individuals` knowledge, skills and attitudes. 
Several authors (Leveson, 2011; Rasmussen, 1997; Reason, 1997) have 
pointed to the importance of individual assessment and action to 
maintain control in emergencies. The activities of individuals may even 
deviate from standard procedures, as a necessity to remain in control of 
a critical situation. “This operator variability reflects a capacity of human 
operators to respond creatively to shifting contexts” (Rasmussen & 
Suedung, 2000, p. 66).  
Paper V’s findings point to a decentralized responsibility for assessing 
risk in avalanche rescue operations. One of the interviewees named this 
phenomenon: “Outsourcing of control actions to the next level…”. In 
this respect, competent decision-making by the individual front-end 
rescuers may compensate for inadequate control algorithms at a higher 
level (Reason et al., 1998; Weick et al., 2008). Leveson (2011) argues 
that front-end personnel are not always capable of making safe decisions, 
pointing to the importance of system-level information for sound 
decision-making. System-level information in avalanche rescue 
operations could be regional and local avalanche risk, knowledge of 
other rescue resources approaching from different directions, and 
information about the patient`s situation (cost-benefit; Paper III). 
Individual capacities as safety barriers are not necessarily visible in plans 
and reports of organized rescue activity, which implies that the effect of 
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individual skills on operative risk management is not easily measured, 
perhaps only noticed as low accident rates. In oversimplified hindsight 
analyses, sharp-end actors are more easily identified as “the culprits” in 
cases of accidents (Rasmussen, 1997; Reason, 1997).  
Buffers 
The findings reported in Papers III and IV, on overcommitment, seem to 
support the impression that the individuals` perception of risk and how 
they communicate this to their fellow rescuers is a major factor in 
managing operational risk. Crew members accentuated critical questions 
as an important approach to avoid common pitfalls of overcommitment. 
This is in accordance with the concept of “Red teaming” (Masys, 2012), 
i.e. to encourage different perspectives. The HEMS crew members 
maintained that this capacity is linked to knowledge, experience and 
teamwork behaviour. Due to the variability in the rescue service, an 
adequate level of training and experience cannot be expected in all rescue 
units participating in avalanche rescue. Specially trained rescue 
personnel, often air rescue crew members, therefore, constitute important 
"buffers" between less experienced personnel and demanding rescue 
situations.  
This, of course, also points to a major vulnerability in the system: what 
happens when rescue operations, by coincidence, are handled by less 
experienced personnel through all managerial levels? This question is 
partly answered by Papers II and V, pointing also to weaknesses in 
control algorithms at dispatch centres as a lack of risk assessment 
activities in later rescue phases. “Most accidents in well-designed 
systems involve two or more low-probability events occurring in the 
worst possible combination” (Leveson, 2011, p. 34).  
The National Guidelines for Avalanche Rescue 
The establishment of national guidelines for avalanche rescue in 2007 
(NRR, 2012) have played an important role in standardizing rescue 
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procedures. The guidelines function as a “Book of Knowledge”, “a 
database that…capture the relevant knowledge that (rescuers) need to do 
their job, including compliance standards, best practices and lessons 
learned…” (Wenger et al., 2002, p. 3). As a common platform for 
communication across organizational borders between professional and 
non-professional rescuers, the guidelines further stimulate knowledge 
building and risk awareness in the communities of rescue practice. A 
major challenge is that financial and time constraints may lead important 
actors in the rescue service to disregard recommendations presented in 
guidelines. Risk management in avalanche rescue operations could 
benefit from converting some parts of the guidelines for avalanche rescue 
into strict rules, also for the managerial levels in the rescue service 
(Hopkins, 2011). Challenges linked to “procedural overspecification” 
(Reason et al., 1998, p. 291) and non-compliance will be discussed in the 
next section. 
5.1.2 Destabilizing factors 
The systemic safety analysis presented in Paper V seemed to summarize 
the results presented in Papers I and II and supported the theory of 
overcommitment presented in Papers III and IV. The following over-
arching topics stand out as possible explanations for heightened risk 
levels for patients and rescuers.  
Inadequate control algorithms 
Paper V reports that inadequate control algorithms were frequent 
common causes of unsafe control actions. The unsafe control actions 
defined by Leveson (2011) are: 
1. An unsafe control action is provided that creates a hazard. 
2. A required control action is not provided to avoid a hazard. 
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3. A potentially safe control action is provided too late, too early or in 
the wrong order. 
4. A continuous safe control action is provided for too long or is stopped 
too soon. 
Dispatch procedures are seemingly not facilitating risk assessment 
activities in the initial stages of rescue operations. Reflected in Leveson’s 
accident causation model (2011, p. 217), all four types of unsafe control 
actions were identified. Please see Paper V, Table 1 for further details. 
In the study on road related avalanche incidents (Paper II), frequent 
deviations from normative risk assessment activities were linked to the 
regular exposure of rescuers in avalanche runout zones. A Bayesian 
Belief Network modelling of rescue performance showed that rescue 
management and dispatch of rescue resources are major determinants in 
safe and efficient rescue operations. 
Undesirable incidents indicate a control problem, and control algorithms 
are keys to enforcing safety constraints in a socio-technical system 
(Leveson, 2011). Deficient and differing control algorithms may 
contribute to coincidental variation in performance, both within and 
between the various dispatch centres. This may also cause coordination 
risks. Coherent dispatch procedures are vital parts of dispatch decision 
systems when handling interdependent conditions within or between 
dispatch centres and managerial levels (Johnson, 2016; Leveson, 2011) 
(Paper V). In practical terms, omitting in-depth questioning of witnesses 
and an initial assessment of mission risk (Bründl & Etter, 2012; 
Kristensen et al., 2007) (Paper II) could deprive rescuers of important 
“framing” information (Perrin et al., 2001; Sadler et al., 2007), which 
may positively affect their risk perception and risk awareness (Papers III 
and IV). Framing could also affect the mental models we use when 
selecting strategies for problem solving (Endsley, 1995). 
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The retrospective study of Norwegian avalanche incidents presented in 
Paper I pointed to outdated control algorithms that systematically sub-
optimize the possibility to offer avalanche victims swift and proficient 
prehospital care. The study showed that 55% of avalanche victims were 
injured and that 75% of victims were recovered by the time organized 
rescuers arrived at the scene of the accident. Despite this, helicopters 
were routinely detoured or kept waiting for other resources specialized 
in searching for victims. To uphold this response pattern could be seen 
as a system failure and a breach of professional standards: “The standard 
of performance under given conditions which takes into account recent 
knowledge and evidence-based norms and a standard of practice 
expected of a qualified, well-considered practitioner with similar 
experience in similar circumstances” (Helse og Omsorgsdepartementet, 
2005; Saunes et al., 2010, pp. 25 and 31).  
The importance of control algorithms is linked to both quality assurance 
and learning. Although strict compliance with all detailed descriptions in 
written instructions at dispatch centres is not to be expected (Rasmussen, 
1997), control algorithms should represent best practice, thus ensuring 
optimal handling of avalanche emergencies. The analysis of deviations 
from a prescription for avalanche risk assessment and management 
reported in Paper II is a sort of feedback to dispatch centres. It is “a 
comparison of output measures, including performance, with 
organizational objectives…”, serving as a basis for evaluation and 
adjustment of dispatch centre control actions (Reason et al., 1998, p. 
290).  The system goal identified in the systemic safety analysis (Paper 
V) was: “To provide safe and efficient rescue efforts in all conditions”. 
The control algorithms at dispatch centres need to be adjusted to support 
this organizational objective. Reason et al. (1998, p. 290) state: “This 
type of control (job appraisal) is often necessary when tasks are complex 
and unpredictable”.  
Siri Wiig (2007, p. 10) conducted a multi-level case study on learning 
from errors in healthcare, concluding that “Different system levels are 
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dependent on each other in the process of error prevention”. In evaluation 
of rescue operations, the written algorithms function as a basis for 
transfer of experience and input to necessary changes in rescue practice. 
The group of experts involved in the systemic safety analysis (Paper V) 
identified that links between the dispatch of rescuers and risk assessment 
activities were missing. These links can be provided by continuously 
improved control algorithms.  
Another question, which is not discussed in any detail in this thesis, is 
whether dispatch centre algorithms are designed to accomplish the 
suggested normative risk assessment activities. This could relate to 
differences in mental models between blunt-end designers of systems 
and front-end rescue personnel. Figure 4 illustrates how differences 
between mental models may arise in the avalanche rescue system 
(Leveson, 2011, p. 42) and subsequently cause disharmony in 
perspectives on important issues in avalanche rescue performance. 
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Figure 4. System design and mental models in the avalanche rescue service (Leveson, 2011, p. 
42). 
 
The analyses in this thesis are mainly conducted from the front-end 
perspective, since that is where rescuer and patient safety will be 
compromised. This means that dispatch centres may have been measured 
in tasks which they consider to be outside their responsibilities and 
design specifications (Paper II). Hence, dispatch centres are not staffed 
and trained to conduct and facilitate avalanche risk assessment and 
management.  
The added strain of reforms in governmental agencies, causing “time 
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impact on the learning conditions within and across system levels” 
(Wiig, 2008, p. 46) could further compromise the capacity and 
competency of dispatch centres. This is also linked to the next topic: 
failing assumptions. 
Failing assumptions 
Given the assumption that the structure and hierarchy of the rescue 
service is designed for safe rescue practice, and that the 
operationalization of this design requires education, training, staffing and 
safety-minded control algorithms at all levels, the findings in this project 
point to serious gaps between theory and practice.  
Paper V’s findings indicate that the police, as a structurally visible and 
hierarchically important controller in the safety control structure of the 
rescue service, do not meet the expectations of instructions (Regjeringen, 
1995, Nr. 16, 2005, 2015, 2018), guidelines (NRR, 2012) and 
recommendations (Bründl & Etter, 2012; Van Tilburg et al., 2017). This 
may contribute to a deficient control of rescue operations in the critical 
first hour. This is an example of an assumption that is failing (Leveson, 
2011, 2015), and the assumption may be considered “load bearing” in 
Dewar`s terminology, thus requiring “significant changes in the 
organization`s plans” (2002, p. 66).  
Practical changes are already clearly visible in that front-end 
management and coordination, to an increasing degree, is allocated to 
volunteer rescuers, the local fire brigade and the ambulance services. 
Descriptive statistics in Paper II showed that incidence commanders 
from the police were present at the accident site in less than 75% of cases. 
Despite lack of competence and avalanche safety equipment, police 
patrols were the most frequent first organized rescue responders in road 
related avalanche incidents. In backcountry accidents, a swift police 
response and presence is less common. Recent anecdotal evidence from 
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newspapers also supports observations that incident commanders from 
the police arrive late, or not at all, in various types of emergencies. 
Wiig (2008, p. 55) concluded that emergency management in the public 
sector is vulnerable to a “compound pressure between efficiency and 
safety” and therefore given less priority compared with other, mandatory 
tasks. Rescue management is only a minor part of the police portfolio, 
which may force leaders to downsize preparations for rather infrequent 
avalanche emergencies.  
The assumption is also failing for other participants in avalanche rescue 
operations. The experts in the systemic safety analysis (Paper V) pointed 
towards similar deficiencies to those in the police in both the ambulance 
service and the fire and rescue departments.  Avalanche rescue 
methodology or skills-based training is not a part of the standard 
education for first responders in these emergency services. This also 
implies that these units are generally not equipped with avalanche safety 
equipment. 
Paper V discusses the implications of not complying with regulations 
and recommendations, with reference to Andrew Hopkins (2011), who 
recommended prescriptive rules to force “laggards” into line. This is, of 
course, a sensitive issue, if structurally important regulators (controllers) 
are themselves part of the problem. Sharp-end decision makers may 
choose not to comply with rescue procedures, as a necessary 
accommodation to dynamic situations (Rasmussen, 1997; Reason, 
1997). Blunt-end non-compliance with training requirements, control 
algorithms and recommended risk assessment activities could affect the 
safety of sharp-end workers and patients, as indicated in Papers I, II and 
V. Ignorant rescue management could also force rescuers to overcommit, 
if rescue activities are wrongly initiated in hazardous conditions (Papers 
III and IV). An important aspect to consider in future discussions on this 
matter is that the safety control structure of the rescue service (Paper V) 
illustrates a top-down safety management, whereas the development of 
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avalanche rescue procedures and recommendations, e.g. the guidelines 
for avalanche rescue (NRR, 2012), are exclusively a bottom-up activity. 
This also serves to illustrate that the police, although institutionally an 
operative partner in the rescue “samvirke”, are not an integral part of the 
“communities of avalanche rescue practice”. 
Lastly, the variability in the rescue organizations is also indicative of 
vulnerable assumptions about proficiency in avalanche rescue 
management. The performance analysis presented in Paper II showed a 
63% probability of efficient and safe rescue operations. The uncertainty 
about avalanche rescue performance could be linked to a mismatch 
between the assumptions on which the rescue service is designed and the 
practical feasibility of rescue plans and actions.  
Inadequate avalanche risk assessments 
Considering the required short response times in rescue operations 
(Brugger et al., 2001), a knowledge-based, high-quality avalanche risk 
assessment requires immediate and direct dispatch of acknowledged 
experts. The Norwegian National Guidelines for Avalanche Rescue 
(NRR, 2012) recommend that snow safety specialists are summoned to 
assist rescuers in complex operations. According to a government 
circular, experts from the Norwegian Geotechnical Institute can be called 
out to assist in rescue operations and situations requiring the evacuation 
of inhabited areas (Regjeringen, 1978).  
The group of experts in the systemic safety analysis also identified the 
summoning of snow safety specialists as a safety requirement (Paper V, 
Appendix A). Avalanche rescue leaders are frequently called out to assist 
in avalanche rescue operations, but these are volunteers with variable 
training and experience in avalanche risk assessment. Paper II’s findings 
show that road related avalanche incidents often take place in periods 
with considerable-to-high avalanche risk, in darkness and limited 
visibility. Avalanche risk assessments in these conditions require 
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specific and ample training, in addition to proficient use of specific map 
tools to assist the judgements (Caragounis et al., 2015). The later 
developments of the map tool “Regobs” by the Norwegian Water 
Resources and Energy Directorate (Engeset et al., 2018) demonstrates 
promising features, which offer valuable assistance in avalanche risk 
assessments, also for less skilled rescue personnel. 
The Canadian BC Ministry of Transportation and Infrastructure (2017) 
demonstrates split roles in avalanche emergencies, where Avalanche 
Safety Officers focus on snow safety issues, whereas Task Force Leaders 
concentrate on the implementation of search and rescue techniques. A 
division of responsibility between safety assessments and rescue 
activities could ensure high-quality rescue performance and help prevent 
overcommitment in rescue efforts (Papers III and IV).  
To remain in control of safety when responding to road related avalanche 
incidents, the rescue service could introduce level-based decision 
making as a safety constraint. Leveson discusses limitations to 
decentralized decision-making, stating that “Low level personnel can 
only make decisions in one direction, that is, they may only abort 
landings” (2011, p. 44). “Low level” in this context needs to be 
interpreted as low competence level. A similar approach was suggested 
by one of the experts in the systemic safety analysis (Paper V), in which 
a “NO” would be OK, whereas a “GO” would require a separate 
assessment from qualified personnel. This could prevent untrained and 
unequipped personnel from entering danger zones; however, it would 
increase the time needed for rescuers to arrive at the scene of accidents. 
5.1.3 Overcommitment 
The conflicting imperatives of rescue pose a serious challenge to the 
rescue system goals: safe and efficient rescue efforts in all conditions 
(Paper V). The exploratory study of overcommitment in medical 
evacuation and rescue operations yielded a surprisingly multifaceted 
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picture of a phenomenon which seemed recognizable to the interviewees. 
Overcommitment was appreciated as an important topic, both in their 
demanding medical evacuation missions and in rescue operations 
requiring interorganizational efforts. They explained the anatomy of 
situations where rescuers could make themselves vulnerable by 
committing more than was feasible, desirable, expected, recommended 
or compellingly necessary. The crews also reflected on their own 
strategies to resist overcommitment, summarized in Paper IV as 
“operational uncertainty management”.  
The autonomous response of geographically widespread rescue units 
poses a serious challenge to controlling overcommitment in the critical 
first hour of rescue operations. Risk perception and situation awareness 
are bound to differ due to inter-rescuer variations in background, 
training, experience and available “subsets of information” (Endsley, 
1995, p. 39). Siri Wiig (2008, p. 57), who studied risk management in a 
parallel arena, found that “Risk perception within the specialized 
healthcare regime was heterogeneous and varied across regime levels”. 
The resulting differences in risk images across organizational borders 
affected the sharing of information and subsequently also how risk was 
managed. 
The spatio-temporal differences in avalanche risk are reflected in the 
individual perspectives of rescuers approaching from totally different 
directions. Optimally, to achieve a high level of shared situation 
awareness across rescue units travelling in a complex environment 
requires a continuous exchange of safety-related information. Team 
situation awareness in these situations would be “the sum of operator 
perception and comprehension of information and the ability to make 
projections of system states on this basis” (Kaber & Endsley, 1998, p. 
43). In short, a state where decision makers can sense, grasp and predict 
future developments. 
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Added to the challenges linked to flow of information and individual and 
team differences in risk perception, the geophysical uncertainty of snow 
avalanches leaves rescuers with an undefinable residual uncertainty. 
Even if all available information about local weather, snowpack and 
terrain was distributed, uncertainty would still exist about the probability 
of avalanche release and runout lengths (McClung & Schaerer, 2006; 
Schweizer, 2008). The study of rescue performance in road related 
avalanche incidents (Paper II) indicated frequent exposure of rescuers in 
avalanche runout zones during avalanche cycles (undesirable incidents). 
Questions arise, then, about the rescuers` conceptualization of 
uncertainty and the related coping strategies (Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997). 
Clearly, forestalling was a visible strategy when rescuers reportedly 
retreated from rescue activities to avoid avalanche hazard. Knowing the 
residual uncertainty of avalanche prediction, and that further avalanche 
risk assessment was hampered by darkness and reduced visibility, 
suppression of uncertainty seems the most likely strategy in at least some 
of the undesirable incidents identified in this study. This conclusion is 
somewhat contradictory to the findings of Lipshitz and Strauss (1997), 
which showed that suppression was the least likely used coping strategy 
when facing all types of uncertainty. Mikkel Bøhm (2017, p. 106), 
however, suggests that suppression is probably more common than 
previously anticipated. 
The incidence of suppression of uncertainty is relevant, since the 
transition from other coping strategies to suppression seems to coincide 
with the transition of rescue efforts where “imperative seems to grow 
into a compulsion, more instinctive than rational” (Jonsen, 1986, p. 174). 
Overcommitment is, thus, linked to suppression of uncertainty. 
The listed difficulties related to performance and safety in the process 
industry also seem relevant for the avalanche rescue service (Kaber & 
Endsley, 1998, p. 43):  
x A failure to detect critical cues  
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x A failure to properly interpret the meaning of information 
x A lack of understanding of individual task responsibilities and 
the responsibilities of other control operators 
x A lack of communication between operators functioning in teams 
The possible causes of overcommitment identified by HEMS crew 
members both initiate and exaggerate these difficulties, whereas the 
measures included in “operational uncertainty management” are 
intended to resist an unfortunate development towards overcommitment. 
The concept of overcommitment was elucidated within the framework 
of three-man crews in the National Air Ambulance Service. The question 
is now whether it is possible to influence overcommitment across 
organizational levels in the rescue service. 
The organizational overcommitment resulting in many and unnecessary 
high-risk – low-gain situations (searching in avalanches with no victims 
involved) (Papers I and II) could be reduced by evaluating and adjusting 
dispatch routines. A low threshold for activating an excess of rescue 
resources increases the complexity of coordination and communication, 
thus negatively affecting the conditions for collective risk awareness. It 
is also an example of “outsourcing of risk assessment” to front-end 
rescuers, which could increase the possibility that incompetent personnel 
are forced into typical overcommitment situations.  
To counteract the pressure created by conflicting goals in socio-technical 
systems, Wiig (2008) recommended developing aims and measures 
which are recognizable and feasible at lower organizational levels. The 
HEMS crew members praised their repeated CRM training, which 
encouraged “team talk” (Gundrosen et al., 2016) to equalize situation 
awareness and to prevent errors.   
Interorganizational training with an increased focus on CRM-like 
training and “red teaming” (Masys, 2012) could inspire the complex and 
multifaceted rescue organization to act like a team and thereby benefit 
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from the added protection offered by team behaviour (Flin et al., 2008; 
Salas et al., 2005). 
5.1.4 Monitoring of risk indicators 
James Reason (1997) points to the importance of proactive measures that 
will cause a gain in organizational fitness. The activities to be monitored 
in the suggested set of leading risk indicators could offer a combined 
function as elements in a “fitness program” and as manageable 
organizational safety barriers, “determining a system`s safety health” 
(Reason, 1997, p. 114).  
Jan Hayes (2012) advocated a focus on barrier performance rather than 
results from separate and uncertain risk analyses. Failing congruence 
between the intentions expressed by the safety control structure and the 
abilities of important actors in the rescue service is indicative of 
weakened barrier integrity. The findings of this thesis point to a 
nonchalant attitude to the integrity of the barriers which have been 
defined for avalanche rescue operations (NRR, 2012; Regjeringen, 2005, 
2018). The reaction by operational personnel in Haynes` study was to 
stop production if barriers were lost, in danger of being breached, or even 
if the integrity of the barrier was questionable. A recommended action 
for managers in the rescue service could be to reiterate the intention of 
barriers and inspire the individual rescue organizations, including the 
public emergency services, to act promptly if the barriers are not working 
as intended. In future activities to mend and strengthen barriers, it will 
be important to operationalize and visualize the assigned responsibilities 
at all levels in the safety control structure. Only then will operative 
personnel be able to observe and evaluate organizational barrier 
integrity.  
This thesis is currently a solitary voice in warning about potential 
weaknesses in the avalanche rescue safety systems. The establishment of 
the recommended set of leading risk indicators could both improve the 
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organizational fitness of the avalanche rescue service and further 
contribute to validating the findings in this study.  
The monitoring of risk indicators could be included in the regular 
auditing of the LRCCs conducted by the JRCCs. This finds support in 
already existing regulations: “The Joint Rescue Coordination Centre 
shall regularly monitor the Local Rescue Coordination Centres and 
ensure that these work in accordance with the instructions and 
recommendations given for the rescue service” (Regjeringen, 2015, 
2018). At all levels, the set of indicators should be considered natural 
elements of both basic and advanced avalanche safety training 
programmes (NRR, 2012; Van Tilburg et al., 2017). After all, “It is as 
much about what people do with what they notice as it is about the 
activity of noticing itself” (Weick et al., 2008, p. 37). 
5.2 Study strengths and limitations 
Retrospective studies on historical data from Norwegian avalanche 
incidents formed the basis for statistical generalizations about avalanche 
victims and rescue operations (Papers I and II). The interpretation of this 
data material, along with qualitative data from focus group interviews 
(Papers III and IV) and the systemic safety analysis (Paper V), served as 
input to the subsequent analytical generalization (Polit & Beck, 2010), 
going from specific observations to general concepts. The 
generalizations represent our assumptions on how various mechanisms 
interact to produce the given result, “a working hypothesis”, which is 
highly contextual (Cronbach, 1975). 
The systemic safety analysis further invited the views of expert “brothers 
in arms”, thus broadening the analytical perspective of the thesis. It could 
also counteract researcher bias, but Thurmond warns that like-minded 
analysts could also amplify already existing biases (2001). In our case, 
several of the participants shared similar backgrounds from volunteer 
mountain rescue organizations, but this also added to the in-depth 
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understanding of avalanche risk assessment and management in the 
rescue service. 
Co-authors of the various papers have also made significant 
contributions to the interpretation of the data material and the results. 
Likewise, many conscientious reviewers offered important input about 
data, analyses and results, which greatly improved our presentation of 
methods and results.  
Over time, study results have been presented in several academic and 
rescue communities. These activities have thoroughly tested descriptions 
and analyses and contributed to the increased validity, credibility and 
transferability of results. 
All in all, the triangulation of studies, methods and analysts strengthened 
our ability to understand the results (Thurmond, 2001) and constituted 
the holistic scope which is required in studies of risk management in a 
socio-technical system (Wiig, 2008).  
Specific strengths and limitations of the various studies are presented in 
the respective papers. None of the studies in this thesis was a randomized 
experiment. No direct interventions were made in populations, but 
investigators may have influenced interview situations. The introduction 
of a topic alone may influence people’s way of thinking about a specific 
phenomenon. This was a concern in the study of overcommitment, since 
we could not know beforehand whether interviewees were familiar with 
the expression. Therefore, the interviews followed a common structure, 
which included a short introduction on the topic, followed by open 
questions (Litosseliti, 2003). This procedure returned detailed stories 
from the operational world of HEMS crew members, as such both 
exploratory and descriptive in character. The use of a questioning guide, 
with necessary adaptations, was therefore considered adequate to support 
the exploratory nature of the study.  
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Likewise, in the systemic safety analysis reported in Paper V, the 
introduction of the STAMP/STPA methodology surely influenced the 
experts` way of thinking about safety in the Norwegian avalanche rescue 
service. This could also influence the discussions and the subsequent 
analysis of weaknesses and strengths in the avalanche rescue system. 
This created a need to balance necessary information about the methods 
and the aim of utilizing the individual experience of the participating 
experts. 
The presented results, conclusions and theories presuppose causality. 
Causal knowledge is the cornerstone of predictions and planning. A 
cause is seen as a mechanism or phenomenon which has the capacity to 
produce certain effects. It is tempting to believe that an ability to explain 
a phenomenon also allows accurate predictions about the same 
phenomenon. The challenge is to go from descriptions to an in-depth 
understanding, since to understand implies trying to answer how and 
why certain mechanisms cause an effect (Skog, 2004). 
It is pertinent to question our assumption of causality between registered 
deviations from a prescriptive tool for avalanche risk assessment and 
management, and rescuer exposure in avalanche-prone terrain (Paper II). 
The assumption rests on two main pillars: 1: Compliance with 
recommendations presented in avalanche bulletins, snow safety 
literature and training are expected to reduce avalanche accidents (Van 
Tilburg et al., 2017). 2: Organizational factors are important as direct or 
indirect causes of unwanted incidents and accidents (Reason, 1997). 
Attempting a further evaluation on the basis of the Bradford Hill criteria 
(Hill, 1965), we have shown a rather strong association between the 
perceived events, deviations and exposure (although seldom direct, close 
in time or always observable) (Hume, 2003). The association is coherent 
with (snow) safety, mountaineering and avalanche rescue literature. It is 
fair to expect a certain preventive effect of applying the prescribed 
activities, although one cannot expect a specific effect linked to all the 
individual activities. On lack of specificity, Hill (1965, p. 297) comments 
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that “One-to-one relationships are not frequent”. Since the analyses were 
performed by only one investigator, repeated studies are needed to 
conclude on the consistency of the registered deviations. An attempt to 
reduce the single-investigator challenge was made by using detailed data 
dossiers to document the evaluation of cases. 
The effect of non-compliance with normative risk assessment and 
management activities, lack of information, lack of training, etc. are seen 
as possibly uncorrelated causes, yielding common effects (Waldmann, 
1996): undesirable incidents where rescuers are overly exposed in high 
avalanche risk situations and patients who are not granted an optimal 
rescue response. The scientific process in this thesis thus follows the 
logical principles of induction, by accumulating isolated events to 
formulate general hypotheses about patient and rescuer safety.  
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6 Conclusion 
The following is a short summary of important results and suggestions 
for follow-up studies on avalanche rescue practice. 
The Norwegian avalanche rescue service seems to be caught off balance 
when facing the extra load of common risk influencing factors in rescue 
operations. The overall impression is that many rescue operations are 
carried out with high risk to rescuers, defined by the level of exposure 
sustained during missions (Paper II). Dispatch routines may have 
compromised the possibility of offering injured avalanche victims the 
right treatment at the right time in the right place (Paper I). Consequently, 
the standard rescue response in avalanche rescue operations needs to be 
adjusted to enhance both patient and rescuer safety. One typical example 
would be establishing a standardized use of safe meeting places in 
infrastructure-related avalanche incidents. Another would be to ensure 
immediate and direct dispatch of medical personnel to avalanche victims. 
Safety in avalanche rescue operations is a system problem (Leveson, 
2011; Rasmussen, 1997), and accidents occur when safety constraints are 
breached. Safe rescue practice constrains the activities of the 
participating organizations within a reasonable degree of freedom, to 
allow necessary front-end decisions to be made. The safety constraints 
acting on the avalanche rescue service are already laid down in 
instructions, regulations, handbooks, guidelines and recommendations 
(Helse og Omsorgsdepartementet, 2005; NRR, 2012; Regjeringen, 2005, 
2015, 2018). Further work on safety in the rescue service could benefit 
from a focus on compliance with the established safety constraints, 
especially at the blunt end. This could also ensure that avalanche rescue 
practice corresponds to the assumptions underlying the existing safety 
control structure (Paper V).   
The concept of overcommitment could provide a basis for both real-time 
adjustment and retrospective evaluation of commitment in rescue 
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operations. Pertinent questions, as to whether rescuers make themselves 
or others vulnerable by committing more than is feasible, desirable, 
expected, recommended or compellingly necessary in a given scenario, 
could induce learning and reduce the risk of personal injury or death. 
Avalanche rescue performance could benefit from a change of focus 
from a predominantly skills-based training to operational uncertainty 
management (Paper IV), in line with the appraised CRM training of 
HEMS personnel. This should include measures to enhance avalanche 
risk awareness, commitment moderation and avalanche risk mitigation 
(Paper II). 
The value of the various analyses and results included in this thesis may 
serve as input to discussions on risk acceptance levels in the rescue 
service, the applicability and validity of control algorithms in rescue 
management and how to adjust the degree of commitment in various 
rescue missions. 
6.1 Follow-up studies and activities 
x The incidence of rescuers exposed in runout zones (Paper II) and 
direct travel to accident sites (Lunde & Kristensen, 2013) in high 
avalanche risk conditions have been used to define and count 
undesirable incidents in the Norwegian avalanche rescue service. It 
would be beneficial to validate these results by qualitative methods 
and in-depth analyses of individual rescue units.   
 
x Future studies on the quality of avalanche risk assessments in the 
rescue service could benefit from combinations of technically 
gathered spatial data and questionnaires (Hendrikx & Johnson, 2016; 
Hendrikx et al., 2016) to elicit the rescuers` thoughts on specifics in 
route selection and decision-making in rescue operations.  
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x It would be of benefit to clarify how dispatch routines could facilitate 
risk assessment activities, both from the perspective of emergency 
call centres and at rescue unit level. 
 
x The concept of overcommitment could act as a common ground for 
rescuers and researchers in their efforts to explore and further 
develop interorganizational uncertainty coping strategies in 
mountain rescue operations. A typical follow-up study could be to 
conduct questionnaires and multi-variate analyses to validate and 
elaborate on the findings presented in Papers III and IV. Further 
studies could also benefit from including a wider array of rescue 
units.  
 
x The risk indicators presented in this thesis were selected by a cross-
paper analysis of findings, which could support long-term 
monitoring of risk in the avalanche rescue service. 
Interorganizational studies to assess the indicators against specific 
criteria are needed (Herrera, 2012; Thorsen & Njå, 2014).  
 
x The organizational structure of the Norwegian rescue service is 
common for all land-based rescue operations. It could be of interest 
to evaluate findings of the systemic safety analysis (Paper V) in the 
context of other types of rescue operations. 
 
x Research on mountain rescue performance requires communication 
and cooperation with multiple organizations and public agencies. To 
encourage future cross-organizational studies, it would be beneficial 
to establish a common portal for access to relevant data, academic 
guidance and dissemination of research results.  
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Abstract
Background: Avalanche emergency response should address current accident scenarios to optimize survival
chances of victims and to keep rescuers safe. The purpose of this article is to present a basis for evaluation and
necessary adjustments in dispatch, prioritization, and management of Norwegian avalanche rescue operations.
Methods: This is the first peer-reviewed retrospective study of all Norwegian avalanche incidents registered by
the two Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centers (JRCCs) in the period 1996–2017 that describes the characteristics and
trends of rescue missions and victims.
Results: The Norwegian JRCCs have registered 720 snow avalanche events, with a total of 568 avalanche victims, of
which 120 (21%) died. Including those fatally injured, a total of 313 avalanche victims in 209 accidents were treated
as patients (55%), and we saw > 1 patient in 24% of these operations. Norwegian avalanche victims were partially
or completely recovered prior to the arrival of rescuers in 75% (n = 117) of all rescue operations. In the remaining
25% of cases, the rescue service located 62% (n = 55) of the avalanche victims visually or electronically. In 50% of
the 720 incidents, rescuers spent time searching in avalanches with no victims.
Conclusions: This survey indicates that we have experienced a shift in Norwegian avalanche rescue: from search
for missing persons in the avalanche debris to immediate medical care of already-located patients. The findings
suggest that a stronger focus on both patient and rescuer safety is necessary. The patients must be ensured the
right treatment at the right place at the right time and the allocation of rescue resources must reflect a need to
reduce exposure in avalanche terrain, especially in cases with no affirmed victims. We present a flowchart with a
recommended rescue response to avalanche accidents in Norway.
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Background
Norway’s National Guidelines for Avalanche Rescue [1]
give directions for the management of avalanche rescue
operations. The main aim is safe and efficient rescue ef-
forts and the rescue service work to ensure that ava-
lanche victims receive as early and advanced emergency
medical treatment as other patients in the country [2, 3].
The existing guidelines state that rescue dogs and volun-
teer rescue specialists be summoned and dispatched
along with the first responding National Air Ambulance
Service (NAAS) [4]. This routine normally causes a delay
in air rescue response because the specialized resources
are not stationed at the helicopter base.
It is important to customize the avalanche rescue re-
sponse to the avalanche victims’ need for medical assist-
ance, the capacity of the air rescue services [5], and the
safety of rescuers. Mair et al. [6] concluded that: “Med-
ical emergencies are encountered at avalanche scenes
twice as often as there is need to search for totally bur-
ied victims, clearly supporting the immediate dispatch of
medical crewmembers to the accident site”. The import-
ant parameters are the patients’ expected survival time
and the rescue time (time from the accident until treat-
ment is initiated), given by the patients’ injuries and the
emergency preparedness of the rescue service. Although
asphyxia is the main cause of death in avalanche victims,
several studies underline that many victims die because
of mechanical injuries [7–9], especially to the chest and
head. This is also the case for patients who are not to-
tally buried [7, 10, 11]. Hermann Brügger directs atten-
tion to a lack of consideration of trauma in the field
management algorithm for the care of avalanche victims
[12]; this should be reflected also in dispatch routines.
Avalanche emergency preparedness has improved with
standardized avalanche rescue training for all Norwegian
air rescue crews [5] and the provision of electronic
search devices (transceivers and RECCO) to all air am-
bulance and rescue helicopter bases. Avalanche rescue
methodology, which was formerly a domain of the vol-
unteer rescue organizations, is now a part of standard
operating procedures for all actors in the rescue service
[1] and Helicopter Emergency Medical Service.
In this study, we present a basis for evaluating dispatch
and prioritization of avalanche rescue resources. The
data describe important characteristics of rescue opera-
tions, victims, location methods, and the situation at the
accident site when rescuers arrive.
Methodology
Data selection
To evaluate Norwegian avalanche rescue operations, the
JRCCs authorized the first author to collect and organize
data from rescue logs and reports since 1996. The National
Police Directorate has granted access to police rescue logs
for the same period. Eighty-three avalanche rescue variables
were extracted from operational data and text fields, anon-
ymized, and recorded in a Microsoft Excel database, here-
after named the Norwegian Avalanche Rescue Database.
The variables describe time and place, incident type, ava-
lanche size, victims, rescue resources, rescue response time,
location methods, weather, regional avalanche danger level,
and risk level [13, 14].
The incidents comprise all outdoor activity categories
and infrastructure-related avalanches. We included all or
a selection of the incidents in the study, based on type,
amount, and quality of information linked to each inci-
dent (Fig. 1), thus, the number of incidents and observa-
tions will vary between analyses. As appropriate, five
Swedish and Finnish incidents that were assisted by the
Norwegian Rescue Service, were excluded in all analyses
concerning characteristics of avalanches, victims, and
patients. We concentrated specific analyses on accidents
with confirmed victims in the two 10-year periods from
1998 to 2017 (n = 268). When describing the situation at
the accident site when the rescuers arrived, we selected
all cases with available relevant information in the time
period 2010–2017 (n = 117).
Definitions
An avalanche incident is any recorded event, with or
without confirmed avalanche victims. An accident is an
event with people caught by an avalanche, with three
categories: fatal accident, personal injury accident, and
close call. Vehicles and houses involved in avalanches,
without passengers or inhabitants directly affected by
debris, were counted as close calls. Persons directly af-
fected by the avalanche debris were counted as victims.
All victims with any degree of physical injury were de-
fined as patients. Data about sensitive and detailed infor-
mation about the patients’ conditions has not been
recorded. Hence, degree of injury was defined in accord-
ance with common practice in road traffic accidents;
“slight injury” (treated on site or at a local doctor’s of-
fice), “serious injury” (evacuated to a hospital for exam-
ination and treatment) and “fatal injury”. Fatalities were
recorded without reference to length of hospitalization
following the accident.
Statistical analysis
We used Microsoft Excel Data analysis with XLSTAT
[15] for statistical analyses. To characterize rescue oper-
ations, avalanche victims, patients and fatalities, we cal-
culated frequencies, rates, mean, median, interquartile
range, range and 95% confidence interval (indicated by ±).
Indications of monotonic trends over time were analyzed
using the Mann-Kendall trend test [16, 17] and the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test [18] was applied to detect simi-
larities of distributions. The two-Sample t-test was used to
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compare group means when comparing two different
time periods. We considered bilateral p values below
0.05 significant.
Results
Avalanche rescue operations, victims, patients and
fatalities
In the period 1996–2017, the JRCCs in Norway registered
a total of 720 snow avalanche incidents, with an annual
mean of 33 ± 7 (Fig. 1). Apart from non-involvements
(38%, n = 709), the most frequent avalanche incidents
were related to backcountry skiing (21%) and roads (16%).
In 360 of the 720 incidents, rescuers were called out and
searched in avalanches without any involved victims. A
rescue response in avalanche accidents was the case in
35% of all incidents. In the remaining 15% of incidents,
rescuers were dispatched, but not activated on site.
There were 568 avalanche victims in 279 accidents. Of
the recorded incidents, 58% (n = 715) had no victims
and 13% were close calls, leaving 209 (29%) personal in-
jury and fatal accidents. These accidents comprised 313
patients, including 120 fatalities.
Figure 2 illustrates the time series 1996–2017, based
on the number of rescue operations, avalanche victims, reg-
istered patients, and fatalities. The distributions of victims
vs. patients and patients vs. fatalities were significantly dif-
ferent, with p values 0.017 and < 0.0001, respectively. Com-
paring victims and patients in 1996–2007 and 2008–2017,
Fig. 1 Norwegian avalanche incidents 1996–2017. Flowchart showing selections of Norwegian avalanche incidents and key results, based on logs
from the Norwegian Joint Rescue Coordination Centers for northern and southern Norway 1996–2017
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only the last time period showed significantly different dis-
tributions (p value: 0.041).
We found statistically significant increases in the num-
ber of rescue operations, victims, and patients, as all
these parameters nearly doubled in the period 2008–
2017 compared with 1998–2007. No significant differ-
ence was found between the mean numbers of avalanche
fatalities in the two time periods 1998–2007 and
2008–2017, although the annual average increased
from 4.4 to 6.9.
The period from 1998 to 2017 showed 0.55 patients
per avalanche victim. The trend tests showed a slight,
though significant, decrease in the ratio of patients to
victims (p value = 0.009, Sen’s slope: − 0.013). We also
noted a significant decrease in the number of fatalities
per victim (p value = 0.027, Sen’s slope: − 0.01). There
was no trend in the series of fatalities per patients, with
a ratio of 0.38.
Avalanche fatalities
The number of fatalities in avalanche accidents showed
an average of 5.5 deaths per year over the period 1996–
2017. The overall mortality rate of avalanche victims in
the same period was 0.21 (n = 568). From 2010, we ob-
served a marked change from the preceding 14-year an-
nual average of 4.3 avalanche-related deaths. From 2010
through 2017, the annual average nearly doubled, to 7.5
fatalities per year (p value = 0.032). The number of fatal-
ities fluctuated over shorter time periods: the number of
deaths declined from an annual average of 8.0 fatalities
from 2012 through 2014 to 4.3 from 2015 through 2017
(p value = 0.071).
Specific mention should be made regarding people fall-
ing off breaking cornices, as they are counted as avalanche
accidents in Norway. This event caused 11 fatalities and 3
seriously injured patients in the 22-year period from 1996
to 2017. Eleven (two survivors) were located by organized
rescuers and only three by companions. Nine were found
because of visible parts, three by transceivers, and two by
probing. Six of these victims were foreign citizens.
What is the situation at the accident site on arrival of
rescuers?
Multiple victims and patients
The most frequent scenarios of the 209 rescue opera-
tions with patients to assist during 1996–2017 were ser-
iously injured patients (81) and fatalities (90), with fewer
(38) for slightly injured people. The average number of
patients per rescue operation was 1.5 (range: 7), with > 1
patient in 24% of operations. There was a small but not
significant (nsd) increase in the frequency of rescue op-
erations with ≥3 avalanche victims to assist, from 17.9%
of all operations during 1998–2007 (n = 95) to 21.3%
during 2008–2017 (n = 174). Likewise, for ≥3 patients,
from 6.3 to 10.3% (nsd) of all rescue operations.
Situation on arrival of rescuers
Overall, during 1996–2017, NAAS helicopters and
Air-Force-operated search-and-rescue helicopters (330
Squadron) responded to 325 and 184 of the 720 registered
Fig. 2 Norwegian avalanche rescue statistics 1996–2017. Relationships among 720 Norwegian avalanche rescue operations, 568 avalanche
victims, 313 patients and 120 fatalities in the 22-year-period from 1996 to 2017, based on JRCC information
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avalanche incidents, respectively. NAAS personnel were
the most frequent first organized rescue responders
(26.8%, n = 440). They brought rescue dogs or avalanche
rescue specialists to 37 and 24 of these 118 rescues,
respectively. The median response time (time from
the emergency call to first arrival) was 40 min (IQR:
30.5, n = 191). The rescue time (time from accident
until the patient is offered first aid) may be much
longer because of difficult access, search, or extrica-
tion. In this dataset, rescue time was only recorded in 62
accidents, with a median time of 85min (IQR: 123.8).
Table 1 illustrates that the most common situation fa-
cing first responding rescuers in the period 2010–2017
(n = 117) was already-localized and more or less extri-
cated (75.2%) and injured (82.9%) victims.
In 29 accidents, 55 victims still had to be located
by arriving rescuers. Thirty-nine of these victims died
(70.9%). Thirty-four (62%) were located without spe-
cialized search resources (dogs and divers) or in-
creased manpower for efficient probing and digging
(Table 2). The high number of victims located by dig-
ging was caused by avalanches hitting buildings in
Svalbard in 2015.
Avalanche victims and their rescuers
Sufficient information allowed categorization of rescue
strategies (self-rescue, companion rescue and organized
rescue) for 416 of the 568 avalanche victims in the
period 1996–2017. These categories include all kinds of
activities and rescue situations, irrespective of degree of
burial and need of assistance. The largest proportion
comprised those who ended up on the surface or who
managed to free themselves from the avalanche debris
(35.6%, n = 148). In companion rescue situations (29.3%,
n = 122), 86.1% of the victims survived, whereas the pro-
portion of survivors who had to wait for organized res-
cuers (35.1%, n = 146) was 41.1%.
Methods of locating avalanche victims
Between 2008 and 2017 (n = 316), 89% of victims (visible
avalanche victims [75.4%], those located by transceivers
[12.3%], and those who were able to call for help
[1.3%]) did not require specialized search resources to
be located (Fig. 3). In practice, probing and search dogs
are equally successful (in 3.5 and 2.2% of cases, respect-
ively), though probing by companions is also included
in this dataset.
The proportion of avalanche victims found by visual
searching increased slightly between 2008 and 2017,
from 68.3 to 75.4% (p value: 0.004). The major difference
between the periods 1998–2007 and 2008–2017, how-
ever, is the increase in the number of avalanche victims
who were located using transceivers, from 5.8 to 12.3%
(p value < 0.001).
Discussion
The observed increase in the number of rescue opera-
tions, victims, and patients places an extra burden on
both health and rescue resources. The high number of
rescue operations with no victims requires specific atten-
tion because rescuers already spend ample time in ava-
lanche runout zones in real rescue situations [14, 19].
Mair et al. [6] recommend a limited response in cases
where witnesses cannot give clear information about vic-
tim involvement. We should develop better systems to
handle uncertainty in the first phase of avalanche rescue
operations.
In this study, every second avalanche victim was a pa-
tient, which approximates the findings of Hohlrieder et
al. [20], which showed 49 injuries in 105 victims. Ava-
lanche victims are exposed to considerable mechanical
pressure [21] and forceful impacts with terrain features.
The entire range of mechanical injuries is possible [22]
and victims may sustain permanent impairment. In
Canada, “trauma accounted for more than half of the
deaths among people extricated in the first 10 minutes”
[23] and other studies also direct attention to injured
avalanche victims [6, 8, 24]. Survivors are frequently ex-
posed to low temperatures, wind, and moisture, which
all contribute to lower core temperature and an in-
creased tendency to bleeding [25]. Therefore, early and
proficient medical treatment of avalanche victims is
important.
It is worrying that multiple victim scenarios are so
common. In a recent study by Kottmann et al. [26], 32%
of all rescue operations had more than one casualty.
Table 1 Norwegian avalanche accidents 2010–2017
Fatal accident Injured victims Close call Total %
Not localized 22 6 1 29 24.8
Localized-not excavated 1 3 2 6 5.1
Localized and excavated 16 49 17 82 70.1
Total 39 58 20 117
% 33.3 49.6 17.1
Situation at the scene of the accident on arrival of rescuers, relative to type of accident. N = 117
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This phenomenon should be addressed in both emer-
gency response and accident prevention.
The downward trends in numbers of patients and fa-
talities per victim may reflect an increase in successful
rescues, which results from both swift victim location,
use of safety equipment, and successful prehospital
patient care. The ratio of patients per avalanche victim
indicates victim vulnerability. Equipment like trans-
ceivers, probes and shovels contributes to reduced bur-
ial time, and backpacks with floatation devices may
prevent victims from being totally covered by debris
[27, 28]. However, none of these offer any direct or ex-
tensive protection. Safety helmets are recommended for
recreational skiers and snowboarders [29] and “should
be considered when travelling in avalanche terrain”
[22]. The important message for dispatch centers is that
avalanche victims wearing safety equipment will likely
be found and excavated before the arrival of rescuers,
and they are probably injured.
The varying ratio between avalanche victims and
the number of fatalities emphasizes that coincidence
rules the outcome of these accidents. Those who end
up totally covered by avalanche debris are dependent
on rescue-competent companions to increase their
likelihood of survival. This study indicates that moun-
tain travelers are increasingly aware of their rescue
responsibility because more avalanche victims have
been located visually and by using transceivers.
Consequently, it is unusual for the Norwegian rescue
service to have to search for missing people in ava-
lanches. If so, the victims are often visible or search-
able with transceivers or RECCO.
The length of burial time and burial depth affect
survival rate [7]. This connection has rightly guided
development of emergency preparedness and rescue
response for years. The parallel introduction of more
efficient means of companion rescue has caused a
change in the initial tasks of the first responding orga-
nized rescuers [30]. We should adjust the allocation of
rescue resources to reflect current rescue scenarios
and ensure that patients get the right treatment at the
right place at the right time [31]. Avalanche accidents
must be perceived and handled as acute medical emer-
gencies. This is reflected in today’s emergency pre-
paredness system, as air ambulance helicopters are
frequent first organized rescue responders. However, if
we aim to save the most critically-injured patients,
prehospital medical personnel should respond without
first waiting or detouring for voluntary search re-
sources. In most cases, teaming up with extra medical
personnel may be more pertinent than fetching man-
power and dogs for searching. The findings of this
study, and the conclusions of Mair et al. [6], provide
the basis for a flowchart (Fig. 4) for dispatching and
prioritizing resources in avalanche rescue operations
in Norway.
Table 2 Rescuers’ methods of locating 55 victims in 29 Norwegian avalanche accidents of all categories in the period 2010–2017
Location method Visible Probing Dog Transceiver Diving Audible Digging
N 17 5 6 14 1 2 9
% 30.9 9.1 10.9 25.5 1.8 3.6 16.4
Fig. 3 Methods of locating avalanche victims in Norway over two time periods; 1998–2007 and 2008–2017
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Limitations
Our Excel database was developed in retrospect and some
of the information has been interpreted from free text
fields. Even if the informational quality of registration has
increased over the years, it still varies because of both
inter-operator differences in registration of relevant details
and inter-regional differences in conducting and docu-
menting rescue activities. To compensate for a lack of in-
formation in logs and reports from relevant authorities,
we have also included reports from the mass media. In
some cases, both rescuers and involved victims have been
asked to supply relevant details. Nevertheless, some pa-
rameters suffer from varied levels of registration detail,
which causes a bias in evaluation of time series and trends,
especially in cases without fatalities or injured persons.
Conclusion
We have experienced a shift in Norwegian avalanche
rescue from searching for missing persons in the
avalanche debris to providing immediate medical care of
already-located patients. Subsequently, the rescue ser-
vice’s longstanding focus on rapid implementation of ef-
fective search operations should be changed to speedy
and safe provision of advanced prehospital emergency
medical treatment and evacuation.
Dispatch routines should reflect that many rescue op-
erations take place in adverse conditions that threaten
rescuer safety. Especially in situations of uncertainty
about victim involvement, necessary actions to remain
in control of the situation should be taken on all man-
agerial levels, even if this means a slower and more lim-
ited rescue response.
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Fig. 4 Flowchart showing the recommended rescue response to avalanche accidents in Norway
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A B S T R A C T
In Norway, snow avalanches hitting roads are a considerable safety challenge for the rescue services. Previous
studies have given rise to concern about the rescuers´ levels of exposure to avalanche risk during these missions.
The safety of the rescuers must balance a quick and lifesaving response. The ability to meet both demands
constitutes the performance of the rescue service. In the period 2010–2014 the rescue services registered 58
avalanches hitting public roads in Norway. The study reported in this article includes all those events. It explored
the characteristics of the rescue missions and which risk indicators that contributed to overall risk to rescuers'
health and victims' survival. 45 out of these 58 incidents were analyzed using organizational risk indicators. Risk
inﬂuencing factors (RIF) and other relevant variables were then included in a Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) in
order to model both the associated risk and the overall performance of the rescue service. The analyses showed
that rescue management in the alert phase, professional assessment of avalanche conditions, and continuous risk
assessment are the most important RIFs to control when aiming at an eﬀective and safe rescue operation. In
addition, actions to control undue haste and over-commitment, and enhance risk awareness will contribute to
increased safety in this line of rescue work.
1. Introduction
It is predicted that the number of landslides and snow avalanches
will increase in Norway as a result of climate change (Bjordal and
Larsen, 2009). Consequently, the Norwegian avalanche rescue service
will face an increase in road related avalanche incidents, requiring
rescue responses in conditions of possible danger. Organized rescue in
Norway is carried out as a cooperation between public, voluntary and
private organizations. The rescue response to road related avalanche
accidents displays great variation in the composition of responding
units, preparedness for these speciﬁc events, competence of individual
rescuers and commanders, available specialized resources and which
rescue organization is the ﬁrst responder. In a previous study on snow
avalanche risk for Norwegian rescuers in the period 1996–2010, Lunde
and Kristensen (2013) found that rescuers travelled directly to accident
sites in high avalanche risk conditions in 26% of all cases. A high
proportion of these incidents were in residential areas and on roads.
Yet, avalanches hitting access roads or accident sites caused no physical
harm to responding rescuers in the same period.
Naturally released avalanches are the main hazards for responding
rescuers. Uncertainty about snow characteristics aﬀect the predict-
ability of both avalanche release, the avalanche path and the runout
zone. Glassett and Techel (2014, p. 349) concluded about avalanches
aﬀecting people along transportation corridors that; “Secondary or de-
layed avalanches pose a serious threat to both workers and users especially
during times of continuing critical avalanche conditions”. In Troms in
northern Norway, on March 30th 2013, two cars were hit when an
avalanche released on persistent weak layers. Both cars, still visible on
the snow surface were badly damaged, but no victims were seriously
injured. It was, however, diﬃcult to verify how many people were in
the area when the avalanche descended, and the police initiated a
search operation. Approaching rescuers passed a number of avalanche
runout zones on their way to the accident sites and eventually gathered
close to several dangerous avalanche paths that had still not released.
During the ﬁrst phase of this operation, some of the rescuers´ cars were
blocked by new avalanches in the area, which eventually covered a
road stretch of 1300m.
Performance analysis of avalanche rescue operations requires a
holistic approach, which involves the introduction of organizational
risk indicators as building blocks of the present and future safety level.
In this context, the concept of performance is used to describe how well
the avalanche rescue system manages to strike a balance between safety
and eﬃciency. A swift rescue response is required, however mediated
by the need to avoid new avalanches both en route and on the accident
site. In extreme cases, rescue eﬀorts may have to be postponed for hours
and days. The Drümännler accident in Switzerland on January 3rd 2010
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serves as a grave illustration of this issue (Etter, 2010). Seven people
including an air ambulance doctor were killed during the rescue mis-
sion.
In order to model rescue mission performance we developed re-
search questions that we could investigate, cf. Fig. 1:
The research questions constitute necessary information needed to
model rescue performance and are in fact based on all available in-
cidents experienced in Norway. The model is a ﬁrst approach to provide
a tool for rescue services to adapt their missions in accordance with
their local conditions and recognized challenges in emerging crises.
2. Methodology and assumptions
In this section, we present the methodology used to study the per-
formance of the Norwegian avalanche rescue service.
2.1. Deﬁnitions
• An avalanche incident is any recorded event, with or without con-
ﬁrmed avalanche victims.
• A road or infrastructure related incident is where an avalanche has
struck public roads or residential areas.
• Undesirable incidents occur when rescuers are exposed in avalanche
runout zones during high avalanche risk conditions.
• An accident is an event with people caught by an avalanche, with
three categories; fatal accident, personal injury accident and close
call.
• Vehicles and houses involved in avalanches, without passengers or
inhabitants directly aﬀected by debris, were counted as close calls.
• Persons directly aﬀected by the avalanche debris were counted as
victims.
• Over-commitment is deﬁned as “Situations where rescuers make
themselves vulnerable by committing more than is feasible, desir-
able, expected, recommended or compellingly necessary in the
given scenario, and thereby run the risk of life-threatening injury”
(Lunde and Braut, 2019).
• Performance is deﬁned as a combination of risk and mission eﬀec-
tiveness.
• ALARP: As Low As Reasonably Practicable, and in proportion to the
expected beneﬁt of the rescue activity (HSE, 2018). Management
and operators must ensure that that the organization is ﬁt for pur-
pose, the risks are suﬃciently low, and that suﬃcient safety and
emergency measures are instituted (Melchers, 2001).
Risk recognition plays a major part in rescue missions. The risk
deﬁnition controversy attracts many researchers, see discussions in
(Braut et al., 2012; Njå et al., 2017; Watson, 1994). One core issue is
how to understand and handle uncertainties. Employing risk analysis
tools entails the use of models, assumptions and data varying in accu-
racy and relevance, which further complicates the communication of
safety levels.
The purpose of risk assessments in rescue missions is to enable
practitioners who act as decision makers to construct risk images based
on best possible knowledge, before and during their decision making
either on-scene or in operations centres. Risk is constructed by (un-
desired) events (A), consequences (C), and related uncertainties (U), in
which the background knowledge (K) is of vital importance. Risk is
commonly communicated as combinations of the concepts probability
(or frequency) and outcome (or consequences) and is in our case related
to the wellbeing of the rescuers and patient safety.
Response time and rescue capacity are important factors to consider
when optimizing the rescue response on the scene of the avalanche. It is
a load-response situation as in traditional engineering, but where the
stakes are high and conditions uncertain. In order to develop a per-
formance model, we needed to design the research so we could use the
best available background knowledge for the modelling work. In this
respect we needed to analyse the experience data to reveal inﬂuencing
factors and tendencies from the real events.
2.2. Database, variables and selection
The Norwegian statistics include all recorded road related
Exposure data, statistics
- The regional avalanche danger level
- The position of roads relative to avalanche runout zones 
- The rescuers´ degree of presence in avalanche runout zones
Statistical analysis of selected variables:
- Descriptive statistics
Analysis of avalanche risk assessment and management 
activities:
- Deviations from a prescription for avalanche risk assessment
and risk management
Qualitative and quantitative modelling:
- Bayesian Belief Network
What are the 
characteristics of 
Norwegian road related 
avalanche incidents and 
rescue operations?
Research question
What risk influencing 
factors affect the 
performance of the 
Norwegian avalanche 
rescue service, and how 
can performance be 
modelled?
How is avalanche risk 
assessment and 
management handled in 
these rescue operations?
Methodology/Analysis technique
To what degree do 
rescuers expose 
themselves to avalanche 
risk when responding to 
avalanche incidents on 
Norwegian public roads?
Fig. 1. Research questions and related analyses.
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avalanche incidents in the period 1996–2014. The primary data source
is the Search and Rescue Application System (SARA) at the Joint Rescue
Co-ordination Centers in North- and South-Norway. This is an in-
tegrated decision support system used to log and share information
during rescue operations and to provide a basis for debrieﬁng and re-
ports. The Norwegian Joint Rescue Coordination Centers (JRCC) and
The National Police Directorate have authorized the ﬁrst author to
collect and organize data from avalanche rescue logs and reports since
1996. The authorization was linked to internal evaluation of rescue
practice and formed a basis for annual reports to the International
Commission for Alpine Rescue (ICAR).
83 variables relevant to avalanche rescue have been extracted from
the operational data and coded in a Microsoft Excel database, hereafter
called the Norwegian Avalanche Rescue Data Base (NARDB). The
variables describe time and place, type of incident, type of activity,
avalanche size, avalanche victims (no personal information), rescue
resources, response time, ﬁrst responders, methods of locating ava-
lanche victims, type of rescue, weather, regional avalanche danger
level, risk management and duration of rescue operations.
As illustrated in Fig. 2, we isolated the two periods 1996–2009
(n=77) and 2010–2014 (n=58), because the information underlying
the cases were of diﬀerent quality. Thereafter, we concentrated in-
depth analyses of avalanche risk assessment and management on the
last 5-year-period 2010–2014 (n=45). Our aim was to determine the
characteristics of Norwegian road related avalanche incidents and to
establish a knowledge base for modelling avalanche rescue perfor-
mance.
2.3. Study design and material
The material was retrospectively analyzed case by case to determine
the characteristics of road related avalanche incidents, the rescuers´
degree of exposure to avalanche hazard and their avalanche risk as-
sessment and risk management activities.
2.3.1. Avalanche rescue characteristics – statistical analysis
We obtained select descriptive statistics of Norwegian road related
avalanche rescue operations from the NARDB. We used Microsoft
Excel for Mac 2016 Version 16.19 (Microsoft Corporation, 2010,
Redmond, Washington) for statistical analyses. To characterize rescue
operations and avalanche victims, we calculated frequencies, percen-
tages, mean, median, 25th and 75th percentiles and range. The Welch's
t-Test was used to compare group means when comparing two diﬀerent
time periods. We considered bilateral p-values below 0.05 as sig-
niﬁcant.
Fig. 2. Flowchart showing the selection of Norwegian road related avalanche
incidents included in the study.
Fig. 3. Example of open source avalanche map of Lødingen, Nordland, North-Norway, provided by NGI. The dark red delineated area represents avalanche release
areas (inclinations steeper than 30°). The pink delineated area represents theoretical maximum runout zones. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this
ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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2.3.2. Avalanche related data materials
Avalanche related information was gathered from open sources
made available by the Norwegian Meteorological Institute (DNMI), the
Norwegian Public Roads Administration (NPRA), the Norwegian Water
Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE) and the Norwegian
Geotechnical Institute (NGI). These sources oﬀered data and maps,
detailing topographical (Fig. 3), snow and weather conditions, as well
as historical data on avalanches reaching speciﬁc road sections (Fig. 4).
Speciﬁcally, the expert tool and web portal XGEO allowed reconstruc-
tion of data related to snow cover and avalanche danger levels (Barfod
et al., 2013).
In Fig. 4 the coloured areas indicate steepness. Rescuers ap-
proaching from the north will pass 8–10 observed avalanche runout
zones on their way to an accident in Fiskefjord/Forvikneset.
2.3.3. Criteria for the interpretation of risk exposure levels
The rescuers` degree of exposure to avalanche risk was based on
three criteria:
1. The regional avalanche danger level (EAWS, 2016). The national
avalanche forecasts issued by the NVE were available only from
2013 onwards (n=19). Our assessment of avalanche danger level
prior to 2013 (n=26) was based on an index including 7 class III
(LaChapelle, 1985; McClung and Schaerer, 1993) parameters: pre-
cipitation (type, intensity and 72 h accumulation), temperature,
temperature trend, wind speed and direction. There was no in-
formation on class II, snowpack factors. Jürg Schweizer et al. (2003)
concluded that ﬁeld observations of snowpack characteristics
showed few deviations from the forecasted danger level, so class II
information would certainly have added precision to our assess-
ment. Naturally, recent avalanche activity was always the case in
these incidents, (class I data), helping to distinguish between lower
and higher avalanche danger levels (McClung and Schaerer, 1993;
Techel and Schweizer, 2017).
2. The position of roads relative to avalanche runout zones (Kristensen
et al., 2008), as indicated on NGI avalanche maps (NGI, 2018),
NPRA road data (NPRA, 2018) and XGEO (Figs. 3 and 4).
3. The rescuers´ degree of exposure in areas prone to naturally released
avalanches derived from logs and reports (Table 1). There was no
information about where each rescue staﬀ member was at all times,
and even small terrain variations could make the diﬀerence between
a safe and an unsafe area. However, available information on
starting points, travel routes and location of rescue sites still enabled
conclusions about the degree of presence in avalanche prone road
sections. We used four degrees of exposure, as indicated in Table 1.
Fig. 4. Example: Screenshot from www.xgeo.no, showing historical avalanche paths (white and yellow delineated polygons) reaching the road in the same area as
shown in Figure 3 (Lødingen, Nordland, North-Norway). (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version
of this article.)
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2.3.4. Avalanche risk assessment and management activities
To identify links between risk inﬂuencing factors and undesirable
incidents (rescuers exposed in avalanche runout zones during high
avalanche risk conditions), all cases were analyzed on the basis of the
normative, chronological order of the rescue phases. The six phases
used in this project were: Alert and dispatch; Mobilization of rescuers;
Travel to the accident site; Rescue / Activities on the accident site;
Evacuation; and Normalization. The normalization phase is not relevant
for the models presented in this study and is therefore omitted in the
further work.
In order to operationalize important issues in every rescue phase a
“procedure-hazop” (Willis et al., 1994) was designed and adapted to
avalanche rescue activities. This work was done in the autumn of 2013.
Initially, two experts on avalanche rescue reviewed all six phases by
using guidewords (e.g. “too early”, “too late”, “lacking”, “too much”) to
identify hazardous deviations from an optimal operation. The system
assessed was the Norwegian Rescue system and its normative proce-
dures and guidelines (Regjeringen, 2018). Later, the analysis that
contained the list of deviations was recurrently presented in various
annual rescue forums, adjusted and converted to a normative list of
expected activities in each rescue phase (Appendix A). Such rescue
forums were seminars and courses arranged by the Norwegian Red
Cross Rescue Corps, Norwegian School of Winter Warfare and the JRCC
with attendees from both professional and volunteer rescue organiza-
tions.
The normative list of expected rescue activities presented in
Appendix A was used to scrutinize logs and reports from all 45 cases
from the period 2010–2014. Compliance with the prescription was as-
sumed to ensure an overall safe performance and, consequently, de-
viations from the prescribed assessment procedure were considered to
form critical features of the emergency response system. The ﬁrst au-
thor analyzed all 45 cases, recorded deviations in each of the phases
with a description of the contents and the criticality of the deviation.
The assessments were recorded in a data dossier containing detailed
evaluation of data sources, their reliability, relevance and validity.
2.4. Factor analysis to extract trends in the material and narrow the critical
tasks in the rescue missions
In order to extract tendencies in the rich data material we used a
factor analysis in addition to case by case document analysis and in-
terviews. A mixed methods approach and triangulation is advocated by
Miles (1994). The exploratory factor analysis (EFA) can also contribute
to answering the research questions on the characteristics of Norwegian
road related avalanche incidents and rescue operations and the degree
rescuers expose themselves to avalanche risk when responding to ava-
lanche incidents.
Factor analysis on binary items has been discussed in the research
literature since the 1970-ies (Chapter 8 - Factor Analysis for Binary
Data in Bartholomew et al. (2011); Muthen (1978); Muthen and
Christoﬀersson (1981)). Using factor analysis to reveal tendencies in
binary variables has not been usual in research designs, but
Starkweather (2014) provides a procedure in the Rstudio editor (R Core
Team, 2018) that uses the correlation statistic for each pair of variables
in the data. The polycor-package contains a function – hetcor - that
looks at each pair of variables and computes the appropriate hetero-
geneous correlation for each pair. The hetcor function is capable of
calculating polychoric correlations for binary items. We reduced the
huge dataset of 39 binary variables (Appendix A) to 23 because the
remaining 16 variables showed no variance (< 2 registered deviations)
or were non-measurable (lack of details in logs). Because the data is
imported as numeric, we ﬁrst recoded it as a factor (i.e. categorical)
which was done using the sapply-function. When the numeric data was
recoded as factors, we proceeded by loading the polycor-package,
which contains the hetcor-function. We computed the correlation ma-
trix and assigned that matrix to a new object from the output of the
hetcor-function. This is seen as the appropriate correlation matrix, used
as the matrix of association for the factor analysis.
The fairly low N (45) is a challenge for factor analysis (Jung, 2013),
although “samples somewhat smaller than traditionally recommended
are likely suﬃcient when communalities are high” (MacCallum et al.,
2001). Preacher and MacCallum (2002) followed up on this issue and
pointed out that N's below 20 led to a marked reduction in factor re-
covery. The main conclusion, though, was that small N's still allowed
satisfactory isolation of factors. The 45 cases in this study make up the
entire population of road related avalanches in Norway in the study
period and, as such, recover all relevant population factors. Thus, we
claim that the material could provide interesting constructs. Applying
Starkweather's procedure (2014), the aim was to test our previous in-
terpretations of this data material. The initial correlation matrix formed
the basis for a 3-factor solution.
2.5. Qualitative and quantitative modelling
Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN) are considered useful in the as-
sessment of safety and performance in socio-technical systems with
many interacting variables (Greenberg and Cook, 2006). We chose the
software program Agenarisk (2015) to generate a BBN model of the
Norwegian avalanche rescue service. Agenarisk is designed to accom-
modate “organizations that need to assess and manage risks in areas where
there is little or no data” (Agenarisk, 2015). This software application
includes algorithms that combine probability calculations and graph
theory to support risk assessment and decision analysis (Stephenson,
2000). Regional diﬀerences in rescue performance can be simulated by
entering observations (soft evidence) in the respective variables
(Fenton and Neil, 2012, p. 145), thereby achieving locally relevant
estimates of performance.
The construction of the BBN followed the seven steps recommended
by Fenton and Neil (2012, p. 164):
1: Identify relevant variables.
2: Create a node to each variable.
3: Identify the set of states for the variable.
4: Specify the states for the nodes.
5: Identify variables that require direct links.
6: Create the identiﬁed direct links.
7: Specify the node probability table for each node in the BBN.
By placing the variables relative to each other in the graphical
structure, we created a generic norm for risk inﬂuencing factors and
performance in avalanche rescue operations (Fig. 5). As such, “Bayesian
networks may be viewed as normative cognitive models of propositional
reasoning under uncertainty” (Pearl and Russel, 2000, p. 5). To avoid a
combinatorial explosion, we restricted the variables to binary states
(Fenton and Neil, 2012, p. 215).
The network was simpliﬁed by using synthetic nodes deﬁned by
their parents. Although a BBN is primarily used to model causal con-
texts, where the edges indicate causal direction, directional indication
Table 1
Deﬁnition of degree of exposure in areas prone to naturally released avalanches.
0 No exposure
1 Planned, short exposure: A limited number of rescuers are exposed in planned, short-time operations
2 Occasional exposure: Rescuers pass several avalanche runout zones during access and return
3 Prolonged exposure: Rescuers stay and work in avalanche runout zones
A. Lunde and O. Njå &ROG5HJLRQV6FLHQFHDQG7HFKQRORJ\

using synthetic nodes will indicate how sub-variables converge to form
the synthetic nodes (Fenton and Neil, 2012, pp. 184–188). This struc-
ture is also found in Norrington et al.'s (2008) modelling of reliability in
maritime search and rescue operations in the UK. In our case, we were
left with eight synthetic nodes directly aﬀecting the resultant node;
Eﬃcient and Safe Operation.
The strengths in the relationships are quantitatively indicated by
assigning conditional probability distributions (Fenton and Neil, 2012,
p. 141) to all nodes in the BBN. In quantifying the probability dis-
tribution tables, the assigned values are based on a combination of
frequencies and analyst judgement (Aven, 2012, p. 81) as empirical
data is not easily retrieved. In February 2015, we asked groups of re-
gional avalanche rescue specialists from the Norwegian Red Cross
Rescue Corps to assign probability of deviance from the prescription for
avalanche risk assessment and risk management (Appendix A). Group
elicitation expands the knowledge on which to base the probabilities
(Vick, 2002, p. 313), and seeks inter-subjective agreement (Aven, 2014,
pp. 64–65) - a common opinion among experts. We then applied
“normalized frequencies” to the variables of the BBN, based on these
assignments, historical data and experience, “to better conform to the
circumstances at hand” (Vick, 2002, p. 127). In this approach, the basis
for assigning probabilities can be questioned, whereas the value itself is
an expression of the uncertainty linked to the state of the event or
variable in question (Aven, 2012, p. 72).
The node probability tables (NPT) were completed manually or by
the use of the “Noisy-Or-function” (Fenton and Neil, 2012), based on
the data material and expert opinions. A NPT for the variable “Rescue
activities” is shown in Table 2.
The Noisy-Or-function reduces the need to elicit a large number of
conditional probability values, as the node is given a value according to
the probability of the consequence if this causal factor occurs. It re-
quires, however, the determination of an extra probability value
(“leakage value”), representing the uncertainty in choice of causal
factors, and thus captures the importance of factors not included in the
model (Fenton and Neil, 2012, pp. 236–241). This implies that the
probability of the consequence will equal the leakage value even if all
parent nodes are set to “not true”.
Lastly, we applied the Agenarisk sensitivity analysis to test model
validity (Fenton and Neil, 2012, p. 264). The sensitivity analysis let us
see the eﬀect of the parent nodes on the resultant node without suc-
cessively having to put all variables in a favourable and unfavourable
state. A graphical output (tornado diagram) allows quick identiﬁcation
of unreasonable inﬂuence.
3. Results
3.1. Descriptive statistics
The number of road related avalanche rescue operations doubled
from an annual average of 5.5 to 11.6 when comparing the two periods
1996–2009 (N=77) and 2010–2014 (N=58) (p value= .003). In the
period 1996–2014, avalanches that hit public roads caused 6 fatal ac-
cidents, 4 personal injury accidents and 15 close calls. In these acci-
dents, 11 out of 34 avalanche victims died (mortality rate: 32.4%).
110 recorded avalanche incidents had no victim involvements
(n=135). During the ﬁve winter seasons from 2010 to 2014, Norway
experienced 2 fatal accidents, 7 close calls and 49 non-involvement
incidents (n=58). The main characteristics of all Norwegian road re-
lated avalanche incidents in the period 1996–2014 are presented in
Table 3.
In the longtime period 1996–2014 (n= 135), no vehicles were
completely covered by avalanche debris. In this material, we saw no
indications of a relationship between degree of coverage of avalanche
struck vehicles, avalanche danger level and the reported depth of
avalanche debris on the road. For those vehicles that ended up in water,
traces were always visible, enabling quick locations of the accident
sites. All involved passengers were also visible, and subsequently none
of the avalanche victims required location by traditional means, like
dogs, probes or transceivers. Victims and cars deposited in water were
located from boats or by divers.
In 28 (62%) of the 45 analyzed cases in the period 2010–2014, the
regional avalanche danger was at level 3, considerable (EAWS, 2016).
Of the remaining 17 incidents in the study, 15 were at danger level 4
and 2 were at danger level 5.
3.2. The rescuers` degree of exposure to avalanche risk
In 12 rescue operations (n=45) (26.7%) rescuers stayed and
worked in runout zones during avalanche danger levels 3–5. In 16 of
the operations (n= 45) (35.6%) rescuers were occasionally exposed in
runout zones as they travelled to and from accident sites. In 7 of the 45
operations (15.6%), following planning, rescuers deliberately entered
avalanche prone areas in swift search operations to check whether
vehicles were covered by avalanche debris. We found no exposure of
rescue personnel in 10 of the 45 rescue operations (22.2%).
3.3. Avalanche risk assessment and management activities
The analysis of deviations from a prescription for avalanche risk
assessment and risk management (Appendix A) gave the following
average number of deviations in each rescue phase: Alert/Dispatch: 19
(n= 45) (42.3%), Mobilization: 4 (n=45) (8.9%), Travel: 10 (n=45)
(22.2%), Rescue: 13 (n=45) (28.9%) and Evacuation: 1 (n=45)
(2.2%). A ﬁgure showing the detailed distribution of deviations can be
found in Appendix B.
The rescuers´ degrees of exposure and risk assessment deviations
showed a correlation of 0.84.
3.4. Factor analysis
We examined the correlation matrix derived from registered de-
viations and found that all but one (“Rescue units are informed about the
time of the accident”) of the 23 items correlated with one or more factors
by> 0.3. The result indicated a suﬃcient degree of collinearity be-
tween the variables. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) test, which returns
Fig. 5. Generic Bayesian Belief Network. A generic BBN model with factors that
may aﬀect performance (safety and eﬃciency) in the Norwegian avalanche
rescue service.
Table 2
Node probability table for the node «Rescue activities”, with parents
“Competence” and “Accident site management”.
“Competence” Low Full
“Accident site management” Inadequate Adequate Inadequate Adequate
Inadequate 0.95 0.8 0.4 0.01
Adequate 0.05 0.2 0.6 0.99
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a value between 0 and 1 to indicate the suitability of the data for factor
analysis, showed a mediocre (0.64) value, weakly indicating a factor-
able dataset. The Bartlett's test of sphericity was not signiﬁcant
(χ2=281.337, p= .77), failing the assumption of equal variance.
Lastly, the mean level of communality, which is the proportion of
variation explained by the model, was 0.75 (σ= 0.2). This value in-
dicates that the variables are fairly well explained by the factors. Thus,
the exploratory factor analysis supported the isolation of 3 latent fac-
tors (Table 4), subsequently denoted: I: Degree of avalanche risk aware-
ness (α= 0.85); II: Degree of commitment (α=0.85), and III: Degree of
application of risk reduction measures and mitigation (α= 0.86). The
Cronbach's alpha coeﬃcients (Cronbach, 1951) are all above 0.70,
which indicate that the items show good internal consistency. The re-
latively high values give rise to concern that some items are redundant
and test the same phenomenon, although the limit for such an as-
sumption is commonly set to> 0.90 (Tavakol and Dennick, 2011).
Items “No assessment of maximum avalanche runouts” and “Lack of
competent rescue personnel” cross load ≥0.6 on factors I and II, sug-
gesting that these items may measure both concepts. Considering
loadings between 0.5 and 0.6, the boundaries between factors are
blurred, especially in items related to the Alert and dispatch phase
“Dispatcher does not announce an initial assessment of avalanche risk”,
“Avalanche rescue specialist is not appointed in the alert phase” and
“Dispatcher does not gather critical information before alerting and dis-
patching rescue units“.
These constructs reﬂect the ﬁndings presented in section 3.3,
Avalanche risk assessment and management activities (Appendix B), in
that we see an aggregate of covariance in items related to dispatchers´
and rescuers´ activities to mind and handle avalanche risk in the var-
ious phases of rescue operations. In this respect, factor I and II load
quite substantially, whereas factor III, does not stand out very clearly,
loading strongly 0.90 on the item “Rescuers are not travelling on the
ground when helicopter is available and safer”, but rather weakly on an-
other important risk reducing measure; “Rescue unit does not cross po-
tential runout zones during elevated avalanche danger levels” (0.54).
Further, factor III would beneﬁt from including other items that are not
in the list of items in Table 4, to strengthen the risk reduction and
mitigation proﬁle, but these loadings were below 0.5.
Table 3
Select statistics of Norwegian road related avalanche incidents in the periods 1996–2009 and 2010–2014.
Search and rescue statistics 1996–2010 (n=77) 2010–2014 (n= 58)
Response time in minutes, median (nobs, 25th–75th percentiles) – 34 (30, 26.3–48.0)
Duration of operations, hrs, median (nobs, 25th–75th percentiles) – 2,3 (40,1.5–3.6)
Time of day between 1800 and 06001 h, n (%) 34 (44.2) 23 (39.7)
Debris width on road in m., median (nobs, min, max) 60 (41, 10, 1300)
Debris depth on road in cm., median (nobs, min, max) – 250 (29, 2, 1000)
Most frequent ﬁrst responder2; Police patrols, n (nobs %) 14 (66, 18) 25 (45, 56.0)
Police (accident site leader) present, n (%) 47 (61.0) 42 (72.4)
Rescuers on site, median (nobs, 25th–75th percentiles) 6 (25, 2.0–14.5) 6 (32, 4.0–20.0)
Rescue dogs present on site, n (%) 40 (51,9) 23 (51,1)
Air rescue helicopters activated / en route, n (%) 36 (46,8) 35 (60,3)
obs, Number of observations. nobs is the number of rescue operations where this information was provided.
1. The time of day with least daylight, early winter; darkness, in spring; short time of darkness.
2. Organized rescue.
Table 4
Factor loadings, sorted by Factor I, in decreasing order. Note: Factor loadings< 0.5 are suppressed and factor loadings ≥ 0.60 are in bold to highlight items showing
a strong connection with the factor of interest. The 3 latent factors were named: I: Degree of Avalanche risk awareness (α= 0.85) II: Degree of commitment
(α= 0.85) and III: Degree of application of risk reduction measures and mitigation (α=0.86).
Item no. Item Factor I Factor II Factor III Communality
3a1 Avalanche risk assessment is performed (“Nowcast”) 0.89 0.89
1a2 Dispatcher gathers suﬃcient information about the situation and the involved victim/s 0.87 0.92
4a1 Avalanche risk assessment is performed (“Nowcast”) 0.86 0.83
4a2 Rescue unit assesses maximum avalanche runouts in the accident area 0.76 0.63 0.99
2b1 Suﬃciently competent rescue personnel with respect to complexity 0.74 0.65 0.98
1a3 Dispatcher has available standardized guidelines for gathering avalanche speciﬁc information 0.71 0.67
1b2 Dispatcher announces an initial assessment of avalanche risk in the area 0.63 0.51 0.53 0.93
1c2 Avalanche rescue specialist is appointed in the alert phase 0.60 0.54 0.99
1b1 Dispatcher gathers critical information before alerting and dispatching rescue units 0.60 0.52 0.59 0.68
2b7 Not too many rescuers dispatched (adjusted to situation and risk level – reduce exposure) 0.57 0.56 0.50
3a3 Rescue unit does not cross potential runout zones during elevated avalanche danger levels 0.56 0.50 0.54 0.86
1a1 Dispatcher asks about avalanche risk, weather, terrain, light/visibility, type of avalanche 0.65 0.59
1a4 Dispatcher interviews accident reporter / witness to gather avalanche speciﬁc information 0.82 0.74
1c1 Dispatcher oﬀers suﬃcient information to rescue units 0.72 0.57
1c3 Rescue units are informed about the time of the accident. 0.78
1c4 Rescue units are oﬀered information on local conditions (terrain, snow and visibility) 0.76 0.75
2b2 Travel to accident site only after rescuers are adequately informed and coordinated 0.68 0.59
2b4 No overcommitment. Level of motivation adjusted to situation and possible gain 0.61 0.45
3a5 Adequate avalanche risk assessment 0.78 0.57 0.92
3b1 Rescuers are not travelling on the ground when helicopter is available and safer 0.90 0.86
3b2 Avalanche risk assessment is performed continuously when travelling to the accident area 0.26
4a3 Rescue units do not spend too much time on their way to, and/or in the accident area 0.77 0.89
4a4 No overcommitment. Justiﬁed and reasonable time and eﬀort spent in the accident area 0.56 0.59
SS loadings 7.21 6.39 3.64
Proportional variance 0.31 0.28 0.16
Cumulative variance 0.31 0.59 0.75
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3.5. Qualitative and quantitative modelling - Bayesian Belief Network
Based on the normative list of expected activities in each rescue
phase (Appendix A), descriptive statistics, identiﬁed risk indicators and
input from experts on Norwegian avalanche rescue operations, a BBN
was constructed consisting of 34 variables (Fig. 6 and Table 5). Eight
synthetic nodes (yellow label in Fig. 6) were directly linked to the ﬁnal
node “Eﬃcient & safe operation” (green label in Fig. 6).
When weighting the inﬂuence of the synthetic nodes on the out-
come variable by the Noisy-Or function (Fenton and Neil, 2012), most
weight was assigned to the “RISK Alarp” variable (0.6) and the least
weight to “Conditions” (0.1). The leakage value was set to 0.1. The re-
sultant a priori probability (normal state) of a safe and eﬃcient rescue
response was 63%, i.e. in 6 out of 10 rescue operations following road
related avalanches, the Norwegian avalanche rescue service demon-
strates an acceptable performance.
We evaluated the inﬂuence of the eight synthetic nodes on the main
variable by sensitivity analysis (Fig. 7) (Fenton and Neil, 2012, p. 264).
The variable of greatest inﬂuence on Norwegian avalanche rescue
performance is the ability of rescuers to operate within tolerable risk
limits (Risk ALARP). This ability is seen as a result of pertinent ava-
lanche risk assessments in all phases of the rescue operation and pos-
sible gain for avalanche victims. The probability of a safe and eﬃcient
operation ranges from 0.47 when risk is not kept as low as reasonably
practicable to 0.82 when risk is within acceptable bounds (no un-
warranted exposure of rescue personnel). Dispatch and avalanche
rescue management are both considered important factors in moder-
ating the rescuers ability to balance risk and beneﬁt. From a normal
state of 63% probability of a safe and eﬃcient operation, there is an
increase to 76.5% when dispatch of rescuers is 100% adequately
handled. Likewise, positive states for avalanche rescue management
and response time will have a considerable impact on the main vari-
able, increasing the reliability to 80.1% and 78.6%.
In January 2017 we used the model to simulate avalanche rescue
performance in a region of Western Norway, in an inter-organizational
pre-season avalanche rescue meeting (Lunde et al., 2017). Prior to the
meeting we elicited relevant input from local rescue specialists and then
entered soft evidence (Fenton and Neil, 2012, p. 145) in accordance
with their advice. The result, which showed an increase in performance
from the overall national level of 63% to a regional performance level
of 81%, illustrated how BBN modelling may be used to identify weak-
nesses and strengths in local emergency preparedness. “In all of this, the
whole exercise of using probability is fundamentally diagnostic in nature”
(Vick, 2002, p. 400).
4. Discussion
4.1. Characteristics of road related avalanche incidents
Based on historical data it seems unusual for a vehicle struck by
snow avalanche to be totally covered by debris, and this seems to be
independent of avalanche danger level and possibly avalanche size.
This observation is uncertain, both due to inconsistent reports of ava-
lanche debris on the roads and the inherent uncertainty in assessing
avalanche danger levels (Techel and Schweizer, 2017). Schweizer et al.
(2018) found no relation between avalanche size and avalanche danger
level, which could explain the lack of dependency between coverage
and avalanche danger level. Another plausible explanation in those
cases where vehicles ﬂoat freely in moving debris is the eﬀect of inverse
segregation (Kern et al., 2001), i.e. an upward sorting of larger particles
Fig. 6. BBN model of the performance of the Norwegian avalanche rescue service during road related incidents, in a normal state with apriori probability values.
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in granular ﬂow, irrespective of density. Of course, micro-terrain fea-
tures may trap vehicles, and one may expect that such scenarios are
sought avoided by careful road planning. Considering the construction
of modern cars and the passengers` regular use of safety belts, ava-
lanche victims will most likely be stuck inside the vehicle. This limits
the search and rescue task to localizing the car and freeing the victims.
Implicitly, crew demanding and time-consuming operations to search
for non-conﬁrmed victims outside of vehicles are examples of high risk
– low gain activities and should be reduced to a minimum. There exist
very few examples containing other road users, such as motorbikes,
cyclists or pedestrians struck by snow avalanches.
4.2. Rescuers` exposure to avalanche risk
Two-thirds of the rescue operations took place during considerable
avalanche danger. This proportion of incidents in danger level 3 con-
ditions coincides with recent NPRA statistics on road related avalanches
(Orset et al., 2017) and an earlier study by Hohlrieder et al. on ava-
lanche rescue missions in Austria (2008). According to the European
avalanche danger scale, naturally released avalanches are increasingly
frequent at danger levels 3–5 (EAWS, 2016). Jürg Schweizer et al.
(2003) found that observed avalanche activity alone correlated poorly
with the lower avalanche danger ratings. In a more recent study by
Schweizer et al. (2018, p. 1), they found that “the frequency of natural
avalanches strongly increases with increasing danger level”.
The probability of secondary avalanches in adjacent paths is typi-
cally assigned a value between 0.03 and 0.30 (Hendrikx et al., 2006).
Kristensen et al. (2003), used a snow avalanche probability of 0.5, and
presented two representative calculations of the probability of moving
and stationary cars being hit by “neighbour-avalanches”, showing va-
lues of 0.0001 and 0.15. Kristensen and Harbitz also proposed that the
probability of a new avalanche in the vicinity of the ﬁrst may rise to
0.90 in case of conﬁrmed recent avalanche activity, which is normally
the case in road related avalanche rescue operations.
We made no attempt to calculate the risk level for individual res-
cuers in these operations. E.g. calculating the Avalanche Hazard Index
(Schaerer, 1989) for all the road sections of these 45 cases would be a
formidable task, and the required number of uncertain assumptions
would most likely compromise the validity and usefulness of the results.
The use of expected values to describe risk for rescuers is also ques-
tionable, as this metric does not account for outliers, i.e. extreme
events. This “can seriously misguide decision-makers in practice”
(Aven, 2014, p. 25). For our purpose of identifying undesirable in-
cidents, a semi-quantitative approach was suﬃcient.
Even a low probability of release and a statistically low risk of being
hit by an avalanche during a rescue response may be considered un-
acceptable, taking into account the high mortality rate in road related
avalanche accidents (0.32) and that safety is top priority for rescuers
(Blancher et al., 2018, p. 4; Garrison, 2002, p. 634; Regjeringen, 2018).
Given the low predictability of snow avalanches (Jürg Schweizer,
Table 5
Variables and states: BBN modelling the reliability of Norwegian road related avalanche rescue.
Variables Deﬁnitions States
Eﬃcient & safe operation Optimal rescue operation without undesirable incidents Yes No
Conditions Weather and avalanche conditions Favourable Unfavourable
Visibilitya Visibility related to avalanche risk assessment Favourable Unfavourable
Percipa Precipitation / snowfall per hour < 2 cm/h > 2 cm/h
Winda Wind in meters per second < 8m/s > 8m/s
Temperature Temperature in degrees Celsius < 0° C > 0° C
Response time Time from ﬁrst emergency call till rescuers arrive on site Acceptable Unacceptable
Distanceb Travel distance from responding unit till accident site Short Long
Route selection Route from base till accident site Favourable Unfavourable
Local knowledge Knowledge of avalanche danger zones and paths Yes No
Av. risk assessment Avalanche risk assessment included in route selection Yes No
Navi. equipment Rescuers equipped with and use maps, compass, GPS Yes No
Competence Rescuers can ﬁnd a safe route in avalanche terrain Yes No
Commitment Balancing safety of rescuers and possibility of saving lives Appropriate Inappropriate
Expectation Rescuers` expectations on possibility of saving lives. Appropriate Inappropriate
Risk ALARP Risk kept As Low As Reasonably Practicable, as a factor of initial and ongoing avalanche risk assessment and
realistic gain. Rescuers with safety equipment.
Yes No
Gain Probability that somebody are in fact caught by avalanche Yes No
Observed A vehicle is observed caught by avalanche Yes No
Missing A person is reported missing in the area / road stretch Yes No
Visible An object / vehicle is visible on the surface of the avalanche Yes No
Initial av. risk assessment Rescue units assess avalanche danger before travelling toward the accident site Yes No
Continuous av. risk assessment Rescuers assess avalanche risk continuously during travel to accident site Yes No
Runout_assessment Rescuers assess runouts for all relevant avalanche paths in the area. Yes No
Av. rescue mngment Avalanche rescue commander and other professional avalanche personnel (e.g. geologists) are involved in the
rescue operation, from the beginning till the end.
Yes No
Dispatch RCC Emergency call handling, initial avalanche risk assessment and dispatch of competent personnel. Adequate Inadequate
Av.rescue guidelines National Guidelines for handling road related avalanche incidents Yes No
Avalanche danger focus Dispatcher awareness of own inﬂuence on rescuer safety. Result of National Guidelines and training. Yes No
Filter 1c Dispatcher seeks information on weather, terrain, light/visibility and avalanche type. Yes No
Avalanche risk assessment Result of Avalanche danger focus and Filter 1; initial sorting of operation in high or low risk. Communicated. Yes No
GIS Geographical Information Systems. Gather relevant information from all available sources. Yes No
Critical info Critical information on known avalanche zones and safe areas is identiﬁed and communicated to rescue units. Yes No
Call-out Call-out / dispatch to accident site only after critical information is communicated to rescue units. Mature Premature
Rescue activities Coordinated, safe and eﬃcient rescue activities Adequate Inadequate
Accident site mngmnt Competent accident site management Adequate Inadequate
Competence Avalanche rescue competence High Low
a With reference to (Lied and Kristensen, 2003).
b With reference to the probability of survival for totally buried avalanche victims (Brugger et al., 2001), distance allowing a rescue response within 15min is
short, otherwise long.
c With reference to (Kristensen et al., 2007). Filter 1 is the ﬁrst information gathered by dispatch centers.
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2008), only a terrain-based approach (Lied and Kristensen, 2003, p.
119) of total avoidance of release zones and only limited and controlled
exposure in runout zones is recommended for the rescue service (NRR,
2012). This is reﬂected in both the prescription for avalanche risk as-
sessment and management (Appendix A) and in the Bayesian network
(Fig. 6 and Table 5).
As the rescuers` exposure in avalanche terrain was quite high, in
avalanche danger levels 3–5, and many rescue responses took place in
darkness and reduced visibility, we raise the question whether the
Norwegian avalanche rescue service is working safely in this type of
rescue operations. Since a high percentage of call-outs seemed un-
necessary (8 out of 10 avalanches had no victims) and risk assessment
and management activities were missing or inadequate (section 3.3),
we see this as a sign of over-commitment (Ash and Smallman, 2008).
More research is needed to establish which mechanisms are acting upon
avalanche rescuers in “Go – No go” situations. This is especially im-
portant in rescue situations engaging a mix of volunteer and profes-
sional rescuers, with diﬀering intra-organizational safety regulations.
4.3. Avalanche risk assessment and management
We considered information ﬂow, activation of trained rescuers and
professional support in avalanche risk assessments as measures to re-
duce the uncertainty involved in these rescue operations. An important
starting point, therefore, is to introduce a risk minded dispatch of
rescue personnel. This aspect is included in several nodes of the BBN,
especially “Dispatch RCC”, “Av. rescue management”, “Risk ALARP” and
“Rescue activities”. Deviations from the prescription for avalanche risk
assessment and management are frequent in the alert and dispatch
phase. The regularity of these deviations may be an expression of a
system failure, e.g. it is not speciﬁed as a regular task at dispatch
centers to gather and share information on avalanche risk. We assume
that early information about local weather, terrain, snow and avalanche
conditions (Kristensen et al., 2007) will increase the collective ava-
lanche risk awareness (K. E. Weick et al., 2008) and reduce the possi-
bility of undesirable incidents. Bründl and Etter (2012) also recommend
an early assignment of mission tendency as low or high risk. Therefore,
a failure to trigger avalanche risk awareness can propagate to later
rescue phases (Reason, 1997) and manifest itself as dangerous acts
(prolonged exposure in runout zones) in dangerous conditions (ava-
lanche danger levels 3–5). Deviations in accomplishing avalanche risk
assessment and management occurred in one quarter of the activities
related to the travel and rescue phases. We link this observation to our
interpretation of the factor analysis. These factors were not decisive to
the modelling of performance in Norwegian avalanche rescue opera-
tions but supplemented our validation of the variables and probabilities
included in the BBN.
Leveson (2011) stresses that a focus on deviations from normative
procedures diverts the attention from the “performance-shaping context”
acting on decisions and individual behavior. This is in line with the
views of Rasmussen (1997), pointing at the normality of operating on
the limits of normative work procedures. Transferring the ideas of
Rasmussen (1997), one may say that the conﬂicting interests of rescue
activities and rescuer safety causes “a systematic migration of organiza-
tional behavior toward accident”. Taking an organizational view point,
Rasmussen argues that “modelling activity in terms of sequences and errors
is not very eﬀective for understanding behavior”. One part of the perfor-
mance-shaping context is the initial handling of road related avalanche
incidents and the sense of urgency which dispatch centers impose on
both the rescue organization and individual rescuers. We think that
further research into factors that govern choice of behavior in ava-
lanche rescue missions is needed, in which the concept of over-com-
mitment and the perspectives on naturalistic decision making could
provide interesting knowledge.
4.4. Bayesian Belief Network modelling rescue performance
The BBN represents a conglomerate of diﬀerent managerial levels,
actors, functions and tasks, in addition to purely stochastic variables
like weather and snow conditions. It oﬀers an evaluation of the per-
formance of Norwegian road related avalanche rescue on a national
level. No doubt, zooming in on a regional scale the network may take
other dimensions and give diﬀerent results. This is also reﬂected in the
feedback gained from fellow rescuers on presenting the model, oﬀering
Fig. 7. Sensitivity analysis. Variables of greatest inﬂuence are indicated by the length of the horizontal bars. The vertical line indicates the marginal probability for an
eﬃcient and safe operation (0.63).
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insightful suggestions on new variables and adjustments of the variable
ratios (Lunde et al., 2017). In our approach, the knowledge base for
assigning probabilities can be questioned, whereas the value itself is an
expression of our uncertainty about the state of the event or variable in
question. In the understanding that all probabilities associated with an
uncertain event are conditional upon the context of the incident, we
must also be open to changing our perception of the given probability in
meeting new knowledge and new assumptions. This is the basis for
structuring and quantifying phenomena in the Bayesian network.
BBN as the modelling tool is especially powerful when we have a
mix of qualitative and quantitative data (Fenton and Neil, 2012). The
validity of the model, both causal interpretations and generalizability,
can be questioned. The intention with such models is not to be con-
sidered as the truth or being the correct model. It is a representation of
the data material and the expertise of the analysts involved. Thus,
rescuer's participation and critical reﬂections are assumed in all con-
texts using the model. According to Pitchforth and Mengersen (2013, p.
162), validity in the context of BBNs can be understood as “the ability of
a model to describe the system that it is intended to describe both in the
output and in the mechanism by which that output is generated”. Feedback
is in itself a useful validation technique, and this BBN invites further
discussions on variables and dependencies aﬀecting rescuer safety. As
well as communicating which RIFs to control in avalanche rescue, the
interdisciplinary process of developing a regional BBN may contribute
to increased safety awareness, in accordance with the elements of col-
lective mindfulness (K. Weick and Sutcliﬀe, 2001).
Our results show a 63% probability of safe and eﬃcient avalanche
rescue performance. The considerable uncertainty as to whether risk
will be controlled at an ALARP level (nearly 50–50), is probably not a
fair description of all regions in Norway. However, the BBN reﬂects
ﬁndings in logs and reports where the ﬁrst responding rescue units
often represent ordinary, though professional, emergency services
without systematic formal training in avalanche risk assessment and
management. This is exempliﬁed by the fact that police patrols were the
ﬁrst to respond in 56% of these 58 cases. Also, incident site comman-
ders are not always present to support the ﬁrst responding rescuers. The
rescue operations are normally handled by members of volunteer rescue
organizations, also with a varying competence in avalanche rescue.
Although some regions have specialized avalanche rescue teams and
snow safety specialists, one cannot systematically expect these complex
incidents to be handled by experts. These considerations are reﬂected in
the initial, unconditional probabilities of all parent nodes in the pre-
sented BBN, except “Conditions” and “Response time”.
Apart from challenges linked to training and competence, rescuers
are obviously faced with tough decisions to make within a limited
timeframe. Both internal motivation and external pressure, e.g. from
witnesses, employers and mass media may inﬂuence their decisions
(Ash and Smallman, 2008; Blancher et al., 2018, p. 4; Winn et al., 2012,
p. 81). This aspect is integrated in the nodes “Expectation” and
“Commitment”, and these are as well assigned a low probability of
being kept at an appropriate level. This is explained by the fact that
most incidents had no victims, and in spite of little information to
justify the eﬀorts, rescuers often responded directly and swiftly to the
accident site, and worked for prolonged periods of time, in adverse
conditions (Appendix A, ID nr 4a4).
Braut et al. (2012) introduced “Risk Informed Decision Making”
(RIDM) as the approach in situations of uncertainty. They pointed at the
importance of continuous risk assessments based on information pro-
cessing and identiﬁcation of critical values. In clarifying alternatives,
qualiﬁed assumptions on future events should be given in terms of
probabilities – a process resembling the quantiﬁcation of BBNs. BBNs
are also mirrored in their concept of risk images, which underlines the
dynamic nature of decision processes. This relates to the role of situa-
tional cues in decision making, noted in this study as e.g. rain on snow,
snowdrift, reduced visibility and avalanche activity. Ash and Smallman
(2008) observed varying reactions to relevant cues, and found that
experts, more often than other ﬁre and rescue team members, judged
the risk level to be unacceptable. Human factors in avalanche rescue
like the roles of expectation, motivation and commitment, need further
studies. Against this background we also see the control actions by
dispatchers as necessary mechanisms for adjusting expectations, sense
of urgency and safety mindedness.
4.5. Limitations
The Microsoft Excel data base is developed in retrospect and some of
the information has been interpreted from free text ﬁelds. Even if the
informational quality of registration has increased over the years, it is
still variable due to both inter-operator diﬀerences in registration of
relevant details and inter-regional diﬀerences in how to conduct and
document rescue activities. This may have aﬀected the level of detail in
which risk assessment and management activities were logged and
consequently how the rescue situation was interpreted by the analyst.
Also, the analysis was performed by the ﬁrst author only. Since some of
the cases required a certain degree of interpretation, the study would
probably have beneﬁted from repeated measurements. Nonetheless, all
analyses were documented in data dossiers to ascertain consistency and
to allow comparisons to be made.
5. Conclusion
The Norwegian avalanche rescue service is vulnerable in its hand-
ling of road related avalanche rescue operations. The seemingly excess
exposure can be linked to deﬁciencies in the acquisition and ﬂow of
information in the alert and dispatch phase, inadequate deployment of
competent personnel, implying inadequacies in the avalanche risk as-
sessment and management. The method used to evaluate rescuers´ ex-
posure in avalanche prone terrain could be included in emergency
planning and preparations for infrastructure related avalanche rescue
operations, speciﬁcally directing rescuers to safe places along access
routes.
Modelling avalanche risk assessment and reliability with Bayesian
Belief Networks proved promising, as it allowed the integration of both
historical data, observations and experience, whilst taking into account
the uncertainties linked to these complex rescue operations. The in-
tuitive nature of the graphical model conveys openly the included
factors and dependencies, contributing to a transparent analysis
(Straub, 2005). As such, the BBN allowed avalanche risk management
to “be modelled by a cross-disciplinary study, considering risk management
to be a control problem and serving to represent the control structure”
(Rasmussen, 1997, p. 183). The model itself also encourage a critical
reﬂexive stance to risk that imply continuous knowledge generation.
The resulting probability of a safe and eﬃcient rescue operation
reﬂects the variability in performance, pointing at important factors to
control in order to ensure an acceptable level of response throughout
the country. Over the years, much attention has been paid to response
time, in view of the poor prognosis of totally buried avalanche victims.
The results of this study indicate a need to focus on factors that allow
rescuers to remain in control of their own safety. Balancing the need of
patients against rescuer safety implies controlling undue haste and
over-commitment, enhancing risk awareness and allowing time for
necessary avalanche risk assessment and management. Considering
safety as a control problem (Leveson, 2011), managerial levels need to
engage in control actions that stimulate and support both safety and
eﬃciency.
Conﬂict of interest
None of the authors beneﬁt from the production or sale of the
mentioned software solutions used in this study.
A. Lunde and O. Njå &ROG5HJLRQV6FLHQFHDQG7HFKQRORJ\

Acknowledgements
This study would not have been possible without access to rescue
logs and reports, granted to us by the Norwegian Joint Rescue
Coordination Centers and the Norwegian Police Directorate, in addition
to supplemental information from colleagues in avalanche rescue.
Thanks to snow avalanche researchers Kalle Kronholm and Krister
Kristensen for valuable comments during the study; to professor Geir S.
Braut for his feedback on reading this paper; to Red Cross Rescue Team
leader Jan Peder Hoggen, who took an active part in the procedural
HAZOP leading to the avalanche risk assessment technique and to
professor Knud Knudsen and associate professor Ulrich Dettweiler for
comments on factor analysis. We are also grateful for the very con-
structive comments from the anonymous reviewers.
Appendix. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.coldregions.2019.04.011.
References
AgenaRisk 6.2, revision 2840, 2015. Bayesian Network and Simulation Software for Risk
Analysis and Decision Support [Online]. Retrieved from. https://www.agenarisk.
com/technology.
Ash, J.S., Smallman, C., 2008. Rescue missions and risk management: highly reliable or
over committed? J. Conting. Crisis Manage. 16 (1), 37–52.
Aven, T., 2012. Foundations of Risk Analysis, 2nd ed. Wiley, Hoboken, N. J (229 pages).
Aven, T., 2014. Risk, Surprises and Black Swans: Fundamental Ideas and Concepts in Risk
Assessment and Risk Management. Routledge, London (262 pages).
Barfod, E., Müller, K., Saloranta, T., Andersen, J., Orthe, N.K., Wartianien, A., ... Engeset,
R., 2013. The expert tool XGEO and its applications in the Norwegian Avalanche
forecasting Service. In: Paper Presented at the International Snow Science Workshop
Grenoble—Chamonix Mont-–Blanc.
Bartholomew, D.J., Steele, F., Galbraith, J., Moustaki, I., 2011. Analysis of multivariate
social science data. In: Statistics in the Social and Behavioral Sciences Series. CRC
Press, Boca Raton, Florida (384 pages).
Bjordal, H., Larsen, J.O., 2009. Avalanche Risk in a changing climate Development of a
Landslide and Avalanche Risk Model. In: Paper Presented at the International Snow
Science Workshop 2009, Davos.
Blancher, M., Albasini, F., Elsensohn, F., Zafren, K., Hölzl, N., McLaughlin, K., 2018.
Management of Multi-Casualty Incidents in Mountain Rescue: Evidence-Based
Guidelines of the International Commission for Mountain Emergency Medicine (ICAR
MEDCOM). vol. 19(2).
Braut, G.S., Rake, E.L., Aanestad, R., Njå, O., 2012. Risk images as basis for decisions
related to provision of public services. Risk Manag. 14 (1), 60–76.
Brugger, H., Durrer, B., Adler-Kastner, L., Falk, M., Tschirky, F., 2001. Field management
of avalanche victims. Resuscitation 51 (1), 7–15. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0300-
9572(01)00383-5.
Bründl, M., Etter, H.-J., 2012. Rescue Compass – A decision making tool for avalanche
rescue. In: Paper Presented at the International Snow Science Workshop 2012,
Anchorage, Alaska.
EAWS, 2016. European Avalanche Warning Services Avalanche Danger Scale. Retrieved
from. http://www.avalanches.org/eaws/en/main.php.
Etter, H.-J., 2010. Avalanche Accident(S) on Drümännler. http://www.alpine-rescue.org/
ikar-cisa/documents/2010/ikar20100130000515.pdf.
Fenton, N., Neil, M., 2012. Risk Assessment and Decision Analysis with Bayesian
Networks. CRC Press. Taylor & Francis Group, Florida, USA (6000 Broken Sound
Parkway NW, Suite 300, Boca Raton, FL 333487-2742, USA. 503 pages).
Garrison, H.G., 2002. Keeping rescuers safe. Ann. Emerg. Med. 40 (6), 633–635. https://
doi.org/10.1067/mem.2002.129940.
Glassett, T.D., Techel, F., 2014. Avalanche accidents involving people along transporta-
tion corridors and the implications for avalanche operations. In: Paper Presented at
the International Snow Science Workshop 2014, Banﬀ, Canada.
Greenberg, R., Cook, S.C., 2006. A Generic BBN Safety Model. In: Paper Presented at the
Product Safety Engineering Society Symposium, 2006 IEEE.
Hendrikx, J., Owens, I., Carran, W., Carran, A., 2006. Avalanche risk evaluation with
practical suggestions for risk minimization: A case study of the Milford Road, New
Zealand. In: Paper Presented at the International Snow Science Workshop 2006,
Telluride, Colorado, USA.
Hohlrieder, M., Thaler, S., Wuertl, W., Voelckel, W., Ulmer, H., Brugger, H., Mair, P.,
2008. Rescue missions for totally buried avalanche victims: Conclusions from 12
years of experience. High Alt. Med. Biol. 9 (3), 229–233. https://doi.org/10.1089/
ham.2007.1061.
HSE, 2018. ALARP "at a Glance". Health and Safety Executive, Great Britain. Retrieved
from. http://www.hse.gov.uk/risk/theory/alarpglance.htm.
Jung, S., 2013. Exploratory factor analysis with small sample sizes: a comparison of three
approaches. Behav. Process. 97, 90–95. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.beproc.2012.11.
016.
Kern, M., Tschirky, F., Schweizer, J., 2001. Feldversuche zur Wirksamkeit einiger neuer
Lawinen-Rettungsgeräte. Jahrbuch, pp. 127–145.
Kristensen, K., Kristensen, C.B., Harbitz, A., 2003. Road Traﬃc and Avalanches – Methods
for Risk Evaluation and Risk Management. Surv. Geophys. 24 (5), 603–616. https://
doi.org/10.1023/B:GEOP.0000006085.10702.cf.
Kristensen, K., Lunde, A., Skjelbakken, T.A., Hoggen, J.P., Hjelle, M., Torpe, E., Nordseth,
H., 2007. Risk a life to save a life? Risk management in avalanche rescue operations.
In: Paper Presented at the International Commission for Alpine Rescue 2007,
Pontresina, CH, . http://www.alpine-rescue.org/ikar-cisa/documents/2008/
ikar20080213000183.pdf.
Kristensen, K., Kronholm, K., Bjørdal, N.H., 2008. Avalanche Characterization for
Regional forecasting. In: Paper Presented at the Whistler 2008 International Snow
Science Workshop.
LaChapelle, E.R., 1985. The ABC of Avalanche Safety, 2nd ed. The Mountaineers, Seattle,
WA (112 pages).
Leveson, N., 2011. Engineering a Safer World Systems Thinking Applied to Safety. MIT
Press, Cambridge, Mass (534 pages).
Lied, K., Kristensen, K., 2003. Snøskred: håndbok om snøskred. Vett & Viten, Oslo (200
pages).
Lunde, Albert, Braut, Geir Sverre, 2019. Overcommitment: management in helicopter
emergency medical services in Norway. Air Med. J (Article in Press).
Lunde, A., Kristensen, K., 2013. Avalanche rescue and mission risk in Norway 1996-2010.
In: Proceedings of the International Snow Science Workshop. Grenoble – Chamonix
Mont-Blanc.
Lunde, A., Eldholm, T., Hoggen, J.P., 2017. Pre-Season Inter-Organizational Avalanche
Rescue Meeting; Rescue Management in Road Related Avalanche Rescue Operations.
Presentation. In. Unpublished:. Volda avalanche rescue team, Ørsta.
MacCallum, R.C., Widaman, K.F., Preacher, K.J., Hong, S., 2001. Sample size in factor
Analysis: the Role of Model Error. Multivar. Behav. Res. 36 (4), 611–637. https://doi.
org/10.1207/S15327906MBR3604_06.
McClung, D., Schaerer, P.A., 1993. The Avalanche Handbook. The Mountaineers, Seattle,
Washington, USA (271 pages).
Melchers, R.E., 2001. On the ALARP approach to risk management. Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf.
71 (2), 201–208. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0951-8320(00)00096-X.
Miles, M.B., 1994. Qualitative Data Analysis : An Expanded Sourcebook, 2nd ed. Sage,
Thousand Oaks, California, USA (338 pages).
Muthen, B., 1978. Contributions to factor Analysis of Dichotomous Variables.
Psychometrika 43 (4), 551–560. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02293813.
Muthen, B., Christoﬀersson, A., 1981. Simultaneous factor analysis of dichotomous
variables in several groups. Psychometrika 46 (4), 407–419. https://doi.org/10.
1007/BF02293798.
NGI, 2018. Bratte områder Norge / Steep Areas in Norway. Digital Map. Retrieved from.
https://geodata.ngi.no/arcgisportal/apps/webappviewer/index.html?id=
fd597e0179fe479b9274d95a90b00931.
Njå, O., Solberg, Ø., Braut, G.S., 2017. Uncertainty – Its ontological status and relation to
safety. In: Motet, G., Bieder, C. (Eds.), The Illusion of Risk Control. What Does it Take
to Live with Uncertainty? Springer Briefs in Applied Sciences and Technology, pp.
5–21.
Norrington, L., Quigley, J., Russell, A., Van der Meer, R., 2008. Modelling the reliability
of search and rescue operations with Bayesian Belief Networks. Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf.
93 (7), 940–949.
NPRA, 2018. Nasjonal vegdatabank / National road data bank. Retrieved from. www.
vegdata.no.
NRR, N.R.R., 2012. Retningslinjer for redningstjeneste ved snøskredulykker (National
guidelines for avalanche rescue). Oslo, Norway.
Orset, K.I., Lome, K.B., Frekhaug, T.H., Haaland, S., 2017. Snøskred på veg der personer
er involvert (Road related avalanches and aﬀected road users). In: Paper Presented at
the Skredkonferansen 2017, Åndalsnes, Norway.
Pearl, J., Russel, S., 2000. Bayesian Networks. Retrieved from. UCLA Cognitive Systems
Laboratory, USA (Technical report 157-160).
Pitchforth, J., Mengersen, K., 2013. A proposed validation framework for expert elicited
Bayesian Networks. Expert Syst. Appl. 40 (1), 162–167.
Preacher, K., MacCallum, R., 2002. Exploratory factor Analysis in Behavior Genetics
Research: factor Recovery with Small Sample Sizes. Behav. Genet. 32 (2), 153–161.
https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1015210025234.
R Core Team, 2018. R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Computing. R
Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria ISBN 3-900051-07-0.
Retrieved from. http://www.R-project.org.
Rasmussen, J. (1997). Risk management in a dynamic society: a modelling problem. Saf.
Sci., 27(2–3), 183–213. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/S0925-7535(97)00052-0.
Reason, J., 1997. Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents. Ashgate Publishing
Limited, Surrey, England (252 pages).
Regjeringen, 2018. Håndbok for redningstjenesten (Handbook for the Norwegian rescue
service). Oslo. Retrieved from. https://www.hovedredningssentralen.no/wp-
content/uploads/2018/09/Den-norske-redningstjenesten.pdf.
Schaerer, P.J.A., 1989. The Avalanche-Hazard Index. vol. 13. pp. 241–247.
Schweizer, J., 2008. On the predictability of snow avalanches. In: Paper Presented at the
International Snow Science Workshop 2008, Whistler, Canada, September 21-27,
2008.
Schweizer, J., Kronholm, K., Wiesinger, T., 2003. Veriﬁcation of regional snowpack sta-
bility and avalanche danger. Cold Reg. Sci. Technol. 37 (3), 277–288. https://doi.
org/10.1016/S0165-232X(03)00070-3.
Schweizer, J., Mitterer, C., Techel, F., Stoﬀel, A., Reuter, B., 2018. Quantifying the ob-
vious: The avalanche danger level. In: Paper Presented at the International Snow
Science Workshop 2018, Innsbruck, Austria, . http://arc.lib.montana.edu/snow-
science/item/2706.
A. Lunde and O. Njå &ROG5HJLRQV6FLHQFHDQG7HFKQRORJ\

Starkweather, J., 2014. Factor Analysis with Binary Items: A Quick Review with
Examples. University of North Texas Benchmarks.
Stephenson, T.A., 2000. An Introduction to Bayesian Network Theory and Usage. IDIAP
Retrieved from. http://publications.idiap.ch/downloads/reports/2000/rr00-03.pdf.
Straub, D., 2005. Natural hazards risk assessment using Bayesian networks. In: Augusti
(Ed.), Safety and Reliability of Engineering Systems and Structures (Proc. ICOSSAR
05, Rome). Millpress, pp. 2535–2542.
Tavakol, M., Dennick, R., 2011. Making sense of Cronbach's alpha. Int. J. Med. Educ. 2,
53–55. https://doi.org/10.5116/ijme.4dfb.8dfd.
Techel, F., Schweizer, J., 2017. On using local avalanche danger level estimates for re-
gional forecast veriﬁcation. Cold Reg. Sci. Technol. 144, 52–62. https://doi.org/10.
1016/j.coldregions.2017.07.012.
Vick, S.G., 2002. Degrees of Belief: Subjective Probability and Engineering Judgement.
ASCE Publications, 1801 Alexander Bell Drive, Reston, Virginia, USA (472 pages).
Watson, S.R., 1994. The meaning of probability in probabilistic safety analysis. Reliabi.
Eng. Syst. Saf. 45 (3). https://doi.org/10.1016/0951-8320.
Weick, K., Sutcliﬀe, K.M., 2001. Managing the Unexpected: Assuring High Performance in
an Age of Complexity. Jossey-Bass, San Francisco (201 pages).
Weick, K.E., Sutcliﬀe, K.M., Obstfeld, D., 2008. Organizing for high reliability: Processes
of collective mindfulness. In: Crisis Management. vol. 3. pp. 31–66.
Willis, D., Deegan, F., Owens, M., 1994. HAZOP of Procedural Operations. In: Paper
Presented at the SPE Health, Safety and Environment in Oil and Gas Exploration and
Production Conference.
Winn, W., Thomas, F., Johnson, K., 2012. Strategies to reduce US HEMS accidents. Air
Med. J. 31 (2), 78–83. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amj.2011.12.011.
A. Lunde and O. Njå &ROG5HJLRQV6FLHQFHDQG7HFKQRORJ\


3DSHU,,,

Original Research
The Concept of Overcommitment in Rescue Operations: Some
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A B S T R A C T
Objective: Studies on Norwegian avalanche rescue operations have indicated high-stake searching of ava-
lanches during elevated risk conditions. We perceive these characteristics as a sign of overcommitment. The
purpose of this study is to explore the concept of overcommitment in Norwegian medical evacuation and res-
cue operations. How can overcommitment be described and understood as a uniform concept in rescue oper-
ations based on empirical data?
Methods: In a qualitative, exploratory study, 9 focus group interviews were conducted with a total of 30
crewmembers from the Norwegian air ambulance service.
Results: In this ﬁrst in a series of 2 articles, crewmembers’ reﬂections on the concept of overcommitment,
important factors to consider when balancing risk and beneﬁt in every mission, and a number of causal fac-
tors are presented. A deﬁnition of overcommitment in the context of rescue activities is presented.
Conclusion: Air ambulance personnel recognize overcommitment in a variety of situations. They broaden the
concept to include both regular, everyday actions and hazardous rescue attempts in extraordinary incidents.
The causal factors form recognizable constellations that may offer useful starting points for systems-based
counteracting measures. The deﬁnition of overcommitment could provide a background for evaluation and
learning in the rescue service.
© 2019 Air Medical Journal Associates. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
In a previous study on Norwegian road-related avalanche rescue
operations, it was concluded that “human factors in avalanche rescue,
like the roles of expectation, motivation and commitment, need fur-
ther clariﬁcation.”1 The study indicated high-stake searching of ava-
lanches during elevated risk conditions in poor visibility and often
with little information to justify the scale of rescue operations. These
characteristics can be regarded as a sign of overcommitment. As a
general concept, overcommitment in rescue operations has not been
thoroughly approached in previous research. Implementing an inten-
sive effort in a critical situation is in general regarded as a positive
valued virtue; thus, doing more than expected is difﬁcult to question,
challenge, or criticize. Ash and Smallman2 studied the conﬂicting
imperatives of fulﬁlling a rescue mission and keeping rescuers safe in
dynamic risk situations, claiming that rescue organizations are facing
an increasing challenge of overcommitment. Basing their judgment
of overcommitment on the deﬁnition of “rescue attempts in
circumstances that were judged too risky to personnel by the expert
cohort,”2 their main focus was the subject’s choice of tactical mode,
offensive or defensive, in various demanding emergency situations.
In conditions of high avalanche danger, rescuers need to make
careful judgments about their own safety,3 which may not seem
appropriate to bystanders or relatives of the victims. In these situa-
tions, private parties may initiate rescue activities rather than wait
for an ofﬁcial rescue operation. A recent example is the tragic snow
avalanche accident on November 22, 2017, in Anchorage, AK, in
which friends and family recovered an avalanche victim while rescu-
ers were awaiting safer and more favorable conditions.4 Further exac-
erbating the pressure on the individual rescuer in public emergency
services is the duty to treat.5,6 Myhrer7 stated about Norwegian police
ofﬁcers that the statutory obligation to act is not unconditional but
rests on a pyramid of necessary and legal factors. A pertinent question
is whether rescuers can be allowed on their own initiative to take on
a mission that is considered too risky by normal standards because
rescue personnel are by law obliged to engage in safe work practices.8
On the other hand, the responsibility to assess and act related to
available risk information is placed on the actors in the sharp end.
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They are not passive instruments acting in accordance with orders
from a command center. Thus, what should be regarded as according
to “normal standard” is highly contextual. It is difﬁcult to formulate
in detail in standing operational procedures. It is also closely related
to the competence and previous experiences of the involved person-
nel. Risk acceptance criteria are not strictly deﬁned in Norwegian
land-based rescue operations or in absolute values or plain words,
although one may assume that the risk shall be kept “as low as rea-
sonably practicable.”9
Norwegian helicopter emergency medical service (HEMS) person-
nel are frequent ﬁrst responders in both prehospital medical emer-
gency and search and rescue missions.10 HEMS operations to provide
immediate health care to critically ill and injured patients in uncer-
tain situations and austere environments are stressful events11,12 that
may challenge the crewmembers’ ability to balance the needs of
patients and mission safety. Their operational decisions will directly
affect their own vulnerability, sometimes to the extent that they suf-
fer personal injuries and death.13 Although most emergency response
organizations would support the recommendation of Blancher et al3
that “safety of the rescuers is the highest priority,” the commitment
of altruistic and solution-oriented rescuers may override this
principle.14
We wanted to explore the concept of overcommitment in Norwe-
gian medical evacuation and rescue operations and based our study
on the following research questions:
1. How can overcommitment be deﬁned in the context of medical
emergency and rescue operations?
2. Is overcommitment recognized as a phenomenon in Norwegian
medical evacuation and rescue operations?
3. What are the characteristics of overcommitment in Norwegian
rescue operations?
4. How is overcommitment identiﬁed by professional rescuers dur-
ing real operations?
First, we explain how HEMS personnel contributed in data
collection and concept development. Then, we present the empirical
data before theorizing about working principles, comprehensions,
and causal factors related to the degree of commitment in rescue
operations.
Methods and Materials
In this study, we interviewed HEMS personnel from the National
Air Ambulance Services of Norway about the concept of overcommit-
ment and what they do to counteract unwanted exposure to high risk
in rescue operations.
Selection
The National Air Ambulance Services of Norway operates 12 heli-
copter bases around the country, all with a 24/7 on base readiness for
crewmembers. In 2016, they performed a total of 7,796 missions.15 The
helicopters are staffed with 3 crewmembers: a pilot, an HEMS rescue
paramedic, and an emergency doctor. The helicopter crews operate
autonomously on request from emergency medical communication
centers. The Governor of Svalbard operates 2 air rescue helicopters
with a 5-man crew responsible for sea and land rescue in the Artic
north. Although the mainland HEMS and the air rescue helicopters on
Svalbard are 2 different concepts, the crew members face similar chal-
lenges in sorting out the risk level and necessity of rescue missions.
Research Design
In this qualitative study, we explored how highly experienced
prehospital personnel recognize and handle overcommitment. The
interviewees were selected by way of convenience sampling16 after
positive feedback to interview on-duty crews. Bases were selected by
location, and crewmembers were selected by random because they
happened to be on duty on days requested to perform focus group
interviews. All crewmembers were informed that participation was
voluntary, and no one refused to take part.
Malterud et al17 presented a model for the assessment of sample
size in qualitative studies in which information power is given by
aim, sample speciﬁcity, theoretical foundation, dialogue quality, and
analysis strategy. An exploratory study normally requires a large
sample to counteract an imbalanced collection of relevant phenom-
ena. This sample was chosen on the grounds of their unique experi-
ence in handling dangerous missions, allowing a smaller number of
cases. We expected that the characteristic phenomena of over-
commitment would ﬁnd support in safety theory, effectively reducing
the need for a large sample. The dialogue was marked by the fact that
participants and moderators shared a common background from the
emergency services and medicine, quickly establishing a trustful rap-
port. A cross-case strategy of analysis was a natural choice to “pro-
duce new knowledge and augment existing knowledge and
experience.”18 Malterud et al17 state that “cross-case analysis requires
more participants to offer sufﬁcient information power . . .,” but too
many participants would complicate the analysis.
The ﬁrst author, moderating the interviews, has been a member of
volunteer mountain rescue organizations for 40 years and has served
as a police ofﬁcer for nearly 30 years. In these positions, he frequently
cooperates with air ambulance crews. This implies that he is
acquainted with some of the interviewees and has taken part in some
of the rescue operations mentioned during interviews. The second
author, a medical doctor and professor in risk management and socie-
tal safety, observed 1 of the interviews and took part in planning the
study and analysis of the data.
Material
Nine crews, altogether 30 crewmembers, were interviewed in the
period from March 2017 until April 2018. The crews were stationed at
5 bases run by 2 different HEMS providers in North and South Norway.
The HEMS doctors were linked to 4 regional health authorities (in-hos-
pital service as anesthesiologists). Some interviewees had recent expe-
rience from Air Force−operated search and rescue helicopters,
ambulance service, and commercial helicopter companies. The study
was based on informed consent from each single participant. Each
interview lasted 60 to 90 minutes. The interviewees were 3 women
and 27 men aged between 30 and 60 years, with a mean age of
45 years. Themean length of experience from this service was 10 years,
ranging from 0.5 to 34 years. In addition, all crewmembers upheld con-
siderable professional experience from their previous employments.
All interviews except the ﬁrst were tape-recorded to support tran-
scription and summary. The material was transcribed immediately
after the interviews, and the electronic sound ﬁles were deleted.
Thus, no electronic material revealing voices or individual expres-
sions that can be used for identifying respondents or tracing answers
back to single individuals were stored. Therefore, there was no need
for approval according to former data protection legislation or con-
sultations in accordance with the new regulations of 2016/2018.
The written reports from these focus group interviews resembled
police interview reports in that short summaries were given in com-
bination with full transcriptions. To a large extent, linguistic pause
ﬁllers and formulaic language were omitted unless they clearly con-
veyed meaning to the sentence. All reports were anonymized with
regard to place names and recognizable events. After write-up, the
reports were sent to the individual interviewees for comments and
validation, in line with Prudence Plummer-D'Amato’s member check-
ing,19 to enhance credibility and trustworthiness. All reports were
approved without corrective comments.
The interviews followed a common structure with an initial pre-
sentation of the background for the study followed by a clariﬁcation
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of speciﬁc concepts and practical considerations. The interview guide
contained 5 main themes: 1) associations with the concept of over-
commitment, 2) recognition and sharing of operational cues, 3) causal
factors in overcommitment, 4) preventive factors in overcommit-
ment, and 5) overcommitment and learning. To support the explor-
atory nature of the study, we did not apply strict limitations to the
topics and discussions that arose from introducing the main themes.
The interviews were exported to the software programQSR Interna-
tional NVIVO 11 (QSR International, Melbourne, Australia) to aid the
necessary steps of systematic text condensation.20 Starting from the
original themes of the interview guide, main categories and meaningful
key words emerged from the supplied answers and comments.
Results
The ﬁrst part of this section concerns the crewmembers’ thoughts
on the concept of overcommitment and how they seek optimization
by balancing rescuer and patient safety. The last part is a presentation
of what they see as possible phenomena and situations that may lead
to overcommitment.
The Concept of Overcommitment
Cost-Beneﬁt Considerations
The term cost beneﬁt was frequently used to indicate the considera-
tions that crewmembers strived to make during rescue missions. In this
context, cost is an undeﬁned measure of life-threatening “risk,”
whereas beneﬁt reﬂects the patient’s prognosis given the assistance
from air ambulance personnel. We identiﬁed four important elements
of the Cost-Beneﬁt considerations: Patient Situation; Rescue Situation;
Triage and Rescuer Robustness. In the following sections, the interview-
ees are referred to by an uppercase letter and a number (eg, A1).
Patient Situation
Interviewee E2 pointed at communication about the patient’s con-
dition. “Can this patient wait until day light, or is it urgent to respond
ASAP? That's . . . I think . . . the key to everyone having the same SA (sit-
uational awareness) . . . ” C3 commented, “I have a small rating inside
my head on how important it is that this is an air ambulance mission.
Is it crucially important that we arrive right away, or will it be of signif-
icant beneﬁt to the patient, or is it almost so that we will see if we will
be of any use to the patient, at all. A mission is not just a mission.” G2
commented to G3, “You are good at this. You use one tool when you
think that we need to think twice about a nightly mission in poor
weather conditions. Then, you present facts about the patient. Listen,
this patient will actually do very well without us.” G3 responded, “But
that is a very important point to bring forward, I think. One has to con-
sider the medical beneﬁt of the mission.” G3 later concluded that ''As
such, this is associated with risk, but if we can minimize the risk when
it has no effect, then it makes sense, I think.''
Rescue Situation
The interviewees do not accept, by principle, to risk their own life to
save a patient`s life. F3 stated, “No, we are all going to go home. None of
us are going to die at work. Then, rather, the patient will have to die.
And, I mean it. I am really not willing to sacriﬁce my own life . . . how-
ever, to a certain extent, we do that, anyway . . .” G2 presented a moun-
tain rescue case in which they tried to land near a patient with a broken
ankle when surprised by a serious down draft that nearly grounded the
aircraft. “In retrospect, we staked incredibly much compared to the ben-
eﬁt.” G3 added, “That ankle is not worth risking three other lives,
because you can just go back and get him the following day.”
Triage
Interviewee J3 compared overcommitment with “analogous con-
cepts in medicine that we call over-triage or over-consumption of
resources.” He then presented the medical epidemiological expression
numbers needed to treat and numbers needed to harm21 as possible
measures of necessity when approaching the apparent mismatch of
high-risk−low-gain rescue operations. J3 illustrated this by saying, “If
we over-expose ourselves in avalanche danger zones, we will eventu-
ally experience an accident with loss of rescue personnel.” C2 under-
lined “but if you have something to gain, you may go an extra step,
but not on all missions. Because, then you would do that all the time.”
G3 pointed at individual differences in judging patient needs relative
to their own chances of safely reaching the patient. ''But there are dif-
ferences between crews, as well. Some crews provide healthcare,
while others do not. Because, in one crew the composition is such
that you do not respond, while in other crews the composition is
such that you do respond and complete the mission. So that's how
there is actually a difference. All the time. But that, I think, is quite OK.”
Rescuer Robustness
Several crews pointed at the importance of personal robustness
when choosing to abstain from a dangerous mission and linked this
attribute to volume training and experience from similar situations.
F3 stated, “. . . when we get a little more experience from this kind of
work, we are a bit more robust at standing by that choice. In fact, we
must choose our own safety rather than go in and take unnecessary
risk?” C2 said, ''We are used to turning back. We can go on a mission
and turn around and be very pleased when we get home because we
turned back—did the right thing.''
Causal Factors
The crewmembers presented a great variety of phenomena and
situations that could bring them beyond the diffuse border between
accepting or abstaining from a dangerous act or mission.
Personal Affection and Risk Willingness
Crewmembers pointed at individual differences in mission commit-
ment, causing a variability that both strengthens and challenges a
high-reliability organization that relies on standards and procedures.
Personal affection for speciﬁc activities, like mountain climbing or div-
ing, interacts with risk willingness to give different responses in other-
wise similar missions. A1 commented, “Well, it becomes a subjective
opinion of the need for us to do it.” G2 added, “Everybody has some
preferences, and for me it’s the mountains. And then, we’re actually
stretching it, because it’s our arena and our own people . . . ” D2 linked
leisure-time activities and line of work, “Those who choose this profes-
sion are also risky within a certain limit. People have a hobby, often,
which includes risk.” A3 commented, “Indeed, we often have a very
objective goal of how to do things, right? But then this overcommit-
ment, if that’s what we call it, comes in as a subjective thing. This is
what we just have to do, or I want to take on this mission.”
Tunnel Vision and Target Fixation
Tunnel vision was a frequently mentioned phenomenon that
could jeopardize their collective mindfulness of mission-speciﬁc risk
factors. F2 said, “As for myself, it’s tunnel vision. Locking one’s focus
on one thing.” Also, the expression “target ﬁxation” was used, both
literally to describe a hazardous phenomenon when ﬂying and in a
transferred meaning in rescue operations. “We suddenly isolate our-
selves from the rest of the world, inside that little time window, right
there and then” (G2).
Mission Creeping
Crews further warned about “mission creeping” in which previous
positive experience in similar situations and initial efforts to access
the patient temped them to try harder. C2 identiﬁed it as “The nega-
tive spiral where everyone is completely set to solve the mission and
pushes and pushes,'' whereas J3 described it as “Those situations
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where one can suddenly feel that . . . I just have to go over and have a
look . . . You should really get away from that place . . . ” These situa-
tions are often related to ﬂying in marginal conditions. ''Weather-
wise; on the border line, but then, it went well, and now it`s a success
story'' C3 concluded about a mountain rescue mission involving 2
critically injured patients.
Lack of Knowledge
Crewmembers quite unanimously praised knowledge as a prereq-
uisite for sound judgment of operational risk and linked it to cue rec-
ognition, risk assessments, information ﬂow, coordination of
resources, and risk communication. To commit yourself beyond your
own capacity was considered just as dangerous as consciously com-
mitting beyond an identiﬁed margin of safe practice. A3 asked, “About
overcommitment, is that because you don’t know your own limita-
tions or because you lack knowledge?” He found that a downside of
feeling knowledgeable is overconﬁdence. “It may be a weakness if
one comes in a situation where one believes a bit too much on one's
own abilities.''
Demanding, Low-Frequency Events
Interviewees ﬁnd that infrequent, demanding events increase
their feeling of stress and mostly positive excitement. F3 observed,
“. . . when it comes to overcommitment, I feel that the more serious
things we respond to, the greater the degree of overcommitment,
because that's not what we do . . . often, I think.” Challenging envi-
ronmental factors and elements of technical rescue techniques were
mentioned as important cofactors contributing to this feeling. F3
explained the following: “But I think . . . missions that we think
are . . . not fun, but, interesting, then, and which we have trained for,
then I think we need to keep at the back of our head that over-
commitment plays a little . . . because . . . you feel that you get a little
too geared up . . .”
Low-Risk, High-Frequency Events
Air ambulance crews are frequently in routine situations with
generically deﬁned risk factors that need to be analyzed and evalu-
ated in each and every novel situation. One example was how they
accept improvised landing sites to save time. G1 commented ironi-
cally, “Yes, we’ll save 20 seconds on landing, and then we'll be there
waiting for the ambulance.” A3 concluded, “It is a little stupid to land
in the forest when there is actually an airport close by” and pointed
at a need to “standardizing things a bit.” G2 explained the following:
“We know about a number of risk factors in our daily lives, and we
are really willing to continue to take that risk because we perceive it
as low.”
Equipment Availability
There was no common understanding that equipment availability
in a critical situation always led to increased and dangerous commit-
ment. They pointed at nonstandard use of equipment in difﬁcult,
time-critical situations and modern equipment, like night vision gog-
gles (NVGs) and moving maps, which allowed them to lower the
weather minima for ﬂying. A1 thought there were higher minima
before without NVGs, ''but then again, we were out ﬂying in bad
weather, without NVGs, in those times . . .” Some crewmembers
pointed at increased safety as a result of new equipment and a focus
on crew resource management (CRM). A2 answered “No, clearly not”
when asked if their judgment of a situation remains the same with or
without available equipment. He used their diving suits as an exam-
ple; the old suit was too buoyant for diving, the new one “opens up to
take much higher risk and do things that you could not do before.” In
general, by their sheer arrival by helicopter, they feel an increased
pressure to handle the situation, although usually being “quite good
at saying STOP” (H2).
Expectations and External Pressure
Two types of expectations inﬂuence decisions to attempt a rescue
effort: the crewmembers’ internal motivation and a variety of expect-
ations from victims, bystanders, legislation, and cooperating rescue
units. J3 illustrated the dilemma by asking, “And that's typical;
there are people there (in need of help), and then the specialized
rescue service should choose not to help them?” C3 found that “You
are increasingly aware of expectations, from the employer and the
world around us. The fear of being held responsible, in retrospect, I
think unfortunately is something that is becoming more and more
applicable.” The pilots seemed to be less inﬂuenced by external
factors. G1 asserted, “There is no judge who can point at me and say;
I think you should have (chosen to ﬂy).” H1 stated, “If you think about
expectations or pressure, we don’t feel that very much,” adding that
they always try to ﬁnd good solutions.
The strongest urge to do something in critical situations arises
when “Nobody else can do it.” A2 said, “The satisfaction of solving
things where others are stuck. That’s deﬁnitely something that makes
you push it a little . . .” A2 also said that he feels “less autonomous”
when other air rescue bases “are in the loop” (eg, when the mission is
transferred from another crew because of ﬂight time limits). In a
recent mission, he consulted a senior member of the other crew, get-
ting the impression that ﬂying conditions were OK. He sensed that
“we should really try to ﬁx it.” He attributed this to his respect for
older colleagues and “an expectation that made him want to be a
good soldier.”
Victim allegiance was not considered an unambiguous risk factor
in this service, although children do trigger crews to greater efforts
and higher risk tolerance. B1 said that “there is a difference between
a 5-year-old and a 95-year-old” but maintained that compliance with
ﬂight minima, even in those situations, was “surprisingly easy.” A3
stated that ﬂight minima remain the same, irrespective of type of
emergency, and the doctors avoid stressing pilots by referring to the
patient’s poor condition (D3).
Postquiescence Syndrome
Some air ambulance crews reported a stronger urge to engage in a
mission after long, quiet periods, resembling volunteer rescuers who
may wait for months and years in between call outs. This postquies-
cence syndrome, named by the authors, is characterized by increased
activation levels and a strong desire to complete a mission. A2 men-
tioned an example in which they misjudged the consequences of
high altitude and overloaded the aircraft when taking on 2 mountain
rescue missions in the same area. He explained the following: “There
was no time pressure related to the missions, but they had had very
few missions and got two missions close to each other that they
would like to solve.” F3 suggested, “Maybe it’s that feeling that now,
it is ﬁnally happening what we have trained for in such a long time.”
Unforeseen Events
Although termed unforeseen events, the statements made by crew-
members indicate that the risk was reasonably conceivable22 and
always retrospectively explainable. Often, these situations were
related to natural hazards causing retreat or unplanned landings. C2
stated, “Coincidence rules, and the weather can be unpredictable.”
Crews committed themselves in attempts to reach an accident site or
search for missing people, later realizing that they had missed out on
critical information, misinterpreted the circumstances, or found
themselves in a conjunction of surprisingly adverse conditions. Over-
commitment followed as a result of not allowing time to acquire suf-
ﬁcient information about the situation.
Organizational Overcommitment
Organizational factors were identiﬁed as sources to overcommit-
ment in that rescue units are called out in excess numbers or
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activated on-site in situations of uncertainty. J3 referred to rescue
operations “with spontaneously released avalanches, then there are
more spontaneous avalanches, and we have seen all rescuers, all
gathered in the same area . . . ” Crewmembers saw it as a part of the
professional attitude to have “some kind of conscious overcommit-
ment and then de-escalate when someone gets information saying it
is not necessary.” C3 explained, “In search and rescue operations, it is
very often uncertain, ﬁrst of all, how many patients, if any, and if you
have a number of people, then you do not know if there are patients
or if they are stuck somewhere or missing.”
In a similar category are search operations in which no one was
conﬁrmed missing. C1 referred to that as special “avalanche winter,”
where they regularly responded in poor weather conditions, on
“things that people had only observed from the road.” “There were
no observations or traces of people.” C2 suggested that “They . . . think
that the volunteers are so seldom called out to avalanche incidents
that when it's ﬁnally something, they'll be allowed to continue—as a
reward.”
At the other end of the scale was the extrication of conﬁrmed dead
people. J4 stated, “There is one thing that is very interesting here, and
that's when you're going to bring out dead bodies, in terms of risk.
And then we have seen quite a few . . . or at least heard of . . . quite a
few hairy operations where they pick up . . . yes . . . people who are in
''the mountain wall.”
Discussion
This study is based on data from 30 respondents representing
HEMS services in 4 regions of Norway. Thus, we claim that the study
gives a representative picture of opinions related to the driving
forces in rescue missions for personnel engaged in Norwegian HEMS
services.
The reﬂections of air ambulance personnel broaden the concept of
overcommitment to include regular, everyday actions as hazardous
rescue attempts in extraordinary incidents. They point at ﬂawed com-
munication and unsafe control actions23 preceding the “points of no
return,” placing them in hazardous conditions that may have seemed
surprising at the time. Their examples draw a ﬁne, blurry line
between a necessary change of pace to reach the patient in time and
impetuous actions putting their lives in danger. The following deﬁni-
tion of overcommitment in rescue work emerges from the ﬁndings of
this study: “situations in which rescuers make themselves or others
vulnerable by committing more than is feasible, desirable, expected,
recommended, or compellingly necessary in the given scenario and
thereby run the risk of personal injury or death.”
Air ambulance personnel described emergency response situa-
tions in which they deviated from ﬂight minima to reach the patient
or a hospital in time. Although describing compliance with ﬂight reg-
ulations as “ﬂying in a square tunnel,” they obviously added ﬂexibility
to those tunnel walls. In line with their cost-beneﬁt approach, they
are occasionally willing to sacriﬁce some of their own safety margin
to beneﬁt the patient, even if this implies bending the rules. This
seems to be in accordance with the conclusions of the Unites States
National EMS Pilots Association survey that both “internal” and
“external” pressure made pilots “ﬂy in questionable weather condi-
tions.”12 Laws and regulations are not necessarily adapted to front-
end rescue activity, which makes rule bending a natural choice in sit-
uations in which rescuers face strong conﬂicting interests. Over time,
this may become institutionalized as organizations migrate toward
higher risk levels.24
Balancing rescuer and patient safety constitutes the core of risk
management in rescue operations. Pietsch et al,25 pointing at the dan-
gers of mountain rescue operations, concluded that “medical tactics
are dictated by those factors, and beneﬁts and risks of medical inter-
ventions need to be carefully weighed.” CRM training is mandatory
for all personnel engaged in HEMS services. Discussing risk connected
with single missions is an integrated part of this training. The results
of CRM training, no doubt, inﬂuenced the statements made by many
of the interviewees. This was especially the case when discussing
how they identiﬁed overcommitment and their strategies to prevent
overcommitment in HEMS operations.
Four factors summarized the crewmembers’ focus on cost-beneﬁt
considerations. Even if the weighting of these factors is uncertain and
ill-deﬁned in a dynamic rescue environment, they may be used to
both predict and evaluate the level of commitment in a given rescue
situation. Triage will build on the information that is linked to the 2
opposing weights, patient and rescue situation, and aim at decisions
about necessity, urgency, and feasibility of the mission. Optimal eval-
uation cannot occur until after the intersection of decisional certainty
and situational uncertainty26 (Fig. 1), a point in time that may not
even be reached during an ongoing rescue operation.
Figure 1. The role of uncertainty in cost-beneﬁt considerations. Blue arrows indicate levels of situational uncertainty and decisional certainty. Triangles indicate the proportions of
operational uncertainty/certainty over time as a rescue operation progresses from scramble until the end of operation.
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This explains the fourth identiﬁed factor, rescuer robustness,
because most decisions about cost-beneﬁt will be made under uncer-
tainty about both patient and rescuer safety. Sacriﬁce seems unavoid-
able, and satisﬁcing27 becomes a working principle.
One may assume that the tendency to overcommit will decrease
as operational certainty increases. In view of the causal factors iden-
tiﬁed by crewmembers, certainty in operations may not be sufﬁcient
to counteract this phenomenon. Individual characteristics and
considerations will still affect the perception of risk as well as the
ﬁnal judgments about cost and beneﬁt in each and every new situa-
tion. Rescuers seek information or need to rely on their affective
reactions.28 In these situations, the “affect heuristic”29 (ie, judging
the risk as low and the beneﬁts as high because they have positive
feelings toward the activity) will unconsciously inﬂuence decision
making.
Dealing with the speciﬁc risk issues related to every single rescue
operation should be regarded as an important element of sound and
prudent practice in the cross-professional group constituting the
HEMS team. Even though both medical and aviation personnel have
quite clear criteria for acceptable practice in their own ﬁelds, in res-
cue operations these criteria have to be melded together to ensure an
optimization of the beneﬁt without violating relevant safety meas-
ures in every single situation. Consciously addressing the phenome-
non of “affect heuristic” during CRM training sessions may be a
means for developing a sensible cross-professional safety practice in
such situations. The data from this study indicate that this is done to
a certain degree, but making this evenmore explicit might strengthen
the cross-professional craftsmanship related to case-speciﬁc risk
assessments in rescue operations.
The expression numbers needed to treat/harm may be applied to
various parameters in rescue operations. In the context of Norwegian
avalanche rescue operations in the period of 1996 to 2017, the simple
ratio of completed search operations (n = 610) to the number of real
rescues involving avalanche victims (n = 250) may serve as an indica-
tor of organizational overcommitment (ratio of 1:7). Mair et al30
reported nonvictim involvement in 56% of 221 helicopter avalanche
rescue missions in the province of Tyrol in Austria (ratio of 1:8), con-
cluding that this “can be reduced by a restrictive dispatch policy after
avalanche accidents without clear information about human involve-
ment.” Numbers needed to treat/harm measures could be introduced
as lagging risk indicators in avalanche rescue.
Crewmembers recognized several trajectories toward over-
commitment. The rescuer activity that leads up to the point of
becoming a dangerous act is very likely within accepted practice in
“the space of possibilities” with “degrees of freedom to be resolved
according to subjective preferences.”24 Apparent overcommitment
may be experienced as rational, controllable, low risk by the rescuer
in action inﬂuenced by what Neil D. Weinstein termed optimism
bias.31 Along with the “affect heuristic,” these psychological mecha-
nisms may explain why crewmembers found it difﬁcult to detect
overcommitment in real time. Over time, the optimism bias may be
self-reinforcing, causing a wrong impression of being invulnerable.31
In a recent study of accidents in mountain sports, Vanpoulle et al32
found that ski tourers ventured out in conditions identiﬁed to be haz-
ardous and that they minimized, ignored, or banalized risk factors.
This underestimation of obvious risk was attributed to human factors
like risk normalization33 and heuristic traps.34 Previous reports from
Norwegian avalanche incidents35 showed similar phenomena in that
rescuers regularly exposed themselves to the risk of naturally
released avalanches during rescue operations. In those cases, large
groups of rescuers responded to the same accident sites, perhaps also
trapped by social facilitation.34
Several of the causal factors may interact and converge to produce
overcommitment. Slovic28 argued that “extraordinarily generous
behavior toward identiﬁable victims, then, could simply result from
the tendency to altruistic behavior to increase with the proportion
of the reference group.” Crewmembers explained the ease with
which they might reject a mission when at the base. Closer to the
accident site, with an identiﬁable patient, there is an increasing ten-
dency to experience victim allegiance, tunnel vision, mission creep-
ing, target ﬁxation, and expectations and external pressure. Rescuers,
unlike ski tourers, cannot easily choose another place or another time
and will consequently be left on the horns of a dilemma.
Conclusion
Norwegian air ambulance personnel have offered their reﬂections
on the concept of overcommitment in medical evacuation and rescue
operations. The results show that professional rescuers recognize over-
commitment in a variety of situations. The concept is broadened to
include both regular, everyday actions and hazardous rescue attempts
in extraordinary incidents. These multifaceted aspects are included in
our suggested deﬁnition of overcommitment—“situations in which
rescuers make themselves or others vulnerable by committing more
than is feasible, desirable, expected, recommended, or compellingly
necessary in the given scenario and thereby run the risk of personal
injury or death.”
Although always aiming at a perfect balance between patient and
rescuer safety, HEMS crewmembers ﬁnd that a number of personal,
social, organizational, and situational factors distort equilibrium. Their
comprehensions and assumptions can be linked to parallel explana-
tions in cognitive and social psychology, such as heuristics, biases,
group dynamics, and interpersonal relationships. Heuristics, biases,
and various psychological mechanisms may be difﬁcult to discover and
neutralize in an ongoing rescue operation. On the other hand, the
causal factors mentioned by HEMS personnel form recognizable con-
stellations of factors leading to overcommitment. These constellations
may offer useful starting points for systems-based counteracting meas-
ures, which easily could be included in the regular CRM training for
HEMS personnel.
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Objective: Overcommitment in demanding rescue situations may put both rescuers and patients in danger. This
study aimed at identifying individual approaches and organizational strategies that counteract instances in
which rescuers commit more than is feasible, desirable, expected, recommended, or compellingly necessary.
How is overcommitment managed by professional frontline rescuers during hazardous medical evacuation and
rescue situations?
Methods: In a qualitative, exploratory study, 9 focus group interviews were conducted with a total of 30
crewmembers from the Norwegian Helicopter Emergency Medical Service.
Results: In this second article in a series of 2 articles on overcommitment, 12 commitment-moderating factors
are presented. Air ambulance personnel pointed at sociological, cognitive, and organizational elements that
may inﬂuence their degree of commitment in challenging and hazardous rescue situations.
Conclusion: Air ambulance personnel describe a team-based approach to adjust their level of commitment in
medical evacuation and rescue missions. They rely on known, however important, nontechnical skills and
organizational measures to combat overcommitment in demanding rescue situations. Some of their
approaches to safe performance should be adoptable by other rescue units and less experienced voluntary,
not-for-proﬁt, rescue organizations.
© 2019 Air Medical Journal Associates. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
The willingness to engage deeply and with individually and
professionally based motivation for carrying out a deﬁned mission
forms the basis for high-quality rescue performance. As a core
driving force, the individual eager to commit to saving lives
should not be suppressed. However, one should acknowledge that
the eagerness to engage deeply in such activities, often under
harsh environmental conditions demanding decisions under a
high degree of uncertainty, is not free of risk to those involved.
Overcommitment (ie, when rescuers make themselves vulnerable
by committing more than is feasible, desirable, expected, recom-
mended, or compellingly necessary) may put both the mission
and the rescuers at risk. These actions are commonly judged
as isolated impetuous acts but may as well result from complex
interactions of behavior-shaping mechanisms.1 Unsafe actions
reﬂect a control problem,2 not solely along the horizontal axis
representing the frontline rescuers but also in the vertical interac-
tion of complex and sociotechnical integrated project organiza-
tions3 like the rescue services.1 Overcommitment can also imply
futile use of resources. Therefore, it could also be analyzed in an
economic perspective. Available resources are in general scarce.
Therefore, it can often be a sensible question if they can be used
with more beneﬁt for other purposes. This is outside the scope of
this article. The safety control structure1,2 of the Norwegian res-
cue service reﬂects its systematic organization, implying that
the ﬁnal decisions on joint and coordinated efforts are to remain
with the incident commander (IC). The IC relies on feedback from
cooperating units (the team) for him or her to maintain an
updated risk image,4 especially because designated ICs may arrive
much later than the rescue units handling the operational tasks.5
Another factor to observe is that according to Norwegian legisla-
tion every single unit and person taking part in a rescue mission
is obliged to adhere to legal requirements in the acts and regula-
tions relevant to his or her work (eg, the health personnel have
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to follow the standards laid down in the health legislation).
Therefore, the authority and responsibility for the IC are not in
general extended beyond the need of coordinating joint efforts
from different specialized resources.
Eivind L. Rake and Ove Nja 5 found that ICs made few decisions and
relied on “tacitly understood routines and procedures” executed by
the ﬁrst responding individual rescuers. Regarding safety assess-
ments, this means that the ICs mainly agree to recommendations
from frontline rescuers.
What, then, do highly experienced rescuers do to avoid over-
commitment in situations dominated by uncertainty and life-threat-
ening hazards? In this article, we present how overcommitment is
identiﬁed and managed by the frequent ﬁrst rescue responders in the
Norwegian Helicopter Emergency Medical Service (HEMS).
Methodology and Research Design
In this qualitative study, we conducted focus group interviews to
explore how HEMS personnel in the Norwegian Air Ambulance Ser-
vice (NAAS) adjust their level of commitment in various demanding
medical evacuation and rescue situations.
The principle aims of this part of prehospital emergency medicine
are the following6:
1. Bring emergencymedical equipment and specially qualiﬁed health
care professionals quickly to seriously ill or injured patients.
2. Bring patients to an adequate level of treatment in the health ser-
vice during ongoing monitoring and treatment, including provid-
ing emergency medical diagnostics.
3. Perform simple search and rescue operations.
The NAAS operates with 3-man crews: the pilot, medical doctor,
and HEMS rescue paramedic. On-duty crewmembers stay on the base
24/7 for up to 1 week at a time. The composition of the crews varies
over time, but crewmembers are employed at 1 speciﬁc air ambu-
lance base. More detailed descriptions of the NAAS can be found in
the studies by Zakariassen et al7 and Lunde and Braut.8
The interviewees were selected by way of convenience sampling.9
Although the bases were selected by location, crewmembers were
selected by random. Following general information about the project
via NAAS channels, crews were contacted before or in the beginning
of their duty period. All crewmembers were informed that participa-
tion was voluntary, and no one refused to take part.
Malterud et al10 present a model for the assessment of sample
size in qualitative studies in which information power is given by
certain items. In this exploratory study, reﬂecting the broad aim,
we interviewed a sufﬁciently large number of participants to coun-
teract a biased data collection. Air ambulance crews were chosen
because of their unique experience from prehospital critical care,
allowing a smaller number of cases. Characteristic phenomena of
overcommitment were expected to reﬂect established safety the-
ory, effectively reducing the need for a large sample. A cross-case
strategy of analysis was a natural choice to “produce new knowl-
edge and augment existing knowledge and experience.”11 Although
cross-case analysis requires a larger sample, this may complicate
the analysis.10
Material
In the end, 9 crews, altogether 30 crewmembers, were inter-
viewed in the period from March 2017 until April 2018. The inter-
viewees were 3 women and 27 men aged between 30 and 60 years,
with a mean age of 45. The mean length of experience from this kind
of service was 10 years.
These focus group interviews were tape recorded, transcribed,
anonymized, and summarized in written reports. Linguistic pause
ﬁllers and formulaic language were omitted. Group interaction was
not considered a major issue in this study because air ambulance
crews are small and the crewmembers are well acquainted. All
reports were sent to the interviewees for comments and validation,
in line with Plummer-D'Amato's member checking,12 to enhance
credibility and trustworthiness. All reports were approved without
corrective comments. All tape recordings were deleted immediately
after transcription.
The ﬁrst author moderated the interviews. He is a member of vol-
unteer mountain rescue organizations and a police ofﬁcer. In these
positions, he frequently cooperates with air ambulance crews. The
second author is a medical doctor and professor in risk management
and societal safety.
The interviews followed a common structure, with an initial pre-
sentation of the background for the study followed by a clariﬁcation
of speciﬁc concepts and practical considerations. The interview guide
contained 5 main themes: 1) associations with the concept of over-
commitment, 2) recognition and sharing of operational cues, 3) causal
factors in overcommitment, 4) preventive factors in overcommit-
ment, and 5) overcommitment and learning. We did not apply strict
limitations to the topics and discussions that arose from introducing
the main themes.
The interviews were exported to the software program QSR Inter-
national NVIVO 11 (QSR International, Melbourne, Australia) to aid in
the necessary steps of systematic text condensation.13 Starting from
the original 5 main themes of the interview guide, the ﬁrst step of the
analysis resulted in a set of broad categories. A further subdivision
yielded a number of “meaning units”13 (ie, key words that describe
and conceptualize the main ﬁndings of the study).
A more detailed description of methodology is presented in the
ﬁrst article in this series titled “The Concept of Over-Commitment in
Rescue Operations: Some Theoretical Aspects based upon Empirical
Data.”
Results
The interviews of air ambulance crews elicited 12 key words sum-
marizing their reﬂections on what may prevent overcommitment in
hazardous situations. In the following sections, the interviewees are
referred to by an uppercase letter and a number (eg, A1).
Anticipation
HEMS crewmembers often pointed at factors that enhance their
ability to anticipate danger. D2 suggested, "Training, experience and
communication, which can in some way capture the dangers and that
some start it (anticipation) by just expressing the problem before we
arrive.” H3 said, “And we are always talking about the mission on the
way out, going through where we are going, ﬂight operative and
medical things.” D1 offered the following example: “And if there's
mountain farm, there's a zip line.” Thinking ahead of their present
position, either when treating a critically ill patient or in low-altitude
ﬂying, was strongly dependent on acquisition and interpretation of
the available information.
Contingency Planning
Closely linked to anticipation is contingency planning. F3 stated,
“Then, I think we are quite good at this; OK, time out, new plan.” Ini-
tial callout information is often scarce, and this requires constant
adjustment of mental models as new information is available. To
this end, crewmembers continuously exchange views on how to
meet the situation. E2 explained, “On our way out, we will always
discuss; what can we expect?” and then “make a coarse plan and
ﬁne-tune it.” Their contingency plans also involve other resources,
both to ensure as short a response time as possible and to release
some of the pressure put on them to reach the patient's position. G1
said, “Yes . . . yes . . ., I always have a plan C, then, which is . . . It may
be an emergency procedure.”
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Communication
Most crews listed communication, in all phases of missions, as a
key factor in adjusting their level of commitment. E2 states, “It's the
communication in the crew, then everybody is likely to sit with the
same situation awareness . . .” Premission brieﬁngs, exchange of
information with collaborating rescue units, and a constant verbaliza-
tion of observations as they approached the accident site are crucial
communication techniques to increase and equalize team situation
awareness (G1). J3 pointed at “ﬁlters” to prevent overcommitment, of
which the ﬁrst one is to “take a brief time-out” to allow people to
exchange views on the nature of the mission, speciﬁcally about the
patient's condition (E2). The initial internal discussion contributes to
determine the degree of urgency and inherent risks. “We can get into
real trouble if we do not clarify to the team, what we are up against”
(G3). C1 mentioned that some new HEMS rescue paramedics “want
to respond to everything” and explained humorously that he some-
times had to say “That will be without me.” C2 explained, [This is]
“how they facilitate (adjustment of commitment) if someone is very
eager to go; it's through communication; by explaining and telling
what you think, and then discuss.”
Cue Recognition
“Personally, I dont think I've become much better at thorough
assessments and neat decision making, but I'mmuch better at captur-
ing the signals around me . . .” (G2). D2 explained that they pass vari-
ous “layers,” zooming in as they approach the accident site; ﬁrst the
map, then topography, terrain, high mountains, camping sites, and
houses. “You know, always, as long as there's a road, there's often
either wires next to it, or is it house, then it needs electricity.” Cue
recognition, communication, “gut feeling,” and a low threshold for
commenting on dangers and failures were often mentioned in the
same breath, obviously linked to risk awareness. C1 illustrated this by
saying, “You've been here before . . . that is, now you are here . . . It
nearly went wrong here 5 years ago . . . ” The following conversation
between crewmembers C1 and C2 clarify how they see “stomach feel-
ing” with relation to experience: “What you say now is that you have
a stomach feeling.” “Yes, or experience, then.” “And the stomach feel-
ing comes from experience. Many talks about stomach feeling, but
you cannot rely on your stomach feeling before you have experience.”
Equipment and Sensors
Obviously, air ambulance personnel commit themselves to ﬂying
in less than ideal conditions, often over long distances, across climate
zones and varying weather systems. In darkness and changing visibil-
ity, equipment like night vision goggles and a network of Web cam-
eras increase their effective line of sight, thus reducing the need to
“make a try.” Crewmember E2 considered specialized equipment as a
"a pretty obvious risk barrier.” As C1 put it, “You should not go that
far - you must cancel before you get there, because then it's often too
late.” C2 commented, “. . . earlier, when ﬂying in darkness, they didnt
know what kind of weather they would meet, but now, we actually
see the weather (by NVG).”
Experience
Crewmembers found that both task-speciﬁc and volume-based
experience allowed crewmembers to choose more optimal solutions.
“Because you do actually have the ability, because you are so well
prepared with training and experience that; No, we will not do this.”
A2 reﬂected on his own decision making, "I was not so good, the ﬁrst
months, to assess the circumstances of what we did, then . . .” D1 con-
cluded convincingly, “We will never have 2 rookies in the cockpit . . .
That's in any case a requirement that we have.” A1 remarked, “One
thing we try to be a little conscious of is that we have a slightly differ-
ent level of experience.” They used afﬁrmative questions as a com-
mon strategy to balance inequalities in the crew. E3 found experience
“absolutely necessary” because “sometimes when it's difﬁcult, you're
in the borderland where it's the experience that decides.” C1 thought
that “It may have something to do with how we think, how we work
together. We have been on many missions and we are maybe a little
ahead.”
Risk and Vulnerability Awareness
Crewmembers ﬁnd that risk and vulnerability awareness can have
a restraining effect on commitment. G2 stressed the importance of
attention, saying “It's important to focus on what you are actually
doing, rather than what you are going to do.” In line with this, D2 rea-
soned about overcommitment and their perception of risk, “I think
it's how you are as a person and how you're trained and how you
interact with the rest of the crew, how you understand the danger,
and that you describe that danger as real as possible. He continued,
“To talk about a hazard, a concrete problem, is much better than just
speculating about a possible future problem.”
With reference to many sad accidents and their own experience
with close calls, realizing one's own vulnerability was a game
changer. G4 said, “The last accident made me realize that there is a
certain risk involved, even if accidents are seldom.” G2 referred to a
speciﬁc mission, “No, we were, in a way, very much reminded of our
vulnerability. We ﬁnished trying things . . .” From feeling invincible
and on top of all situations, feeling vulnerable leads them to a more
defensive approach.
Quality and Flow of Information
Crewmembers pointed at acquisition and processing of informa-
tion in the early stages of rescue operations as important factors
affecting their level of commitment. J2 stated, “It's about gathering as
much information as possible, from callout till you meet the patient,
to be able to make as good an assessment as possible.” A3 underlined
that the dispatchers at the Emergency Medical Coordination Centre
(EMCC) “get in a lot of information that makes them perceive the
patient as really bad” and when they arrive " the world is completely
different.” Aiming at short response times, the crews seldom stall
their ﬂight for more information. As D2 put it, also demonstrating the
dilemmas facing the ﬁrst responders, “Firstly, if we are going to spend
ﬁfteen, twenty minutes before we go, there's no point in going at all -
because then the patient is dead. We must have systems that make
us go straight into the helicopter and save people.” Especially in
short-approach operations, the crew will not have time to adjust to
the current situation, forcing them into premature and sometimes
unprepared action.
Training and Preparedness
H3 found their position in the Norwegian rescue service as quite
unique “because we spend our entire time at work just to be ready
for action, go on missions and train . . .” J1 stated that “. . . they have
many training missions, where they go through all the points listed
in the SOP, type of mission, potential hazards, route, fuel, status of air-
craft and crew, weather . . .” Unlike other responding units, from the
ambulance or the police, they have no trainees or aspirants. This puts
them in a “buffering” position, making them aware of how a certain
level of knowledge and training inﬂuences their decision making in
demanding situations. C2 stated, “In terms of overcommitment in the
rescue service, I think it relates to knowledge. You want some doctors
to assist the most critical patients, and similarly, you want some
pilots to be ﬂying when conditions are marginal.” In line with this, F2
said, “I certainly believe that our (training) makes us more robust,
because we have a similar mind-set, how we want this to work . . .”
Important parts of this training are crew resource management
(CRM)14 and the type of cross-training that results from assisting
each other during missions. Indirectly, the dispatcher's level and type
of training will affect the rescuers’ degree of commitment. As C2
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pointed out, “When people call the police for help, they do not get the
same questions about the condition of the patient as if they call the
EMCC.”
Standard Procedures
Crewmembers experienced that standardization of training and
procedures served as a mediator of commitment. F1 felt relieved by
ﬂight regulations, “If we ﬂy to (a town) on a cerebral hemorrhage or
respond to an avalanche accident in the mountains somewhere, we
still ﬂy through the same square tunnel . . . And then I can sit here,
not having to take that decision about ﬂying or not . . . to that baby.
It's already taken for me." On the ground, the limits of safe practice
are still subject to professional judgment, although checklists and
procedures support standardized solutions. “They have checklists for
avalanche rescue missions, so that they can go through them without
getting all stressed up—it helps enormously” ( J1). E2 referred to “a
bottom line” of competence for all HEMS crewmembers represented
by “The National Standard for HEMS Rescue Paramedics in the Air
Ambulance Service.”15 H3 pointed out that they have “thousands of
constellations of different crews in a year, as employees change bases
and shifts,” but this does not affect their general way of working
“since everyone is in the same school.”
Teamwork Behavior
Collegiality and rapport were frequently mentioned as essential
factors for a sound decision environment. A3 commented that “it is
about trusting each other's professional knowledge and it is part of
their strength to be in a group with completely different skills.” G1
said the following about detecting danger signs and communicating
it: “What's good is that we live together and have dinner together, all
week. That's the number 1, I think. We know each other.” H2 found
that “It's something about having this as our everyday experience
which might be an advantage. We are used to sitting in a debrieﬁng
situation, we are relatively familiar with each other. Knowing each
other makes it easier. Knowing each other's professions.”
They also have a culture for expressing their own assessments and
concerns, regardless of age and experience. C2 commented that “You
need someone to ask all the critical questions,” to “ignite the fuse,” to
make colleagues aware of dangerous situations. J4 said, “We have
this culture; if anyone objects . . . if anyone is not happy, then we eas-
ily take a time-out.” F3 said, “What is very important is the concept
that all voices have equal value,” referring to young volunteer rescu-
ers who may ﬁnd it difﬁcult to speak up, even if they are rightly
scared. F3 stated, “That`s a ﬁne principle here; even though I don`t
know much about ﬂying, I actually have the right to ask questions
and to be listened to . . .” A pilot commented, “Either we turn back, or
I can try to explain what's my plan, so you can feel safer.”
D1 explained that “we take the time we need to do it safely, and
that permeates a lot of what we are doing; we dont have to prove
that we will get down there, no matter what.” Crewmembers experi-
enced that their safety culture had changed over time, “possibly, and
especially after the accidents we've experienced.” C2 underlined the
importance of the team, “When we started working, we said there
were two things guiding our work; it was the momentum theory and
the chaos theory. No matter how much chaos surrounding us, we
would have to stick together—ﬁnd the right patient, do the right
things—and leave."
Discussion
The nontechnical strategies used by HEMS personnel to stay safe
in a complex rescue environment link in to known theoretical ele-
ments from high-reliability organizing,16,17 collective mindfulness,18
naturalistic decision making,19,20 resilience,21 CRM,14 and teamwork
behavior.22 Listening to the crews leaves an impression that CRM is
institutionalized, and uncertainty coping skills are operationalized
(Table 1).
The multiprofessional composition of the HEMS crews added to
their general experience from a variety of relevant sports and leisure-
time activities creates a diversity that enables them to capture and
understand more of the danger signals from their surroundings.
“High Reliability Organizations (HROs) cultivate requisite variety and
assume that it takes a complex system to sense a complex environ-
ment.”18 HEMS crews have learned through experience and CRM
training that a constant and collective awareness of even the slightest
sign of abnormality or danger will help them to avoid overcommit-
ment and failure. As formulated by a HEMS rescue paramedic, “it is
important to focus on what you are actually doing, rather than what
you are going to do . . .” Mindfulness allows them to observe, recog-
nize, react, and adapt to changes and variations in the rescue environ-
ment,21 thus avoiding and curbing surprises and “unforeseen events”
in a resilient manner. Recalling that the HEMS crewmembers con-
stantly aim at balancing patient safety23 and rescuer safety in all
conditions and situations, a personal commitment is needed to
build an “organizational culture of reliability.”16 Laws and regula-
tions may have an indirect effect on the framework of rescue per-
formance. HEMS crewmembers maintain that their ﬁnal decisions
to act safely are mainly based on knowledge- and skill-based
competencies,22 attitudes, experience, and teamwork behavior of
rescuers (Fig. 1). This is much in congruence with the ﬁndings of
Neal et al24 that knowledge and motivation are “important deter-
minants of safety behaviors.” A major challenge, then, is that both
Table 1
Operational Uncertainty Management
Alarm Seek information about patient situation and rescue situation (R) (2), use equipment/remote sensors/Web cameras (R) (2), ask afﬁrmative questions (1), “red
teaming” (1), active communication, «Huddle up» (R) (1), temporary triage, Is the mission possible?, anticipate situations and hazards (A) (3), call out back-up
resources (F) (3).
En route Connect with coordinators and other rescue units, anticipate situations (A) (3), discuss possible scenarios (A) (3), communicate, constant verbalization of
observations (R) (2) (3), use remote sensors (R) (2), contingency planning (A) (3), cue recognition (2), ask afﬁrmative questions (1), “red teaming” (1), report
unease (1) (3), closed-loop communication, share high-quality information (R) (3), Say No (F). Triage, Possible to complete the mission?.
Arrival Reconnaissance landing sites/hazard sites (F) (2), use established landing sites (F) (2), connect with rescuers on the ground (R) (2) (4), contingency planning (A)
(3), cue recognition (2), request observation of obstructions (R) (F), share high-quality information (R), constant verbalization of observations (R) (2) (3), report
unease (1) (3), ask afﬁrmative questions (1), “red teaming” (1), Say No (F), Triage.
Response Cue awareness (2), Connect with rescue specialists (R) (2) (3) (4). Report unease (1) (3). Say No (F). Triage, “red teaming” (1), apply standard procedures (F),
constant verbalization of observations (R) (2) (3), stay/play/load and go (3).
Suggested activities to increase reliability, reduce and handle uncertainty, and prevent overcommitment in the various phases of ongoing medical evacuation and rescue missions.
Words in italics are summarizing key words derived from the statements of helicopter emergency medical services crewmembers. Capital letters in parentheses indicate tactics of
coping with uncertainty based on the R.A.W.F.S. heuristic.a Numbers in parentheses indicate elements of mindfulness.b
aR: Reduction, A: Assumption-based reasoning, W: Weighing pros and cons, F: Forestalling, and S: Suppression.
b1: Reluctance to simplify interpretations, 2: Sensitivity to operations, 3: Commitment to resilience, and 4: Deference to expertise.
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tactical and strategic managers have to make decisions based on
information from ﬁrst responders who are novices or nonexperts.
This lack of predictability regarding the quality of observations
and information from the accident site affect the risk and neces-
sity assessments that are made by the approaching rescuers and,
subsequently, the choice of rescue response.
Naturally, divergence in professional background, experience,
resources, and rescue focus is an integral part of organized rescue
activity. This may reﬂect the observed differences in how uncertainty
is perceived and handled by the air ambulance personnel and other
rescue units.8 Crewmembers observed different reactions to signals
of danger in members from the various organizations depending on
their level of training and expertise. When responding to natural haz-
ard incidents, cues like avalanche activity, wind direction, tempera-
ture changes, type of precipitation, and snow cover characteristics
mean different things to different people. Over time, even danger
signs may be perceived as normal, “weak, mixed signals that soon
become treated mindlessly. . .”18 as does the way we react to them.
Only in hindsight is the pattern recognizable as a path to tragedy.
This inherent variety of the rescue service may contribute to
increased signal detection and failure-seeking behavior,18 thus con-
stituting a “conceptual slack”26 that aids in self-evaluation and cor-
rection of performance. Of course, differing organizational cultures
may also inﬂuence the common safety climate in an ongoing rescue
operation,24 causing a conﬂict about risk assessments and safety
behavior.27
The CRM training encourages crewmembers to constantly verbal-
ize “real-time observations and assessments of observations based on
relevant cues in the clinical situation,”28 so-called “online commen-
taries.” Simultaneously, cross-training (ie, their knowledge of each
other's professional duties) creates redundancy and mutual trust. It
enables them to monitor the assessments and decisions of their col-
leagues, encouraging their colleagues to speak up if anything seems
unreasonable.22,29 Both anticipation and contingency planning are
based on the crewmembers’ mental models of the current situation.
By verbalizing their thoughts on possible scenarios, they invite their
colleagues to object and present alternatives, so-called “red team-
ing.”30 This will contribute to equalize their situational awareness. As
interviewee C2 explained, “It's important that one of the crewmem-
bers is the grumpy one and asks critical questions. If we all are very
positive, we'll end up in situations where we shouldn't be . . .” This is
of great importance in rescue situations in which success is strongly
dependent on the effort of single crewmembers. The assumption is
that objections to the chosen course of action may counteract sup-
pression of uncertainty in critical decision making.
The HEMS crews’ perception of the “3-crew concept” appears to
be central to their general performance and also to the prevention of
overcommitment. They rely on teamworking to keep them safe. Flin
et al22 explained teamwork skills as “behavioral interactions and atti-
tudes that team members must develop before they can function
effectively as a team.” The reﬂections made by crewmembers indicate
that the same “big 5” elements31 making teams work effectively also
make them work safely. The interviewees accentuated the value of
active and trustful communication in their approach to avoid acci-
dents. In line with the concept of resilience engineering,21 safety is
considered an integral part of HEMS operations.
We see that mindful organizing may prevent some acts of over-
commitment (eg, those described as organizational overcommitment,
low-risk−high-frequency overcommitment, and rule bending). Some
situations will still be dominated by uncertainty in the last and deci-
sive moments. Indecision is paid by the patient's chance of survival.
There is no more available information, and a rescue effort is immedi-
ately required to save a life. When rescuers ignore this remaining
uncertainty and make decisions based on their “stomach feelings”
or just take a chance, they suppress uncertainty.32 These are the
moments that create heroes or fools. In such high-risk situations,
postponing or stalling a rescue effort should always be an acceptable
decision33 based on the cautionary principle.34 This is also the recom-
mended approach in the Norwegian rescue services.35 Forestalling,
scenario and contingency planning, anticipation, assumption-based
reasoning, and reconnaissance before landing/entering a hazard zone
are all examples of cautious and mindful behavior.
Nontechnical skills or CRM is not a regular part of the training for
nonﬂying rescue personnel in Norway, so conscious and focused
teamwork behavior cannot be expected between rescue units. Based
on the ﬁndings in this study, one may recommend speciﬁc interor-
ganizational training based on “communication strategies within
the relevant activity type that trigger actions that are relevant
to safe practices.”28 Kruke and Olsen36 suggest a foundation for
reliability-seeking networks built on elements of high-reliability
organizing and collective mindfulness. Although not all HRO charac-
teristics occur simultaneously,37 organized rescue operations dis-
play important HRO elements, which is in support of considering
the Norwegian rescue service as a reliability-seeking network. Aim-
ing at reducing the prevalence of overcommitment in rescue opera-
tions, future training of rescuers could beneﬁt from a stronger focus
on nontechnical skills.
Conclusion
HEMS personnel describe a team-based approach to adjust their
level of commitment in medical evacuation and rescue missions. Their
organizational structure, on-base duty time, CRM training, and fre-
quent debrieﬁng of missions enhance trustful and direct online team
talk.28 They recommend active communication and “red teaming” to
increase individual and team awareness of both likely and unlikely
accident scenarios, thus avoiding dangerous actions in dangerous
Figure 1. HEMS crewmember decision fundamentals. Factors identiﬁed by Norwegian
HEMS crewmembers to prevent overcommitment reﬂected from the formalistic statu-
tory obligation to act.25
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conditions. In demanding missions, they rely on a combination of non-
technical skills, standard operational procedures, and organizational
measures to identify and avoid harm's way. The most important mea-
sure to counteract overcommitment in the Norwegian rescue service
may be an increased focus on interorganizational CRM-like training.
This might create a safety climate that makes the complex and multi-
faceted rescue organization act like a team. Challenges will remain
regarding the start-up phase of rescue operations in which highly
motivated and less trained rescuers are tempted to engage in hasty
and impetuous action. Managerial levels need to guide and support
autonomous rescue units through the elements of operational uncer-
tainty management to ensure that they stop in time.
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/ŶĨŽƌŵƌŝƐŝƐ^ƵƉƉŽƌƚhŶŝƚŝĨ
ĞŬƐƚƌĂŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇŝŶĐŝĚĞŶƚƐ͘
ůĞƌƚ͘ŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚĞĚ ŶĞĐĞƐƐŝƚǇĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚ͘ŚĞĐŬ ƚƌŝƉƉĞůĂůĞƌƚ͘/ŶĨŽƌŵ ƌŝƐŬ
ůĞǀĞů&ϭ͘ůůŽĐĂƚĞ^ZƌĂĚŝŽ ŐƌŽƵƉ͘ŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚĞ ĂŶĚWƌŝŽƌŝƚŝǌĞ ĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ͘
ŽŶƚƌŽů ĂŝƌƌĞƐĐƵĞ͘YƵĂůŝƚǇĂƐƐƵƌĂŶĐĞ ŽĨ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ͘>ŽŐ ĂǀĂůĂŶĐŚĞ
ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ͘
^ĐƌĂŵďůĞ͘/ŶĨŽƌŵ
ƌŝƐŬůĞǀĞů&ϭ͘
ŝƐƉĂƚĐŚ ƚŽ^ĂĨĞ
ZĞŶĚĞǀŽƵǌWŽŝŶƚ͘
ĂŶĐĞů͘hƉĚĂƚĞ͘
/ŶĨŽƌŵƌŝƐŬůĞǀĞů&ϭ͘
hƉĚĂƚĞ ĂŶĚ ĂŶĐĞůŝŶ
ĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚ
:Zͬ>Z͘&ůĞĞƚ
ĐŽŶƚƌŽů͘hƉĚĂƚĞ͘
ŝƐƉĂƚĐŚƚŽ^ĂĨĞ
^ĐƌĂŵďůĞ ŚĞůŝͬƐŚŝƉƐ ͬƚƌĂŝŶƐͲ ĂĐĐ͘ƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚ
ŶĞĞĚƐĨƌŽŵ>ŽĐĂůZĞƐĐƵĞŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ
ĞŶƚĞƌƐ;>ZͿ͘
1RUZHJLDQ5DLOURDGV
ǀĂůĂŶĐŚĞƌŝƐŬ
ĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚ͘^ƚĂƚƵƐ͘ zĞƐ͘
EŽ͘
ǀĂůĂŶĐŚĞƌĞƐĐƵĞ
ǀĂůĂŶĐŚĞƌĞƐĐƵĞ
ZĞƉŽƌƚƐƚĂƚƵƐ ĂŶĚ
ƵƉĚĂƚĞ ƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ
&DOO   
RU
-5&&YLD3/%
+56
*DWKHU LQIRUPDWRQ)
,QIRUPJXLGHZLWQHVV
ůĞƌƚ>Z͘ŽŶĨŝƌŵ^ ZƌĂĚŝŽ
ŐƌŽƵƉ͘^ƚĂƚƵƐƌĞƉŽƌƚƐ͖
ĂǀĂůĂŶĐŚĞĚĂŶŐĞƌ͕ǀŝĐƚŝŵƐ͕
ƐĞĂƌĐŚ͕ƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ͕ ƉůĂŶ͘
^ƚĂƚƵƐƌĞƉŽƌƚƐ͖ǁĞĂƚŚĞƌ͕ůŽĐĂů
ĂǀĂůĂŶĐŚĞĚĂŶŐĞƌ͕ǀŝĐƚŝŵƐ͕
ƐĞĂƌĐŚ͕ƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ
/ŶĨŽƌŵƌŝƐŬůĞǀĞů&ϭ͘
'Ž ĂŚĞĂĚĨƌŽŵ^ĂĨĞ
ZĞŶĚĞǀŽƵǌƉŽŝŶƚ͘
/ŶĨŽƌŵ ƌŝƐŬůĞǀĞů &ϭ͘
^ƚĂƌƚ͘^ƚŽƉ͘
WƌŝŽƌŝƚŝǌĞ͘
zĞƐ͘ EŽ͘
^ƚĂƚƵƐ͘
/ŶĨŽƌŵ ƌŝƐŬůĞǀĞů&ϭ͘
^ĐƌĂŵďůĞĂǀĂůĂŶĐŚĞƌĞƐĐƵĞƚĞĂŵƐ
ĂŶĚĂǀĂůĂŶĐŚĞƌĞƐĐƵĞůĞĂĚĞƌƚŽ^ĂĨĞ
ZĞŶĚĞǀŽƵǌƉŽŝŶƚ͘
/ŶĨŽƌŵ ƌŝƐŬůĞǀĞů&ϭ͘
^ĐƌĂŵďůĞƌĞƐĐƵĞ ĚŽŐƐƚŽ
^ĂĨĞ ZĞŶĚĞǀŽƵǌƉŽŝŶƚ͘
$UP\
([WUDRUGLQDU\UHVRXUFHV
/RFDO
)LUHILJKWHUV 5HVFXH
ŝƐƉĂƚĐŚƚŽ^ĂĨĞ
ZĞŶĚĞǀŽƵǌ
WŽŝŶƚ͘/ŶĨŽƌŵƌŝƐŬ
ůĞǀĞů&ϭ͘ ^ƚŽƉ͘
(PHUJHQF\
0HGLFDO
&RRUGLQDWLRQ
ůĞƌƚ:Z;WŽůŝĐĞ͖ ǀŝĂΗĂǀĂůĂŶĐŚĞĚŝƌĞĐƚ ůŝŶĞΗ͕
ǁŚĞŶĨŝƌƐƚĐĂůůƚŽϭϭϮͿ͘^ƚĂƚƵƐƌĞƉŽƌƚƐ͘ZĞƉŽƌƚ
ŶĞĞĚƐ͘>ŽŐŐĞĚĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚƐĂŶĚĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ͘
ŽŶĨŝƌŵ ^Z ƌĂĚŝŽ
ŐƌŽƵƉ͘^ƚĂƚƵƐƌĞƉŽƌƚƐ͖͘
ĂǀĂůĂŶĐŚĞĚĂŶŐĞƌ͕
ZĞŶĚĞǀŽƵǌWŽŝŶƚ͘
ŽŶĨŝƌŵ ^Z ƌĂĚŝŽ
ŐƌŽƵƉ͘^ƚĂƚƵƐƌĞƉŽƌƚƐ͖
ĂǀĂůĂŶĐŚĞĚĂŶŐĞƌ͕
ǀŝĐƚŝŵƐ͕ƐĞĂƌĐŚ͕
ƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ͘WůĂŶ͘
(PHUJHQF\ SUHSDUHGQHVVDFWRUV
^ƵŵŵŽŶ ƉĞƌŝŽĚŝĐĂůůǇ ĨŽƌŶĞĞĚƐ
ĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚ͕ĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚΗŐĞƚƚŽ
ŬŶŽǁƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐΗ͘
͘
ŽŶĨŝƌŵ^ZƌĂĚŝŽ
ŐƌŽƵƉ͘^ƚĂƚƵƐ
ƌĞƉŽƌƚƐ͖ĂǀĂůĂŶĐŚĞ
ĚĂŶŐĞƌ͕ǀŝĐƚŝŵƐ͕
ƐĞĂƌĐŚ͕ƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ͘
WůĂŶ͘
/RFDO *3
$FFLGHQWUHSRUWLQJ ZLWQHVV
/XQGHDQG1MnVXEPLWWHGWRSafety ScienceRQ-XO\  3DJHRI
7KH1RUZHJLDQ5HVFXH6HUYLFHLVEDVHGRQWKHFROOHF
WLYHHIIRUWVRISURIHVVLRQDOYROXQWHHUDQGSULYDWHLQVWL
WXWLRQVDQGRUJDQL]DWLRQVLQZKLFKWKHWZR-RLQW5HV
FXH &RRUGLQDWLRQ &HQWUHV -5&&1RUWK DQG 6RXWK
DQG WKH /RFDO5HVFXH&RRUGLQDWLRQ&HQWUHV /5&&
VLWXDWHG DW WKH UHJLRQDO SROLFH KHDGTXDUWHUV DUH UH
VSRQVLEOHIRUWKHLQLWLDWLRQRIUHVFXHRSHUDWLRQVDQGWKH
VXEVHTXHQWGHSOR\PHQWRIUHVFXHUVWRWKHDFFLGHQWVLWH
7KH0LQLVWU\RI-XVWLFHDQG3XEOLF6HFXULW\LVWKHVX
SHULRUDGPLQLVWUDWLYHRIILFHUHVSRQVLEOHIRUHPHUJHQF\
SUHSDUHGQHVVDQGFULVLVPDQDJHPHQW7KH-5&&VDUH
UHVSRQVLEOHIRUWKHRYHUDOOPDQDJHPHQWRIUHVFXHRS
HUDWLRQVDQGWKHVXSHUYLVLRQRIWKH/5&&V7KHSROLFH
DUH UHVSRQVLEOH IRU WKH LQLWLDWLRQDQGPDQDJHPHQWRI
UHVFXHRSHUDWLRQV LQWKHLUUHVSHFWLYHJHRJUDSKLFDODU
HDVZKHUHDVDOOSDUWLFLSDWLQJRUJDQL]DWLRQVDUHUHVSRQ
VLEOHIRUWKHLURZQHPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVVDQGVDIHW\
PDQDJHPHQW%\GHVLJQLWLVDWRSGRZQV\VWHPZLWK
DQ H[SRQHQWLDO LQFUHDVH LQ VHSDUDWH FRQWURO ORRSV DV
RQHJHWVFORVHUWRWKHDFFLGHQWVLWH
'LVWUHVVFDOOVDUH UHFHLYHGE\ WKH -5&& WKHSROLFH 
/5&&WKHKHDOWKVHUYLFH(PHUJHQF\0HGLFDO&RRUGL
QDWLRQ&HQWUHV(0&&RUWKH)LUHDQG5HVFXH&RRU
GLQDWLRQ&HQWUHV)5&&ZLWKWKHVXEVHTXHQWDFWLYD
WLRQRI WKH UHVSHFWLYH UHVFXH UHVRXUFHV2WKHU UHVFXH
RUJDQL]DWLRQVDUHFDOOHGRXWWRHPHUJHQFLHVWKDWFDQQRW
EH KDQGOHG VROHO\ E\ WKH GHGLFDWHG HPHUJHQF\ VHU
YLFHV,QWKHFDVHRIURDGUHODWHGDYDODQFKHLQFLGHQWV
YROXQWHHUUHVFXHUVSRVVHVVWKHPDQSRZHUDQGWHFKQLFDO
UHVFXHH[SHUWLVH7KHVHUHVRXUFHVDUHFDOOHGRXWWRDV
VLVWLQUHVFXHPDQDJHPHQWDYDODQFKHULVNDVVHVVPHQW
VHDUFKLQJRIWKHDYDODQFKHGHEULVH[FDYDWLRQILUVWDLG
WUHDWPHQWDQGHYDFXDWLRQRIYLFWLPV,QDOOSKDVHVDOW
KRXJKLQGHSHQGHQWDVRUJDQL]DWLRQVWKH\IDFHLQWHUGH
SHQGHQFLHVLQWKHLUDFWLRQVWRFDUU\RXWOLIHVDYLQJUHV
FXHDFWLYLWLHV
7KH VDIHW\ DQDO\VLV SUHVHQWHG LQ WKLV DUWLFOH FRQWDLQV
GRFXPHQWDQDO\VLVRIJRYHUQLQJGRFXPHQWVDQGOLW
HUDWXUH IUDPLQJ WKH DYDODQFKH UHVFXH VHUYLFH DQG
WZRGLVWLQFWVHPLQDUVZLWKQDWLRQDOH[SHUWVRQRSHU
DWLYHUHVFXHPLVVLRQV7KHDLPVRIWKHVDIHW\DQDO\
VLVZHUHWR
 ,GHQWLI\ JRDOV KD]DUGV UHTXLUHPHQWV DQG FRQ
VWUDLQWV
'HULYHWKHVDIHW\FRQWUROVWUXFWXUHRIWKH1RUZHJLDQ
DYDODQFKHUHVFXHVHUYLFH)LJ
,GHQWLI\UHFXUUHQWXQVDIHFRQWURODFWLRQVLQWKH1RU
ZHJLDQDYDODQFKHUHVFXHV\VWHP
(YDOXDWH67$03DQG673$DVPHWKRGVIRUDQDO\V
LQJULVNDQGVDIHW\LQWKH1RUZHJLDQDYDODQFKHUHV
FXHVHUYLFH

 0HWKRGRORJ\
 6WXG\GHVLJQ
:HLQYLWHGVL[1RUZHJLDQH[SHUWVWRDQDO\VHVDIHW\IRU
UHVFXHUVLQDYDODQFKHUHVFXHRSHUDWLRQV,QWZRVHPL
QDUVDWWKH&HQWUHIRU6RFLHWDO6DIHW\LQ5RJDODQG1RU
ZD\LQGHSWKGLVFXVVLRQVZHUHEDVHGRQWKUHHKLVWRULF
1RUZHJLDQDYDODQFKHUHVFXHRSHUDWLRQVLQDFURVVFDVH
VWUDWHJ\RIDQDO\VLV.KDQ	9DQ:\QVEHUJKH
7KHVHRSHUDWLRQVZHUH
x $YDODQFKH KLWWLQJ D URDG LQ*\DGDOHQ5RJDODQG
$VQRZSORXJKWUXFNZDVDYDODQFKHGLQWRD
ODNHLQDKLJKDYDODQFKHULVNDUHDDQGUHVFXHXQLWV
ZHUHGHSOR\HGGXULQJWKHQLJKWLQGDUNQHVVDQGDG
YHUVHZHDWKHUFRQGLWLRQV
x $YDODQFKHKLWWLQJDURDGDW.DWWIMRUGHLGHW7URPV
3DUNHGFDUVZHUHKLWE\DYDODQFKHVLQDSRS
XODU EDFNFRXQWU\ VNLLQJ DUHD DQG VHYHUDO QHLJK
ERXULQJ DYDODQFKHV GHVFHQGHG GXULQJ WKH VHDUFK
DQGUHVFXHRSHUDWLRQ
x $YDODQFKHDFFLGHQWLQ$XUODQG6RJQRJ)MRUGDQH
 $ EDFNFRXQWU\ VNLHU ZDV IDWDOO\ LQMXUHG
ZKHQDYDODQFKHGGRZQDVWHHSJXOO\DQGPXOWLSOH
KHOLFRSWHUV DQG RWKHU UHVFXH UHVRXUFHV ZHUH GH
SOR\HGLQWKHDUHD
7KHVHRSHUDWLRQVGHPRQVWUDWHGVSHFLILFFKDOOHQJHVUH
ODWHGWRERWKUHVFXHUDQGSDWLHQWVDIHW\7KHDVVXPS
WLRQZDVWKDWXQGHVLUDEOHLQFLGHQWVFRXOGEHOLQNHGWR
D ODFNRIFRQWURORIDFWLYLWLHVDWYDULRXV OHYHOV LQ WKH
UHVFXHPDQDJHPHQWKLHUDUFK\
7KH VHPLQDUV ZHUH VWUXFWXUHG WR FRPSO\ ZLWK WKH
67$03DSSURDFK/HYHVRQSXVLQJWKH
673$WHFKQLTXH7KHH[SHUWVKDGQRSULRUWUDLQLQJLQ
67$03EDVHGVDIHW\DQDO\VLV 7KHILUVWVHPLQDUIR
FXVHGRQDSUHOLPLQDU\KD]DUGDQDO\VLVDQGWKHVDIHW\
FRQWURO VWUXFWXUH 7KH PRGHUDWRU WKH ILUVW DXWKRU
VWDUWHGE\LQWURGXFLQJWKHJURXSWRWKH67$03PHWK
RGRORJ\DQGWKHWKUHHFDVHV7KHVHFRQGVHPLQDUZDV
DVWHSZLVHDQGGHWDLOHGKD]DUGDQDO\VLVEDVHGRQWKH
673$DFFLGHQWDQDO\VLVWHFKQLTXH
 6HOHFWLRQDQGGDWDFROOHFWLRQ
'XULQJWKHVDIHW\DQDO\VHVDOOOHYHOVRIWKHDYDODQFKH
UHVFXHV\VWHPZHUHUHSUHVHQWHGDSDUWIURPWKH/5&&
/XQGHDQG1MnVXEPLWWHGWRSafety ScienceRQ-XO\  3DJHRI
$QLQFLGHQWFRPPDQGHU,&IURPWKHSROLFHDQVZHUHG
IRUWKLVFRQWUROOHU7KHJURXSYDULHGEHWZHHQWKHWZR
VHPLQDUV WKH,&OHYHOZDVDEVHQWDW WKHILUVWDQGWKH
-5&&OHYHOZDVDEVHQWDWWKHVHFRQGVHPLQDU
7KHVHPLQDUVWRRNSODFHLQ1RYHPEHUDQG)HE
UXDU\(DFKVHPLQDUODVWHGKRXUV7KHGDWD
FROOHFWLRQ UHVHPEOHG IRFXVJURXS LQWHUYLHZV“to ex-
plore specific topics, and individuals` views and expe-
riences, through group interaction”/LWRVVHOLWL
S,QERWKVHPLQDUVWKHPRGHUDWRUJXLGHGWKHGLV
FXVVLRQ WR FRYHU WKH QHFHVVDU\ VWHSV LQFOXGHG LQ WKH
67$03DSSURDFK3ULRU WR WKH VHPLQDUV WKHSDUWLFL
SDQWVZHUHVXSSOLHGZLWKEDFNJURXQGLQIRUPDWLRQDQG
WRROVSHUWDLQLQJWRWKH67$03DSSURDFKLQFOXGLQJD
SUHOLPLQDU\ VDIHW\ FRQWURO VWUXFWXUHRI WKH DYDODQFKH
UHVFXH VHUYLFH7KH OHYHO RI GHWDLO RI DQDO\VLV FRUUH
VSRQGHGWRZKDWFRXOGEHLGHQWLILHGDWWKHQRUPDOKL
HUDUFKLFDOOHYHOVLQWKHUHVFXHVHUYLFH
:HWDSHUHFRUGHGERWKVHPLQDUVWRVXSSRUWWUDQVFULS
WLRQDQGVXPPDU\7KHPDWHULDOZDV WUDQVFULEHG LP
PHGLDWHO\ DIWHU WKH LQWHUYLHZV DQG WKH HOHFWURQLF
VRXQGILOHVZHUHGHOHWHG7KHZULWWHQUHSRUWVFRQVLVWHG
RIVKRUWVXPPDULHVLQFRPELQDWLRQZLWKIXOOWUDQVFULS
WLRQV)ROORZLQJZULWHXSWKHUHSRUWVZHUHVHQWWRWKH
LQGLYLGXDOLQWHUYLHZHHVIRUFRPPHQWVDQGYDOLGDWLRQ
LQ OLQH ZLWK 3UXGHQFH 3OXPPHU'
$PDWRV PHPEHU
FKHFNLQJ WR HQKDQFH FUHGLELOLW\ DQG WUXVWZRUWKLQHVV
 &RPPHQWV ZHUH LPSRUWHG LQ WKH ILQDO WUDQ
VFULSWLRQV7KHUHSRUWVIRUPHGWKHEDVLVIRUIXUWKHUGLV
FXVVLRQVDQGDQDO\VHV
 $QDO\VLV
,QWKHZULWWHQUHSRUWIURPWKHILUVWVHPLQDUDOOVWDWH
PHQWVPDGHE\WKHVHPLQDUSDUWLFLSDQWVZHUHFDWHJR
UL]HG DFFRUGLQJ WR 67$03 WHUPLQRORJ\ HJ JRDOV
KD]DUGV ORVV HYHQWV UHTXLUHPHQWV FRQVWUDLQWV FRQ
WUROOHUXQVDIHFRQWURODFWLRQDQGVFHQDULRV7KLVZDV
GRQHE\FRORXUFRGLQJDQGUHDUUDQJHPHQWRIWKHWH[WWR
IRUPFOXVWHUVRIVLPLODU67$03VWDWHPHQWV,QWKLVDS
SURDFK DOO VWDWHPHQWV XWWHUHG GXULQJ WKH GLVFXVVLRQV
ZHUHXVHGDVDSDUWRIWKHDQDO\VLVLUUHVSHFWLYHRIFKUR
QRORJ\RUWRSLFLQTXHVWLRQ7KHVWDWHPHQWVZHUHWKHQ
UHSKUDVHG LQWRKD]DUGV V\VWHP UHTXLUHPHQWV FRQWURO
DFWLRQV IHHGEDFN DQG HOHPHQWV RI WKH VDIHW\ FRQWURO
VWUXFWXUH
,QWKHVHFRQGVHPLQDUW\SLFDO67$03WDEOHVDQGILJ
XUHVZHUHSUHVHQWHGRQVFUHHQWRVXSSRUWWKHGLVFXVVLRQ
DQGHQVXUHDVWUXFWXUHGDSSURDFK$VWKHDQDO\VLVSUR
JUHVVHG ILQGLQJVZHUH DGGHG GLUHFWO\ WR WKH LOOXVWUD
WLRQVRQVFUHHQDQG ODWHU LQFOXGHG LQ WKH VHPLQDU UH
SRUWV7KHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQDQGWUDQVIHURIVWDWHPHQWVLQWR
WKH673$DQDO\VLVZDVGRQH E\ WKH ILUVW DXWKRU LQ D
GLDORJXHZLWKWKHH[SHUWV

 5HVXOWV
7KH VDIHW\ DQDO\VLV SURYLGHGVSHFLILF JRDOV KD]DUGV
UHTXLUHPHQWVDQGFRQVWUDLQWVZKLFKFDQEHPDGHDS
SOLFDEOH WR WKH 1RUZHJLDQ DYDODQFKH UHVFXH VHUYLFH
ZHUHIHUWR$SSHQGL[$,QWKLVVHFWLRQZHFRQFHQWUDWH
RQWKHVDIHW\FRQWUROVWUXFWXUHRIWKHDYDODQFKHUHVFXH
VHUYLFHDQGWKHFRQWUROORRSVLQYROYHGLQWKHGLVSDWFK
RIUHVFXHUHVRXUFHVDQGWKHVDIHJXDUGLQJRISDWLHQWDQG
UHVFXHUVDIHW\:HFRQVLGHUHGWZRFRQWURODFWLYLWLHVWR
EHFULWLFDOWRUHDFKLQJWKHJRDORIVDIHDQGHIILFLHQWUHV
FXHSHUIRUPDQFH
x JRCC/LRCC/EMCC/FRCC:,QLWLDODVVHVVPHQWRIWKH
YLFWLPCVVLWXDWLRQDQGDYDODQFKHULVNLQWKHDUHDEDVHG
RQ LQIRUPDWLRQ IURP WKH UHSRUWLQJZLWQHVV DQG DGGL
WLRQDOLQYHVWLJDWLRQVDQGVXEVHTXHQWGHFLVLRQRQUHV
FXHUHVSRQVHDVLWXDWLRQVSHFLILFGLVSDWFKDQGSULRUL
WL]DWLRQRIUHVFXHUHVRXUFHV
x Rescue unit leaders:,QLWLDODVVHVVPHQWRIUHVFXHVLWX
DWLRQEDVHGRQLQIRUPDWLRQIURPGLVSDWFKFHQWUHVDQG
DGGLWLRQDOLQYHVWLJDWLRQVDQGVXEVHTXHQWGHFLVLRQRQ
UHVFXH UHVSRQVH PRELOL]DWLRQ RI DGHTXDWHO\ WUDLQHG
DQGSURSHUO\HTXLSSHGUHVFXHUV
7KHVDIHW\FRQWUROVWUXFWXUHVUHODWHGWRWKHDFWLYLWLHVRI
WKHGLVSDWFKDQGSULRULWL]DWLRQRIDYDODQFKHUHVFXHUH
VRXUFHVDUHSUHVHQWHGLQ)LJXUH
/XQGHDQG1MnVXEPLWWHGWRSafety ScienceRQ-XO\  3DJHRI

)LJXUH&RQWUROOHUVDQGFRQWUROORRSVLQYROYHGLQGLVSDWFKRIDYDODQFKHUHVFXHUHVRXUFHV7KHDUURZVLQGLFDWHFRQWURODFWLRQV
DQGIHHGEDFNORRSV7KHEOXHGRWWHGOLQHHQFORVHVWKHFRQWUROOHUVDQGDFWXDWRUVLQYROYHGLQDYDODQFKHUHVFXHRSHUDWLRQV,QLWLDO
ULVNDVVHVVPHQW³UHG´RU³JUHHQ´LQWKHERWWRPER[UHIHUVWRWKHFRQFOXVLRQDQGIUDPLQJRIWKHPLVVLRQ³UHG´LVFRQVLGHUHGD
FRPSOH[ DQG ULVN\ PLVVLRQ ZKHUHDV ³JUHHQ´ LV FRQVLGHUHG D VWUDLJKWIRUZDUG PLVVLRQ ZLWKRXW QRWLFHDEOH ULVN WR UHVFXHUV
.ULVWHQVHQHWDO/XQGH	.ULVWHQVHQ$EEUHYLDWLRQV-5&&-RLQW5HVFXH&RRUGLQDWLRQ&HQWUH/5&&/RFDO
5HVFXH&RRUGLQDWLRQ&HQWUH(0&&(PHUJHQF\0HGLFDO&RRUGLQDWLRQ&HQWUH)5&&)LUHDQG5HVFXH&RRUGLQDWLRQ&HQWUH
+(06+HOLFRSWHU(PHUJHQF\0HGLFDO6HUYLFH6$5+HOLFRSWHU$LUIRUFHRSHUDWHG6HDUFKDQG5HVFXHKHOLFRSWHU
:HQRWLFHIURP)LJXUHWKDWYROXQWHHUUHVFXHUVFDQEH
GLVSDWFKHG IURP DW OHDVW WZR GLIIHUHQW FRQWUROOHUV
-5&&DQG/5&&,PSRUWDQWILUVWUHVFXHUHVSRQGHUV
OLNH WKH DLU UHVFXH KHOLFRSWHUV DQG +(06 DUH GLV
SDWFKHGIURPRWKHUFRQWUROOHUV-5&&RU(0&&WKDQ
WKH/5&&7KH/5&&VGRFRQWUROWKHSROLFHKHOLFRSWHU
VWDWLRQHGLQ2VOREXWWKLVUHVRXUFHLVDQLQIUHTXHQWUH
VSRQGHULQDYDODQFKHDFFLGHQWVDQGWKHUHIRUHOHIWRXW
RI WKLV ILJXUH7KH -5&&KDV WKH ILQDO VD\RQZKLFK
KHOLFRSWHU UHVRXUFHVDUH WREHGLVSDWFKHG WR WKHDFFL
GHQWVLWH+RZHYHUDYDODQFKHDFFLGHQWVDUHFRQVLGHUHG
WR EH PHGLFDO HPHUJHQFLHV ZKLFK DUH KDQGOHG E\
(0&&VRQDQLQGHSHQGHQWEDVLV)LUHDQGUHVFXHXQLWV
DUHGLVSDWFKHGIURPWKH)5&&XVXDOO\RQUHTXHVWIURP
WKH/5&&7KH ILUVW FDOO IURPYLFWLPVRUE\VWDQGHUV
PD\JR WRHLWKHURI WKH WKUHHHPHUJHQF\FDOO FHQWUHV
)5&&/5&&(0&&RUGLUHFWO\
WR WKH-5&&6WDQGDUGSURFHGXUHVUHTXLUH LPPHGLDWH
PXWXDOH[FKDQJHRILQIRUPDWLRQEHWZHHQWKHFRRUGLQD
WLRQFHQWUHV

  5HVSRQVLELOLW\DQGJDSDQDO\VLV±ILQGLQJV
)ROORZLQJ WKH LGHQWLILFDWLRQ RI V\VWHP UHTXLUHPHQWV
WKH DQDO\VLV JURXS GLVFXVVHG ZKHWKHU DQ\ RI WKH UH
TXLUHPHQWVDUHQRWSXWLQWRDFWLRQ,PSRUWDQWSRLQWVWR
FRQVLGHUZHUH-RKQVRQ/HYHVRQ
x :KRLVUHVSRQVLEOHIRUZKLFKV\VWHPUHTXLUH
PHQWV DQG DUH DQ\ UHTXLUHPHQWV QRW EHLQJ
LPSOHPHQWHGPHWRUFRQWUROOHG"
x ,VWKHVDIHW\FRQWUROVWUXFWXUHFRQJUXHQWZLWK
H[LVWLQJRUQHZUHTXLUHPHQWV"
x 'RZH REVHUYH XQFHUWDLQWLHV LQ FRRSHUDWLRQ
DQGFRPPXQLFDWLRQGXHWRIODZHGFRRUGLQD
WLRQ"
x $UHWKHUHPXOWLSOHFRQWUROOHUVFRQWUROOLQJWKH
VDPHSURFHVV"

 'LVSDWFKHUV DQG HPHUJHQF\ SHUVRQQHO ODFN
WUDLQLQJDQGDYDODQFKHVDIHW\HTXLSPHQW
7KHPDLQILQGLQJZDVWKDWLPSRUWDQWFRQWUROOHUVDWWKH
/5&&DQG WKH(0&& DQG IUHTXHQW ILUVW UHVSRQGHUV
IURP WKH HPHUJHQF\ VHUYLFHV DUH QRW SURYLGHGZLWK
SURSHUWUDLQLQJDQGHTXLSPHQWIRUDYDODQFKHUHVFXH

 &RRUGLQDWLRQULVN
7KH-5&&(0&&/5&&DQG)5&&DUHDOOLQDSRVL
WLRQWRVFUDPEOHDQGFRRUGLQDWHERWKDLUDQGRUVRPH
RIWKHVDPHWHUUHVWULDOUHVFXHUHVRXUFHV7KLVFRXOGUH
/XQGHDQG1MnVXEPLWWHGWRSafety ScienceRQ-XO\  3DJHRI
VXOW LQPLVXQGHUVWDQGLQJV DERXW FRQWURO UHVSRQVLELOL
WLHVPLVVLQJIHHGEDFNDQGLQWHUUXSWLRQRIWKHFRQWURO
ORRSRUFRQIOLFWLQJFRQWURODFWLRQV,QDGHTXDWHFRRUGL
QDWLRQFRXOGUHVXOWIURPGHOD\VLQWKHPXWXDOH[FKDQJH
RI LQIRUPDWLRQPLVVLQJRU ODWHQRWLILFDWLRQVEHWZHHQ
FRQWUROFHQWUHVDERXWDYDODQFKHHPHUJHQF\FDOOVODFN
RI LQIRUPDWLRQ LQ WKH VWDUWXS SKDVH DQG WHFKQLFDO
VKRUWFRPLQJVLQFRPPXQLFDWLRQFKDQQHOV
8QVDIHFRQWURODFWLRQV
7KHSRWHQWLDOXQVDIHFRQWURODFWLRQV8&$VWHPIURP
WKHKD]DUGVDQGV\VWHPUHTXLUHPHQWVDQGDVHOHFWLRQ
LVSUHVHQWHGLQ7DEOH,QWKLVWDEOHZHOLQNHGWKHFRQ
WURO DFWLRQV WR FRPPRQ³PDQDJHULDO FRQWURO DFWLRQV´
+HOIHULFK7KHFRQWURODFWLRQVDUHJHQHUDOL]HG
WRHQFRPSDVVVHYHUDOFRQWUROOHUV:HGLGQRWDOORFDWH
WKHVHKD]DUGVWRVSHFLILFHYHQWVRUVFHQDULRV
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
/XQGHDQG1MnVXEPLWWHGWRSafety ScienceRQ-XO\  3DJHRI
7DEOH6HOHFWVXPPDU\RI673$VWHS7KH1RUZHJLDQDYDODQFKHUHVFXHVHUYLFHEDVHGRQWKHLGHQWLILHGKD]DUGV7KHWDEOH
LVEDVHGRQ+HOIHULFK



/XQGHDQG1MnVXEPLWWHGWRSafety ScienceRQ-XO\  3DJHRI
&DXVDODQDO\VLV±673$VWHS
7KH DQDO\VLV GLVFORVHG WKDW PDQ\ XQVDIH FRQWURO DF
WLRQV VKDUHGFRPPRQFDXVHVRIZKLFK WKHPRVW IUH
TXHQWZDVLQDGHTXDWHFRQWURODOJRULWKPV,Q)LJXUH
ZHSUHVHQWWKHDQDO\VLVRIWKH8&$“Dispatch incom-
petent and unequipped personnel in infrastructure re-
lated avalanche rescue operations” 7KLV 8&$ IUH
TXHQWO\OHDGVWRVLWXDWLRQVZKHUHILUVWUHVSRQGLQJUHV
FXHXQLWVIURPWKHDPEXODQFHVHUYLFH WKHSROLFHDQG
ORFDOILUHDQGUHVFXHGHSDUWPHQWVDUHH[SRVHGWRKLJK
DYDODQFKHGDQJHURQSXEOLFURDGV)LJXUHVKRZVWKH
FRQWUROOHUVFRQWUROORRSVDQGSRVVLEOHFRQWUROIODZVLQ
YROYHGLQWKHGLVSDWFKRIUHVFXHUHVRXUFHV

)LJXUH &RQWURO IODZV UHODWHG WR WKH XQVDIH FRQWURO DFWLRQV 8&$“Dispatch incompetent and unequipped personnel in 
infrastructure related avalanche rescue operations”7KH ILJXUH LVEDVHGRQ WKHFRQWURO ORRSSUHVHQWHG LQ /HYHVRQ
/HYHVRQ	7KRPDVDQG7KRPDV$EEUHYLDWLRQV-5&&-RLQW5HVFXH&RRUGLQDWLRQ&HQWUH/5&&/RFDO5HVFXH
&RRUGLQDWLRQ&HQWUH(0&&(PHUJHQF\0HGLFDO&RRUGLQDWLRQ&HQWUH)5&&)LUHDQG5HVFXH&RRUGLQDWLRQ&HQWUH

  'LVFXVVLRQ
 )DLOLQJDVVXPSWLRQV
:KHQ ORRNLQJ DW WKH VWUXFWXUH DQG KLHUDUFK\ RI WKH
1RUZHJLDQ DYDODQFKH UHVFXH VHUYLFH VDIHW\ VKRXOG
HPHUJH IURPQRUPDORSHUDWLRQV LH V\VWHPDWLFFRQ
WLQXRXVDQGWUDQVSDUHQWDYDODQFKHULVNDVVHVVPHQWDQG
PDQDJHPHQWDFWLYLWLHVLQDOOFRPSRQHQWVRIWKHUHVFXH
V\VWHP /HYHVRQ  S  7KH H[SHUWV LQ WKLV
VWXG\PDLQWDLQWKDWWKLVTXDOLW\UHTXLUHVVSHFLILFWUDLQ
LQJDQGFRPSHWHQF\DWDOOOHYHOV6\VWHPDWLFDYDODQFKH
UHVFXHWUDLQLQJLVQRWFRPPRQLQWKHRUGLQDU\WHUUHV
WULDO HPHUJHQF\ VHUYLFHV DQG RQO\ VHOGRP GR WKH\
EULQJDYDODQFKHVDIHW\HTXLSPHQW7KLVILQGLQJSRLQWV
WRDVHULRXVJDSEHWZHHQWKHDVVXPSWLRQZKLFKLVH[
SUHVVHG E\ LQVWUXFWLRQV 5HJMHULQJHQ  
JXLGHOLQHV155WKHLGHQWLILHGVDIHW\UHTXLUH
PHQWV DQG WKH VDIHW\ FRQWURO VWUXFWXUH DQG ZKDW LV
FRPPRQDYDODQFKHUHVFXHSUDFWLFHLQ1RUZD\,WDOVR
GHYLDWHVIURPWKHUHJXODWLRQVODLGGRZQLQWKH1RUZH
JLDQ“Working Environment Act”6HFWLRQ6SHFLDO
VDIHW\ SUHFDXWLRQV )RXJQHU 	 +ROR 
5HJMHULQJHQVWDWLQJWKDWHPSOR\HHVDUH“to re-
ceive the necessary training, practice and instruc-
tion” WKDW VXSHUYLVRUV FRQWUROOHUV PXVW KDYH “the 
necessary competence to ensure that the work is per-
formed in a proper manner with regard to health and 
safety”WKHHPSOR\HUPXVWHQVXUHFDOORXWRI“expert 
assistance, when this is necessary”DQGWKDW“satisfac-
tory personal protective equipment is made available 
to the employees”,DQGthat “the employees are trained 
in the use of such equipment and that the equipment is 
used”7KHDVVXPSWLRQLVWKDWDYDODQFKHHPHUJHQFLHV
/XQGHDQG1MnVXEPLWWHGWRSafety ScienceRQ-XO\  3DJHRI
DUH KDQGOHG E\ WUDLQHG DQG IXOO\ HTXLSSHG UHVFXHUV
IURPEHJLQQLQJWRHQG7KHUHDOLW\LVWKDWWKHILUVWDQG
PRVWFULWLFDOSKDVHRIWKHVHUHVFXHRSHUDWLRQVLVRIWHQ
KDQGOHGE\XQWUDLQHGDQGXQHTXLSSHGSHUVRQQHOIURP
WKHHPHUJHQF\VHUYLFHV,QH[FHSWLRQDOFDVHVORFDODQG
LQGLYLGXDO LQLWLDWLYHV KDYH OHG WR D KLJKHU GHJUHH RI
HPHUJHQF\SUHSDUHGQHVV
7KH1RUZHJLDQ“National Guidelines for Avalanche 
Rescue Operations”155FRQWDLQUHFRPPHQ
GDWLRQVUHJDUGLQJWUDLQLQJFRPSHWHQF\DQGVDIHW\SUR
FHGXUHV$ODFNRIFRPSOLDQFHZLWKWKHVDIHW\UHTXLUH
PHQWV GHPRQVWUDWHV D ODFN RI FRQWURO ZKLFK LQ WKLV
FDVHPHDQVWKDWXQWUDLQHGUHVFXHUVIUHTXHQWO\HQGXS
LQDYDODQFKH UXQRXW]RQHVZLWKRXW VDIHW\HTXLSPHQW
XQGHVLUDEOH LQFLGHQWV $QGUHZ +RSNLQV  SS
GLVFXVVHVWKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRI“prescriptive 
technical rules” DQGFRQFOXGHV UHJDUGLQJ WKHDSSUR
SULDWHQHVVRIVXFKUXOHV“First, where industry good 
practice is agreed, it makes sense to formulate it as a 
clear rule so that laggards can be forced into line”
7KHQDWLRQDOJXLGHOLQHVIRUDYDODQFKHUHVFXHGHVFULEH
LQWHUQDWLRQDOEHVWSUDFWLFHDQGDUH DV VXFKSUHVFULS
WLYHLQWKHLULQWHQWLRQV7RUHJDLQFRQWUROLHWRUHGXFH
XQGHVLUDEOH LQFLGHQWVDOODFWRUV LQ WKHUHVFXH VHUYLFH
QHHGWRGHPRQVWUDWHFRPSOLDQFHZLWKODZVUHJXODWLRQV
DQGUHFRPPHQGDWLRQVV\VWHPUHTXLUHPHQWVDQGFRQ
VWUDLQWVDQGFRQVLGHUWKHPSUHVFULSWLYHUXOHV7KLVLV
DOVRWKHEDVLVIRUWKH67$03DSSURDFK
$QRWKHUDVVXPSWLRQLVWKDW WKHSROLFHKLHUDUFKLFDOO\
DUHPHDQWWRDFWDVDFRQWLQXRXVFRQWUROOHUDWPXOWLSOH
PDQDJHULDO OHYHOV LQ WKH UHVFXH VHUYLFH 7KH UHVXOWV
IURPWKLVVWXG\LQGLFDWHWKDWWKH\GRQRWPHHWWKHH[
SHFWDWLRQV ODLG GRZQ LQ LQVWUXFWLRQV 5HJMHULQJHQ
DQGJXLGHOLQHV1557KLVFRQWULE
XWHVWRDGHILFLHQWFRQWURORIUHVFXHRSHUDWLRQVLQWKH
FULWLFDOILUVWKRXUDQGDVXERSWLPDOGLVSDWFKDQGSULRU
LWL]DWLRQRIUHVFXHUHVRXUFHVFRXOGDIIHFWWKHVXUYLYDO
FKDQFHV RI DYDODQFKH YLFWLPV /XQGH 	 7HOOHIVHQ


 &RRUGLQDWLRQULVN
7KHVDIHW\FRQWUROVWUXFWXUHVLQ)LJXUHVDQGGHPRQ
VWUDWH WKH FRPSOH[LW\RI WKH UHTXLUHG FRRUGLQDWLRQ LQ
DYDODQFKHUHVFXHRSHUDWLRQV:HVHHPXOWLSOHFRQWURO
OHUVRYHUODSSLQJDQGERXQGDU\DUHDVRIUHVSRQVLELOLW\
DQGFRPSOLFDWHGFRPPXQLFDWLRQOLQHV$YDODQFKHDF
FLGHQWV UHTXLUH VKRUW UHVSRQVH WLPHV %UXJJHU HW DO
VRWKHGLVSDWFKRIUHVFXHUHVRXUFHVLVWREHHI
IHFWXDWHGFRQVHFXWLYHO\DQGLQDSULRULWL]HGRUGHUIURP
WKHYDULRXVGLVSDWFKFHQWUHV:HVHHWKUHHFKDOOHQJHV
WKDWPD\DULVHIURPDVLWXDWLRQZKHUHPXOWLSOHUHVFXH
UHVRXUFHV DUH GLVSDWFKHG IURP PXOWLSOH GLVSDWFKHUV
)LUVWO\WKHFRQWURODOJRULWKPVPD\GLIIHUEHWZHHQGLV
SDWFKFHQWUHVZLWKRYHUODSSLQJUHVSRQVLELOLWLHVFDXV
LQJ DPELJXLW\ DQG FRQIOLFWLQJ FRQWURO DFWLRQV
/HYHVRQS6HFRQGO\VRPHRIWKHUHVFXH
XQLWVFDQEHGLVSDWFKHGIURPVHYHUDOGLVSDWFKFHQWUHV
JLYLQJULVH WRPLVXQGHUVWDQGLQJVDERXW WKHRUGHUDQG
SULRULW\RIUHVFXHUHVRXUFHVDQGLQDGHTXDWHFRRUGLQD
WLRQWKURXJKDPELJXLW\DERXWYHUWLFDOFRRUGLQDWLRQUH
VSRQVLELOLW\ -RKQVRQS7KLUGO\ LW LV WKH
WUDYHOWLPHWKDWGHFLGHVZKLFKUHVFXHXQLWZLOOEHWKH
ILUVWWRDUULYH,WLVD“first come, first served” VLWXDWLRQ
ZKLFKLVFRQWUDGLFWRU\WRWKH“safety first”%ODQFKHU
HWDO*DUULVRQ5HJMHULQJHQDWWL
WXGH ZKLFK LV UHTXLUHG LQ KLJK DYDODQFKH ULVN VLWXD
WLRQV,QHIIHFWRSHUDWLRQDODYDODQFKHULVNDVVHVVPHQW
LVOHIWWRWKHLQGLYLGXDOUHVFXHXQLWVZLWKRQO\FULWLFDO
GHFLVLRQVWREHIRUPDOO\DSSURYHGE\WKHLQFLGHQWFRP
PDQGHUDQGWKHUHVFXHFRRUGLQDWLRQFHQWUHV7KLVLVD
V\VWHPZKLFK SODFHV IHZ FRQVWUDLQWV RQ WKH ILUVW UH
VSRQGLQJDXWRQRPRXVDQGVRPHWLPHVXQWUDLQHGUHV
FXHXQLWV
7KLVFRRUGLQDWLRQULVNPD\EHDQDO\VHGIXUWKHURQWKH
EDVLVRIIDFWRUVOLNHDFFRXQWDELOLW\SUHGLFWDELOLW\DQG
VKDUHG PHQWDO PRGHOV 2NKX\VHQ	%HFKN\ 
%RWK DFFRXQWDELOLW\ DQGSUHGLFWDELOLW\ DULVH IURP WKH
KLHUDUFKLFDOQDWXUHRIWKHUHVFXHVHUYLFHEXWFRXOGEH
LPSURYHG E\ FORVHU FRRSHUDWLRQ DQG VKDULQJ RI
NQRZOHGJHEHWZHHQFRQWUROOHUVIURPWKHGLIIHUHQWGLV
SDWFKFHQWUHV7KHVLWXDWLRQFRXOGDOVREHQHILWIURPD
VKDUSHUGHOLQHDWLRQRIDUHDVRIUHVSRQVLELOLW\
6LQFHWKHWLPHRIWKLVVWXG\WKHPXWXDOQRWLILFDWLRQEH
WZHHQHPHUJHQF\FDOOFHQWUHVDERXWVHDUFKDQGUHVFXH
VLWXDWLRQVKDVEHHQLQVWLWXWLRQDOL]HGE\DVSHFLILF“SAR 
alert”URXWLQH7KLVLVWRHQVXUHLQIRUPDWLRQH[FKDQJH
D VZLIWHU DOHUW DQG GLVSDWFK RI LPSRUWDQW UHVFXH UH
VRXUFHV DQG WR LPSURYHFRRUGLQDWLRQEHWZHHQHPHU
JHQF\FDOOFHQWUHVLQWKHLQLWLDOVWDJHVRIUHVFXHRSHUD
WLRQV

 ,QWHUDQGLQWUDFRQWUROOHUYDULDELOLW\
7KH DQDO\VLV UHYHDOV WKDW LQWUD DQG LQWHUFRQWUROOHU
YDULDELOLW\ JLYHV XQOLPLWHG FRPELQDWLRQV RI FRQWURO
OHUVDFWXDWRUVDQGFRQWH[WV,QSUDFWLFDOWHUPVDFRQ
WURODFWLRQZKLFKLVVDIHLQRQHFRQWH[WFDQEHXQVDIH
LQDQRWKHU7KRPDV	/HYHVRQGHSHQGLQJRQ
WKH H[SHUWLVH RI WKH JLYHQ IURQWOLQH UHVFXHU 6R WKH
/XQGHDQG1MnVXEPLWWHGWRSafety ScienceRQ-XO\  3DJHRI
PDQDJHPHQWRIDYDODQFKHULVNLVFRLQFLGHQWDOQRWV\V
WHPDWLF7RDYRLGKD]DUGVWKDWDULVHIURPWKHDOLJQPHQW
RIXQVDIHFRQWURODFWLRQVDQGZRUVWFDVHHQYLURQPHQ
WDO FRQGLWLRQV /HYHVRQ  S  VDIHW\ FRQ
VWUDLQWVPXVWEHLQSODFHDQGNQRZQWRDOOPDQDJHULDO
OHYHOV7KHUHLVWKHUHIRUHDQHHGWRHQJDJHDOODFWRUV
LQDFRPPRQSURFHVVRILGHQWLI\LQJEDVLFJRDOVKD]
DUGVDQGV\VWHPUHTXLUHPHQWV
,QWKLVFRQWH[WZHIDFHDUHFXUULQJFKDOOHQJHOLQNHGWR
“the collective understanding of what is dangerous, 
and how to contribute to reduce the hazards”$YHQHW
DOS:HVHHWKDWWKHSHUFHLYHGREOLJDWLRQ
RI SURIHVVLRQDO HPHUJHQF\ SHUVRQQHO WR DFW &ODUN
0\KUHUDQGD ODFNRI IRUPDODYDODQFKH
UHVFXHWUDLQLQJPD\FRQWULEXWHWRWKLVFKDOOHQJH2QH
RIWKHH[SHUWVLQWKLVVWXG\FRPPHQWHGWKDWSROLFHRI
ILFHUV PXVW DFFHSW D FHUWDLQ ULVN OHYHO LQ WKHLU GDLO\
ZRUNDQGWKDWWKH\SHUKDSVDOVRXSKROGWKLVDWWLWXGHLQ
UHVFXHRSHUDWLRQV"Yes, we see the risk involved, but 
we need to go in...".7KHUHVFXHUVCSHUFHLYHGREOLJDWLRQ
LV SUREDEO\ VWURQJHU WKDQ WKH IRUPDO REOLJDWLRQ ODLG
XSRQ WKHPVLQFHDSUHUHTXLVLWH IRU WKHGXW\ WRDFW LV
WUDLQLQJVDIHW\HTXLSPHQWDQGDUHDVRQDEOHFKDQFHRI
VXFFHHGLQJLQWKHUHVFXHHIIRUW6PLWKHWDOS
FRQFOXGHWKDWSDUDPHGLFVCGHFLVLRQVLQKLJKULVNVLW
XDWLRQVZLOOGHSHQGPRUHRQ“individual risk assess-
ment, perception of risk, and their value systems”WKDQ
IRUPDOJXLGHOLQHV,QWKHFRQWH[WRIDYDODQFKHUHVFXH
RSHUDWLRQVWKLVVWDWHPHQWLVLQVWURQJIDYRXURISURYLG
LQJDOO UHVFXHUVZLWK WKHQHFHVVDU\ WUDLQLQJDQG WRROV
IRU RSHUDWLRQDO XQFHUWDLQW\ PDQDJHPHQW /XQGH 	
%UDXW  DQG DYDODQFKH ULVN DVVHVVPHQW /LHG	
.ULVWHQVHQS155$OVRWKHLQLWLDO
IUDPLQJRIWKHPLVVLRQE\WKHHPHUJHQF\FDOOFHQWUHV
HJE\RIIHULQJ DQ LQLWLDO DVVHVVPHQWDQGFRQFOXVLRQ
DERXWPLVVLRQULVN%UQGO	(WWHU.ULVWHQVHQ
HWDO/XQGH	.ULVWHQVHQ LQ WKHULJKW
ZD\DQGLQWKHULJKWRUGHUZLOOEHOLNHO\WRLQIOXHQFH
WKH UHVFXHU¶V VLWXDWLRQDZDUHQHVVDQG ULVNSHUFHSWLRQ
3HUULQHWDO6DGOHUHWDO
$TXHVWLRQFDQEHUDLVHGUHJDUGLQJWKHDWWDLQDELOLW\RI
QRUPDWLYH PDQDJHULDO FRQVWUDLQWV LQ D G\QDPLF DQG
FRQVWDQWO\ FKDQJLQJ UHVFXH HQYLURQPHQW DV RSHUD
WLRQDO ULVN UHTXLUHV D UDQJH RI DG KRF DGDSWDEOH DS
SURDFKHV WKDWPD\ZHOO IDOO RXWVLGH SUHVFULSWLRQV ,Q
IDFWJHQHUDODQGZHOOGRFXPHQWHGLQMXQFWLRQVPD\QRW
PDNH DQ\ UHDO FRQWULEXWLRQ WR WKH VDIHW\ RI UHVFXHUV
FDXJKWE\FRQIOLFWLQJLQWHUHVWVEXWUDWKHUDFWDV“con-
nivance by management”$VK	6PDOOPDQS
)DFLQJVXFKGLOHPPDVZLWKRXWSHUWLQHQWDQGXS
GDWHGLQIRUPDWLRQRQORFDODYDODQFKHULVNWKHUHVFXHUV
PD\ UHYHUW WR WKH GDQJHURXV VWUDWHJ\ RI VXSSUHVVLQJ
XQFHUWDLQW\ WR IXOILO WKHLU WDVN /LSVKLW]HW DO
7KH UROH RI V\VWHP UHTXLUHPHQWV ZLOO EH WR IRUHVWDOO
WKHVH VLWXDWLRQVE\HQVXULQJ WKDW VDIHW\HPHUJHV DVD
SURSHUW\RIWKHDYDODQFKHUHVFXHV\VWHP±WKHRUGLQDU\
DYDODQFKH UHVFXH DFWLYLWLHV RQ DOO KLHUDUFKLFDO OHYHOV
/HYHVRQS

 6\VWHP7KHRUHWLF3URFHVV$QDO\VLVRI WKH1RU
ZHJLDQDYDODQFKHUHVFXHVHUYLFH
7KHSUDFWLFDOXVDJHRIWKHV\VWHPLFDFFLGHQWDQDO\VLV
PRGHOVLVGHEDWHG8QGHUZRRGHWDO¶VH[SHUL
HQFHZDVWKDWWKH67$03DQDO\VLVSURFHVVZDVFRP
SOLFDWHGDQGKDUGWRXQGHUVWDQG7KHVHOHFWHGDSSURDFK
WR 673$ LQ WKLV VWXG\ GLG QRW UHTXLUH WKH H[SHUWV WR
KDYHDQLQGHSWKNQRZOHGJHRIWKHDQDO\VLVWHFKQLTXH
,WGLGKRZHYHUUHTXLUHDFWLYHPRGHUDWRUVWRNHHSWKH
GLVFXVVLRQVDORQJWKHWUDFNRIWKH67$03EDVHGSUR
FHVV7KHVXEVHTXHQWWUDQVFULSWLRQDQGDQDO\VLVRIGLV
FXVVLRQVDSURFHVVUHVHPEOLQJIRFXVJURXSLQWHUYLHZV
ZDVODERULRXVEXWRIIHUHGWKHRSSRUWXQLW\WRLQFOXGHDOO
SDUWVRIWKHGLVFXVVLRQVLQWKHDQDO\VLV
7KHJURXSRIH[SHUWVIRXQGWKHPHHWLQJVLQVSLULQJUH
ZDUGLQJDQGXVHIXO7KHPDMRUSDUWRIWKHSDUWLFLSDQWV
WLPHZDVVSHQWGLVFXVVLQJWRSLFVZKLFKZHUHURRWHGLQ
WKHLUH[SHULHQFHDQGWKHWKUHHFDVHV$VH[SUHVVHGE\
RQHRIWKHH[SHUWV“It would be more inhibitory to be 
too theoretical and methodical in the approach, versus 
doing it through a slightly more open perspective – as 
it is done here”7KHH[SHUWVH[SUHVVHGFRQFHUQDERXW
WKHOHYHORIGHWDLOQHHGHGWRDQDO\VHDOOIXQFWLRQVDQG
RUJDQL]DWLRQVLQWKHUHVFXHVHUYLFH,WFRXOGDOVREHGLI
ILFXOWWRNQRZKRZWREHVWFRQWULEXWHLIQRWWRWDOO\RUL
HQWHGDERXWZKLFKVWHSLQWKH67$03SURFHVVZDVEH
LQJ GLVFXVVHG 7KH\ DOVR VWUHVVHG WKH LPSRUWDQFH RI
LQYROYLQJWHFKQLFDOVWDIIUHVFXHUVLQWKHGLVFXVVLRQV
WRHQVXUHDKROLVWLFDQDO\VLV
7KH673$DQDO\VLVSURFHVVGLUHFWHGRXUIRFXVWRZDUGV
WKH IXQFWLRQV RI WKH DYDODQFKH UHVFXH V\VWHP DQG
SRLQWHGWRLPSRUWDQWV\VWHPLFFDXVHVWRWKHLGHQWLILHG
KD]DUGV,WLVKRZHYHUFKDOOHQJLQJWRSUHVHQWWKHILQG
LQJVLQDTXLFNDQGFRKHUHQWPDQQHUVLQFHWKHUHPD\
EHVHYHUDO8&$VWKDWDUHOLQNHGWRWKHVDPHXQGHVLUD
EOHVFHQDULRV%ODQGLQH$QWRLQHDGYRFDWHVWKH
XVHRID“Step 2 Tree”WRVWUXFWXUHWKHILQGLQJVRIWKH
FDXVDODQDO\VLV7KLVUHVHPEOHVDIDXOWWUHHDQDO\VLVLQ
ZKLFKWKHVXEFDWHJRULHVRIVFHQDULRVIROORZDORJLFDO
VWUXFWXUH WR GHVFULEH KRZ XQVDIH FRQWURO DFWLRQV DUH
FUHDWHG 7KH VXEFDWHJRULHV FDQ EH ODWHU EH PDSSHG
/XQGHDQG1MnVXEPLWWHGWRSafety ScienceRQ-XO\  3DJHRI
LQWRDFRQWUROSURFHVVORRSDVVKRZQLQ)LJXUHLQWKLV
DUWLFOH
'XHWRWKHOHYHORIGHWDLO LWPD\EHUDWLRQDOWROHDYH
WKHDQDO\VLVRILQGLYLGXDOFRQWURODFWLYLWLHVWRWKHFRQ
WUROOHUVDWWKHFRUUHVSRQGLQJOHYHOVLQWKHVDIHW\FRQWURO
VWUXFWXUH 7KLVPD\ DOVR KHOS WR UDLVH WKH DZDUHQHVV
DQGFRPPLWPHQWRIWKRVHZKRDUHFORVHVWWRWKHSURE
OHP6\VWHPVWKHRU\DQG/HYHVRQ¶VDSSURDFKFKDQJH
WKHPLQGVHWIRUSHRSOHLQYROYHGLQWKHDYDODQFKHUHV
FXHVHUYLFHZKLFKLVFORVHO\UHODWHGWRUHVLOLHQFH&RQ
WLQXRXVO\ DGDSWLQJ WR UHVFXH VLWXDWLRQV DQG EHLQJ
DZDUHRIFRQVWUDLQWVDUHIHDVLEOHIRUWKHSHUVRQQHOLQ
YROYHGDQGDWWKHVDPHWLPHZLOOHQKDQFHRZQHUVKLS
RIWKHUHVFXHVDIHW\PDQDJHPHQWSURFHVV

&RQFOXVLRQ
$ V\VWHPLF DFFLGHQW DQDO\VLV RI WKH1RUZHJLDQ DYD
ODQFKH UHVFXH VHUYLFH UHYHDOHG VHYHUDO KD]DUGV UH
TXLUHPHQWVDQGFRQVWUDLQWV%DVHGRQWKHVDIHW\FRQ
WURO VWUXFWXUH RI WKH DYDODQFKH UHVFXH VHUYLFH D JDS
DQDO\VLV LGHQWLILHG IDLOLQJ DVVXPSWLRQV UHJDUGLQJ WKH
SUHSDUHGQHVV RI UHVFXHUV DQG WKH RYHUDOO FRPSOLDQFH
ZLWKUHJXODWLRQVDQGJXLGHOLQHV7KHVHJDSVFRXOGOHDG
WRXQGHVLUDEOHLQFLGHQWVLQZKLFKXQWUDLQHGDQGXQH
TXLSSHGUHVFXHUVHQGXSLQUXQRXW]RQHVGXULQJKLJK
DYDODQFKH GDQJHU /DFN RI FRPSOLDQFH ZLWK UHFRP
PHQGHGOHYHOVRIWUDLQLQJPD\DOVRLQIOXHQFHWKHGLV
SDWFKDQGSULRULWL]DWLRQRIUHVFXHUHVRXUFHVDIIHFWLQJ
SDWLHQWVDIHW\0XOWLSOHFRQWUROOHUVRYHUODSSLQJDUHDV
RIUHVSRQVLELOLW\DQGFRPSOLFDWHGFRPPXQLFDWLRQOLQHV
LPSO\DULVNIRUFRRUGLQDWLRQIODZV7KHDYDODQFKHUHV
FXHV\VWHPDOVRVKRZVJUHDWYDULDELOLW\LQFRPSHWHQF\
DQG SHUIRUPDQFH ZKLFK UHQGHUV WKHPDQDJHPHQW RI
DYDODQFKHULVNFRLQFLGHQWDOQRWV\VWHPDWLF
7KH67$03673$DSSURDFKWR6$$SURYHGWREHDQ
RYHUDOO YLDEOH DOWHUQDWLYH FRQVLGHULQJ WKDW WKH DWWHQ
WLRQ LV XQFHDVLQJO\ GLUHFWHG WRZDUGV RUJDQL]DWLRQDO
FKDOOHQJHVDWWKHEOXQWHQG7KHVHOHFWHGDSSURDFKLQ
VSLUHGE\IRFXVJURXSLQWHUYLHZVOHIW WKHSDUWLFLSDQWV
ZLWKDPSOHWLPHIRUGLVFXVVLRQVDQGOLWWOHWLPHQHHGHG
IRU6$$WUDLQLQJ$V\VWHPVWKHRU\IRFXVZKLFKSHU
PHDWHVDOOPDQDJHULDO OHYHOVFRXOGDOVRIXQFWLRQDVD
PLQGFKDQJHUIRU UHVFXHUVLQRSHUDWLYHVLWXDWLRQV LQ
FUHDVLQJ WKHDZDUHQHVVRIKRZ LQGLYLGXDODFWLRQVDI
IHFWWKHRYHUDOODYDODQFKHUHVFXHSHUIRUPDQFH

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ď͘ ,ĂƌĚĞƌĞĂŶĚƌĞďĞŐƌĞƉĞƌƐŽŵďĞƐŬƌŝǀĞƌƐĂŵŵĞĨĞŶŽŵĞŶ͍
Đ͘ ƌŽǀĞƌͲĞŶŐĂƐũĞŵĞŶƚĞƚƚĞŵĂŝ͘Ĩ͘ŵ͘ŽƉƉĚƌĂŐ͍
Ě͘ ,ĂƌĚĞƌĞŽƉƉůĞǀĚŽǀĞƌͲĞŶŐĂƐũĞŵĞŶƚŝƚũĞŶĞƐƚĞŶ͍
ŝ͘ ,ǀŽƌĚĂŶĂƌƚĞƚĚĞƚƐĞŐ͍
Ğ͘ ƌŽǀĞƌͲĞŶŐĂƐũĞŵĞŶƚŶƆĚǀĞŶĚŝŐŽŐŶǇƚƚŝŐ͍
ŝ͘ ƚŶƆĚǀĞŶĚŝŐŽĨĨĞƌĨŽƌĊŚũĞůƉĞ͍
Ĩ͘ ,ǀĂŵĞĚĚĞƚŵŽƚƐĂƚƚĞʹƵŶĚĞƌͲĞŶŐĂƐũĞŵĞŶƚ͍


 Ϯ


Ϯ͘ 'ũĞŶŬũĞŶŶĞůƐĞĂǀĨĂƌĞƚĞŐŶ;͟ƵĞͲƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶ͟Ϳ͗
Ă͘ ,ǀĂĞƌƚǇƉŝƐŬĞĨĂƌĞƚĞŐŶŝĚĞƌĞƐǀŝƌŬƐŽŵŚĞƚ͍
ŝ͘ ,ǀŽƌĚĂŶŚĂƌĚĞƌĞŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝƐĞƌƚĚŝƐƐĞĨĂƌĞƚĞŐŶĞŶĞ͍
ď͘ ,ǀŽƌĚĂŶŽŵƚĂůĞƐŽŐŚĊŶĚƚĞƌĞƐĨĂƌĞƚĞŐŶŝĚĞƌĞƐǀŝƌŬƐŽŵŚĞƚ͍
Đ͘ ƌĨĂƌĞƚĞŐŶŶŽĞƐŽŵĞŶŽƉƉĚĂŐĞƌŵĞŶƐĂŬƐũŽŶĞŶƉĊŐĊƌ͕ĞůůĞƌǀĞĚƐĞŶĞƌĞ
ƌĞĨůĞŬƐũŽŶ͍
Ě͘ KƉƉĨĂƚƚĞƐĨĂƌĞƚĞŐŶůŝŬƚŝŶŶĂĚŝŵĂŶŶƐŬĂƉĞƚ͕ƵĂǀŚĞŶŐŝŐĂǀĨĂŐďĂŬŐƌƵŶŶŽŐ
ĞƌĨĂƌŝŶŐ͍

ϯ͘ KŵĊƌƐĂŬĞƌƚŝůŽǀĞƌͲĞŶŐĂƐũĞŵĞŶƚ͍
Ă͘ ,ǀĂŵĞŶĞƌĚĞƌĞĞƌĊƌƐĂŬĞŶƚŝůŽǀĞƌͲĞŶŐĂƐũĞŵĞŶƚ͍
ŝ͘ ,ǀĂĞůůĞƌŚǀĞŵďŝĚƌĂƌƚŝůŽǀĞƌͲĞŶŐĂƐũĞŵĞŶƚ͍
ŝŝ͘ ^ƉĞƐŝĞůůĞƉĂƐŝĞŶƚĞƌͬƵůǇŬŬĞƐŽĨƌĞƐŽŵƵƚůƆƐĞƌŽǀĞƌͲĞŶŐĂƐũĞŵĞŶƚ͍
ď͘ ƌĚĞƚŶŽĞŶƐƉĞƐŝĞůůĞƐŝƚƵĂƐũŽŶĞƌƐŽŵŬĂŶƵƚůƆƐĞŽǀĞƌͲĞŶŐĂƐũĞŵĞŶƚ͍
ŝ͘ ,ĂƌĚĞƌĞŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝƐĞƌƚƐůŝŬĞƐŝƚƵĂƐũŽŶĞƌƉĊĨŽƌŚĊŶĚ͍
ŝŝ͘ ƌŵƵůŝŐŚĞƚĨŽƌŽǀĞƌͲĞŶŐĂƐũĞŵĞŶƚĞƚƚĞŵĂƵŶĚĞƌǀĞŐƐƚŝůĞƚƐŬĂĚĞƐƚĞĚ͍
Đ͘ ,ǀĂŵĞĚŽǀĞƌͲĞŶŐĂƐũĞŵĞŶƚŽŐ͟ŬŽŶŬƵƌƌĂŶƐĞ͟ŵĞůůŽŵƌĞĚŶŝŶŐƐĞŶŚĞƚĞƌ͍
Ě͘ ,ĂƌƵƚƐƚǇƌ͕ƚŝůŐũĞŶŐĞůŝŐŚĞƚŽŐŬĂƉĂƐŝƚĞƚ͕ďĞƚǇĚŶŝŶŐĨŽƌĞŶŐĂƐũĞŵĞŶƚĞƚ͍
Ğ͘ ,ǀĂŵĞĚƐŬĂĚĞƐƚĞĚĞƚƐƚŝůŐũĞŶŐĞůŝŐŚĞƚ͍
Ĩ͘ ƌĞǀĂůƵĞƌŝŶŐ͕ŐƌĂŶƐŬŝŶŐŽŐĞǀĞŶƚƵĞůůĞŬůĂŐĞƌŶŽĞĚĞƌĞƚĞŶŬĞƌƉĊǀĞĚ
ďĞƐůƵƚŶŝŶŐĞƌŽŵĊĨŽƌƚƐĞƚƚĞĞůůĞƌĊĂǀďƌǇƚĞĞƚŽƉƉĚƌĂŐ͍

ϰ͘ KŵĊĨŽƌĞďǇŐŐĞŽǀĞƌͲĞŶŐĂƐũĞŵĞŶƚŝĞŶƌĞĚŶŝŶŐƐŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƐũŽŶ
Ă͘ ,ǀĂŐũƆƌĚĞƌĞĨŽƌĊƵŶŶŐĊŽǀĞƌͲĞŶŐĂƐũĞŵĞŶƚ͍
ď͘ ,ǀĂƚƌŽƌĚĞƌĞǀŝůǀčƌĞŵĞƐƚǀŝƌŬƐŽŵƚŵĞĚƚĂŶŬĞƉĊĊƵŶŶŐĊŽǀĞƌͲ
ĞŶŐĂƐũĞŵĞŶƚ͍

ϱ͘ KŵŽǀĞƌͲĞŶŐĂƐũĞŵĞŶƚŽŐůčƌŝŶŐ
Ă͘ ƌŽǀĞƌͲĞŶŐĂƐũĞŵĞŶƚĞƚƚĞŵĂƵŶĚĞƌĚĞďƌŝĞĨŝŶŐ͍
ď͘ ƌĚĞƚŵƵůŝŐĊŐũĞŶŬũĞŶŶĞŽŐďƌǇƚĞŵĞĚŽǀĞƌͲĞŶŐĂƐũĞŵĞŶƚŵĞŶƐĚĞƚƉĊŐĊƌʹ
ĞůůĞƌůĂƌĚĞƚƐĞŐďĂƌĞĞǀĂůƵĞƌĞŝĞƚƚĞƌŬĂŶƚ;ĞƚƚĞƌƉĊŬůŽŬƐŬĂƉͿ͍
Đ͘ ƌŽǀĞƌͲĞŶŐĂƐũĞŵĞŶƚ͟ƐŵŝƚƚƐŽŵƚ͍͟
Ě͘ ƌŽǀĞƌͲĞŶŐĂƐũĞŵĞŶƚĞƚƚĞŵĂŝŽƉƉůčƌŝŶŐŽŐƚƌĞŶŝŶŐ͍


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